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

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THE THREAT OF GERMAN WORLD-POLITICS

By

HARRY PRATT JUDSON, LL.D.

Professor of International Law and Diplomacy

President of the University of Chicago

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

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THE THREAT OF GERMAN WORLD-POLITICS

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States has been driven into war with Germany by the entry of that power into a policy of piracy on the high seas. Within the area of the Atlantic Ocean, some fifteen hundred miles long and six hundred miles wide, and within nearly all of the Mediterranean Sea notification has been duly given that vessels will be sunk by German submarines without regard to nationality and without regard to the purpose of their voyage.

The joint resolution adopted by Congress in April, 1917, declared a state of war to exist with Germany. Eighteen American ships had already been sunk by German attacks, and two hundred thirty-seven Americans had been killed. The attacks were not only on vessels of the United States. Piratical raids were uniformly aimed at everybody. One-third of the Norwegian commercial marine had been destroyed. In May, 1915, the "Lusitania," a passenger ship, was sunk without warning, without giving any chance for the safety of those on board. More than one thousand persons were drowned. Over one hundred of these were Americans, many of them women and little children.

In these German attacks on neutral rights and safety there was no remote resemblance to the acts of the British navy. While it is true that American commerce with Germany was hindered and in a large measure prevented by the British naval blockade, at the same time not one American life had been lost, not one American ship had been destroyed. It was wholly a matter of property. Each claim on the British government resulting from the blockade could be settled by courts of law, and damages could be paid in money. The only immediate effect on American prosperity was perhaps that the profits of American business might be double rather than threefold what they had been before the war. Further, the question as to the unlawfulness of the British blockade at best was in doubt. Very likely a suit before a court of arbitration on that ground would have gone against the United States.

A government which does not protect the rights of its citizens on the high seas will presently have no rights left. If we permit Germany to

forbid navigation within twenty miles of the coast of Spain, presently we may expect to have that navigation forbidden twenty miles from the coast of the United States.

In short, a government which peaceably submits to such outrages will have and will deserve to have the contempt of the world.

The lawless acts of the German navy under the specific orders of the German imperial government constituted war upon the United States. The joint resolution of Congress in April did not begin war, but recognized a state of war as already existing by the act of Germany.[1]

THE DEEPER CAUSES OF THE WORLD-WAR

We now realize clearly that the world-war, however, has much deeper causes than the mere attempt to blockade the Entente Allies by a submarine campaign. This deeper cause in its essence is a world-wide piratical attack by Germany on nations which have what Germany wants. The word "piracy" is here used in a larger sense than its technical application in international and criminal law. In this larger sense it means seizing by force what belongs to another nation, whether by land or sea. We have learned that there is a scheme, the result of decades of careful and elaborate planning, for subjecting the entire world, sooner or later, to the domination of the German Empire. There is a scheme for seizing coveted lands and coveted dominion in every quarter of the globe. It is in this conflict for the liberty of the world that our country is now deeply concerned. Should the submarine policy itself be withdrawn, it would be idle for us to put a stop to hostilities. We must stay in the fight until these deeper causes of the Great War are destroyed, and until there are adequate securities against their early recurrence.

In reality, then, this war on the part of the United States is, in the first place, a war of self-defense and, in the second place, a war for the defense of all the other democracies of the world.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE AN ENEMY OF THE WORLD

The German Empire as now organized and as now administered is an enemy of the world by reason, first, of its controlling forces; by reason, secondly, of the far-reaching, piratical aims of those forces; by reason, thirdly, of the methods by which the imperial government of Germany seeks to attain these ends.

[1] "War Information Series": *How the War Came to America*, pp. 22–23.

I. THE CONTROLLING FORCES IN GERMANY

The controlling forces in question are perhaps five:

1. The first is the virtually autocratic government of the empire. The constitution of the German Empire is such that the will of the king of Prussia finds easy expression and is only with great difficulty to be resisted. While nominally a constitutional monarch, virtually he is an autocrat.

In these days monarchy is by no means always equivalent to autocracy. In the British monarchy, for instance, it is true that the king succeeds by heredity in the limits of a certain family. However, this succession was determined by act of Parliament, and act of Parliament may set aside the royal family altogether, or any king within the royal family. The British ministers and the Cabinet in England are responsible, not to the king, but to the elective House of Commons. In other words, Parliament through a freely elected House of Commons actually governs the country. The king reigns, but he does not rule. The House of Commons is chosen by what we may call universal suffrage, and in itself has the power under certain customary conditions, not merely to enact new legislation, but even to change the fundamental laws of the country. In short, the British monarchy is a real representative democracy. It is a monarchy only in name.

In Prussia the monarchy is quite different. Here the king also succeeds by heredity and in a certain family, but that succession is independent of parliament or constitution. It is claimed by the king that he succeeds by divine right and not by the will of the people. The Prussian constitution was not made by the Prussian people. It is a grant from the king, who may at any time revoke it. The Prussian ministry is responsible, not to the Prussian parliament, but to the king, who appoints and removes his ministers without regard to parliament or to the popular will. The upper house of the Prussian legislature consists of members who succeed by heredity, and of others appointed by the king. The lower house of the Prussian parliament is, to be sure, elective, but elective by the people on the three-class system. The electorate is divided into three classes according to the amount of taxes paid. The first class, electing one-third of the members, contains approximately 4 per cent of the population. The second class, electing another third of the members, contains about 14 per cent of the population. The third class, also electing one-third of the members, contains about 82 per cent of the population.

In other words, in the Prussian government the king, the hereditary nobility, and the possessors of wealth govern the country. The masses are very nearly helpless.

In the German Empire the king of Prussia, by virtue of being king of Prussia, is German emperor. The ministers are responsible to the emperor, not to the parliament, the chancellor and other members of the ministry being appointed and removed without regard to the desire of parliament or to the popular will excepting in so far as the emperor sees fit. The upper house of the parliament, the Council of the Empire, consists of the delegates appointed by the governments of the 25 states in the federal empire. In this body of 61 delegates there are 17 Prussians; that is, they are virtually appointed by the king of Prussia; and 3 others whom the German emperor, that is, the king of Prussia, controls. These delegates must vote as directed by those who appoint them. Further, no change in the fundamental law of the empire can be made against the votes of 14 members of the Council. Thus the king of Prussia, or in other words the emperor, can prevent any constitutional amendment.

The lower house of parliament—the Reichstag—is elected by universal suffrage, the electors being not less than twenty-five years of age. However, the original apportionment was made in 1871 and there has been no change since. A deputy from Berlin represents on an average about 125,000 voters, while a deputy from the districts of East Prussia, which contain the Prussian landed aristocracy, represents only about 24,000 voters. Legislation is virtually determined by the Council of the Empire, and the Council of the Empire is controlled by the emperor and by the other hereditary princes.

The German Empire is far from being a democracy, whether direct or representative. The power to declare war is in the emperor with the assent of the Council, but when the emperor sees fit to consider the war a defensive one he may declare war without the consent of the Council. That is just what happened in 1914, when the Emperor declared war—and thus is wholly responsible for bringing on the great world-war in which we are now engaged.

2. Another of the controlling forces is the Prussian military caste, arrogant, exclusive, and determined on domination.

The Prussian nobility, at least by custom, has so managed affairs that it has a practical monopoly of appointments to office in the army. In the reserve, sons of great commercial magnates are allowed minor positions, but the control of the army is for the nobles. Their power in politics, especially in eastern Prussia, owing to semi-feudal conditions

and to archaic election laws, is very great. Thus a mediaeval noble class, military and political in power, depending on the emperor for its prestige and in turn supporting the emperor as a God-given monarch, is one of the controlling forces in the German Empire, and a force sinister and baleful in the extreme. The members of this class believe implicitly in the divine right of the noble to flout the common man and of Prussianized Germany to flout the world. Arrogant, insolent, domineering, they go far to make and to keep Germany a bitter enemy to free democratic institutions through all the world.

3. Still another of the controlling forces is found in those who direct the manufacturing and commercial life of the German Empire. They are determined to spread their enterprises throughout the world, not merely by ordinary competition, but by force wherever competition in itself is not sufficient. Years ago it was said repeatedly to a thoughtful American at that time visiting in Germany that Germany must shortly have a war with the United States, the reason being that the United States had begun to attempt to secure a share in the world-markets. This attempt, it was said, must be met with cannon, because those markets belonged to Germany.

4. The fourth great controlling force is the Pan-German organizations. These organizations have been actively at work in definite form since about 1894. Their aims cover the world, and have been expressed in a series of pamphlets, articles, and books with which Germany in the last two or three decades has been flooded. While ostensibly private organizations, it is very clear that their aims are essentially the aims of the other controlling forces in the Empire, and must be reckoned with by the rest of the world, therefore, not as the mere vaporings of irresponsible individuals, but as the deliberate plan which Germany as a whole is determined on carrying out.[1]

5. Another of the ruling influences in Germany is a strange philosophy of the state which seems generally accepted. There is no law of right but that of power, if the state is a party. In short, ethics, as commonly understood in the rest of the world, in Germany apparently applies, if at all, only as between individuals. The state is not bound by any standard but its own advantage. Laws, treaties, solemn governmental engagements, cease to be binding as soon as they cease to be advantageous. Chivalry, courtesy, humanity, are of no account at all if the state otherwise orders. To be sure, this is a code of ethics which is appropriate for pirates; but it is a code which is unquestionably

[1] Chéradame, chap. i.

German today. It differs from the ethical code of the German barbarians who overran Roman civilization fifteen centuries ago only that in our times it is explicitly stated as a system of thought and conduct. Such a philosophical formulation of principles was quite beyond the Goths, or the Vandals, or Attila's Huns. Their descendants have learned phrases, but not ethical action.

II. THE PREDATORY AIM OF GERMANY

As has been said, the essential aim of the controlling forces in Germany is to dominate the entire world, both politically and commercially, by force of arms wherever necessary, by intrigue everywhere else. This is essentially, in its larger sense, piratical. It merely means that other nations have things which Germany wants, and Germany means to get those things without regard to the method.

PRUSSIAN ROBBERY FROM HER NEIGHBORS

Prussia has been a predatory nation from the first. In 1864 the Prussian government succeeded in getting Austria to combine with it to attack Denmark and to take from it the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein. Whatever might be said of the German population of Holstein and of south Schleswig, there is no doubt that a large part of the province of Schleswig was Danish, and that the population of that province is Danish to this day. It was taken from Denmark merely because Prussia wanted it and had the power to get it. In 1866 Prussia succeeded in forcing on Austria a war over the disposition of the plunder of the War of 1864, and by means of this short war Prussia annexed by force of arms other independent German domains and drove Austria totally out of the organization of Germany as a whole. In 1870 Prussia succeeded in forcing on France a war which, while ostensibly declared by France, was in fact, as we now know by the admission of Bismarck, the result of a trick of his own, he and the military authorities dominant in Prussia being determined to bring the war about. As a result of this the provinces of Alsace and eastern Lorraine, thoroughly French in feeling and by nearly two centuries of life, were torn away from France merely because Prussia wanted them and had the power to get them. At the same time Prussia imposed on France an indemnity of one thousand million dollars. This again was an extortion purely piratical in character, and was made the basis of the future military organization and ambitions of the new German Empire.

As to the economic significance of Alsace-Lorraine, the following is a clear statement of the case:

When Moltke in 1870 insisted upon, and Bismarck against his better judgment assented to, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, the main thought in their minds was that of securing a strategic frontier. They secured, though they did not know it at the time, something far more valuable than that, something that has proved the base on which Germany has built up her towering fabric of prosperity and power, something without which Germany could not have begun this war or could not have waged it for six months. They secured the largest deposit of iron ore in Europe and the second largest in the world, surpassed in value and extent only by the Lake Superior deposit in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The soil of the lost provinces has made Germany's fortunes. She has derived from it her metallurgical ascendancy, the motive power for her industries, her wealth, and as a consequence her naval, military, and political power.

The area covered by this deposit embraces the Longwy and Briey districts in France, now occupied by the German armies, and portions of German Lorraine, of Luxemburg, and of Belgium, also for the moment in German possession. If Germany could secure a peace based on her present military position the whole of this wealth of iron ore, estimated at some 5,000,000,000 tons, would pass under her control. As it is, rather more than half the deposit is supposed to lie on the French side of the border and rather less than half in German Lorraine and Luxemburg. That being so, it may be asked why Germany, when she had the chance in 1870, did not annex the entire ore-yielding area instead of allowing it to be divided between France and herself. The answer is that she would undoubtedly have done so had she realized the value of her treasure-trove. But forty-seven years ago metallurgists generally regarded phosphoric ores, which formed the greater part of the Lorraine strata, as worthless and unworkable. The Germans seized everything that in the then state of science was known to be profitable and relinquished the rest to the French. But less than five years later the mining industry was revolutionized by the discovery of a process for dephosphorizing ores. Instantly the value of the ferruginous districts annexed by the Germans was indefinitely multiplied. But at the same time the portions of the basin they had contemptuously allowed to remain in the possession of the French were redeemed at a stroke from comparative worthlessness to a rich productivity.

There are reckoned to be 2,800 million tons of iron ore in all Germany. Of these Lorraine alone is responsible for some 2,000 millions or five-sevenths of the Empire's total supply. When Germany hypothecated the Lorraine beds they were yielding about 500,000 tons of ore a year. In 1875 they still yielded less than three-quarters of a million. Then came Thomas's discovery of the dephosphorizing process and the figures shot up like a rocket until in the year before the war the Germans were extracting from Lorraine over 21,000,000 tons of ore, more than three-fifths of which was produced by the Thomas method. Up to 1903 Germany had no need to import from abroad a single ton of ore. Lorraine alone enabled her to maintain for thirty years an unprecedented industrial expansion. But whether the pace abnormally quickened some ten years before the war, or whether she had commenced to prepare for its outbreak, or whether the Lorraine ores began to deteriorate, Germany between 1903 and 1913 was buying ore abroad in increasing quantities. About one-third of her total consumption was imported from foreign countries in the year preceding the war. That

supply has, of course, for the most part been cut off, and for the past three years Germany has depended almost entirely on the Lorraine mines for the iron and steel which are the basis of all modern warfare. She has got some from the occupied districts of France and Belgium and Luxemburg, but from three-fifths to four-fifths of her output during the war has come from Lorraine. Without the production of the provinces she snatched from France forty-seven years ago Germany would long since have exhausted her capacity for turning out the material of war. Liberate those provinces from her clutch—with their 21,000,000 tons of iron ore a year, their 19,000,000 tons of iron smeltings, their 19,000,000 tons of steel smeltings, and the useful coal fields of the Sarre valley—and a long step has been taken towards binding her down to peace. . . . .

The general outline of the issue that the war is shaping and will determine thus becomes clear. Suppose Germany were to win and were to annex the greater half of the ferruginous basin that lies on French soil. Territorially, it would be a very small acquisition. Economically, its value would be inestimable. It would mean that after the war Germany would be able to raise some 46,000,000 tons of iron ore a year while the French output would be reduced to a bare 4,000,000 tons. Suppose, on the other hand, that the Allied victory is as complete as we all intend it shall be and that Alsace-Lorraine is restored to France. The situation in that case would be almost precisely reversed. France would be in a position to extract about 43,000,000 tons of ore a year, and Germany would have to remain satisfied with a maximum yield of some 8,000,000 tons. No blow could more effectually cripple German industrialism, and with it Germany's capacity to organize another war, than the loss of the Lorraine ore beds; and nothing could so certainly and so speedily re-establish the economic equilibrium of France as to regain possession of them. In the fate of Alsace-Lorraine there is involved nothing less than the industrial primacy of Europe.[1]

GERMAN CENTRAL EUROPE

The aims of the Pan-German policy are based on the control of a great Central-European dominion by Germany itself. This Central-European dominion comprises in the first place the Germanization of Austria-Hungary, first by a customs union and then by such close bonds as in the case of the North-German Zollverein, forming an intermediate step to actual Prussian political domination.

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy is a curious aggregation of territories and races united under the Hapsburg emperor. The history of this empire in the main consists of the gradual accession of the House of Hapsburg to the sovereignty over one after the other of the various elements, as duke, count, king, or what not. The union, therefore, is essentially personal in the emperor. The title of the emperor of Austria as such dates only from 1806, when the mediaeval Roman Empire was dissolved, and the head of the House of Hapsburg

[1] Sydney Brooks, "The Real Problem of Alsace-Lorraine," *North American Review*, No. 744 (November, 1917), pp. 696, 697, and 699.

assumed the new title of "Emperor of Austria." Since 1867 the monarchy has been dual in character, and the head of the House of Hapsburg reigns as emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. Each of these two portions of the joint monarchy has its own parliament and its own ministry, and there is a common ministry for war, finance, and foreign affairs. The democratic basis of the two parliaments is not substantial, and the emperor and king is able to rule without parliament or in spite of parliament whenever it seems best.

The race elements in the dual monarchy are numerous. In Austria there is a total population of approximately 28 millions; 10 millions of these are Germans, the remaining 18 millions being Slavs and Italians. In Hungary the population is approximately 20 millions. Perhaps 10 millions are Magyars, 2 millions Germans, and 8 millions Slavs and Latins. And further, in the dual monarchy the imperial provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina have a population of almost 2 millions, nearly all Serbian-Slavs.

Thus it will be seen that both in Austria and in Hungary the ruling class is a minority which imposes its will on the majority by force and by legal subtleties.[1] Of the total population in the dual monarchy of about 50 millions there are approximately 12 millions of Germans and 10 millions of Magyars, or 22 millions of the ruling classes. The remaining 28 millions include Slavs and Latins. The Slavs comprise the Cěko-Slovaks in Bohemia, Moravia, and eastern Silesia, the Poles in central and western Galicia, and the South-Slavs, including Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. The Latins include Italians in the South Tyrol and in Trieste and vicinity and Roumanians in Transylvania and Bukowina. The Cěks, or Bohemians, are a highly cultivated people, with a history rich in literature, the arts, and free government. The freedom of the Bohemian kingdom historically is as old as that of Hungary, and the desire of the Cěks has long been that the emperor of Austria should be crowned as "King of Bohemia," the ancient kingdom thus forming a third element in the monarchy, on a par with Austria and Hungary. The Galician Poles are a fragment of the ancient Polish kingdom, and represent a part of the plunder of that kingdom taken by the House of Hapsburg late in the eighteenth century. The

[1] The Austrian parliament is cunningly juggled in the membership of its lower house. At the sitting in May, 1917—the first meeting since the war broke out—a rabid Pan-German was elected to the presidency by a vote of 215 to 195—215 Germans to 195 non-Germans in a nation in which Germans are in a minority by a ratio of 10 to 18. The election law puts about an average of 42,889 Germans in a parliamentary district, while it takes about 65,479 Slavs to elect one deputy.

Roumanians and the South-Slavs are a remnant forced across the Austrian line from the old independent Serbian and Roumanian kingdoms, which were destroyed by the Turks in the late Middle Ages.

GERMAN AIMS IN THE BALKAN PENINSULA AND IN TURKEY

The next element in this Central-European dominion to be controlled by Germany lies in the Balkan Peninsula. It is quite essential that through Austria-Hungary Germany should be dominant from Austria to the Aegean Sea. This involves control of Serbia and such alliances with the other Balkan states as might easily be effected through the German princelings on their thrones, or by German intermarriage, as in the case of Greece.

The next step involves the Germanization of Turkey. In the guise of an alliance there would be a real political and economic control of that empire, which might then be exploited by German capital. Thus Germany, if this plan for a Central-European state should be carried out, would be dominant from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf.[1]

GERMAN AIMS OUTSIDE CENTRAL EUROPE

Central Europe as thus organized is the essential basis of the Pan-German plan for the domination of the rest of Europe. It was believed by the Pan-Germanists that it would be easy for Germany to crush Russia, annex Poland and the Baltic provinces, and very likely the large wheat section of the southeast, thus greatly extending German economic influence and putting an end for all time to the power of Russia in Europe. Again, in the west, if there should be objection to the German domination in Central Europe, Germany could easily crush France, annex the valuable mining and industrial region of the north, annex the Channel ports, seize Belgium, and ultimately intimidate Holland into absorption in the German Empire. This would secure for Germany the valuable ports of the North Sea, which could be made the base of her future naval supremacy, and at the same time would annex to the German Empire the large colonies of Holland and of Belgium, great areas in Africa and Asia and the Asiatic islands which Germany has long coveted. It is obvious that if this plan is carried out the next step will be the destruction of the British Empire. A base of operations in the Channel ports would make it not very difficult a few years later to throw a great army into the Island, and either seize it outright or reduce it to impotence by the exaction of an enormous indemnity.[2]

[1] Chéradame, chap. v.

[2] See Appendix A.

GERMAN AIMS IN ASIA AND AFRICA

Meanwhile, subsequent plans for the overthrow of the British Empire in India and for dominance on the China coast are all carefully worked out and on record. The seizure of Egypt would readily follow the control of Turkey, and thus in the long run Africa would become German almost as a whole. The maps found by the Boer conquerors of German Southwest Africa indicated Africa as German from the northern boundaries of the Belgian Congo colonies clear to the Cape, leaving only the little Boer republic as a German suzerainty.[1]

GERMAN AIMS IN AMERICA

The plans for Pan-German domination in the Americas are just as well known and just as obvious in their intent. The German colony in southern Brazil was expected to be a base, if need be, of military operations, and through naval and military force and through alliances it was believed that by the middle of the twentieth century at the latest Germany would control practically all the valuable parts of South America. The result as to the Panama Canal and Central America needs no comment, and the Zimmermann note makes very plain the intent of Germany, hoping to combine with Mexico and Japan to dismember the United States, and to extort from it so enormous an indemnity as to make it simply a vassal state of the world-wide German Empire.

These are not the dreams of visionaries. They are actual plans, worked out in great detail, on record, and proved beyond the possibility of doubt as the ultimate aims of the controlling forces in Germany against which the United States is now at war.[2]

III. GERMAN METHODS

The methods which are to be used and which actually have been used to secure these ends are planned with a total disregard of all the binding rules of law. The violation of treaties in the attack on Belgium and in the German policy with regard to the United States is perfectly well known. The treaty of guaranty signed by Prussia and by Austria was intended to secure Belgium from attack. Regardless of that treaty Belgium was promptly invaded when Germany went to war with France in 1914.[3] Treaties between Prussia and the United States made in 1787 and 1799 and in 1828, repeatedly held to be still binding by the governments of both countries, explicitly recognize the validity of

[1] See Appendix C. [2] See Appendix A. [3] See Appendix E.

commercial dealings between a neutral power and a belligerent in all matters of commerce, including contraband. And yet in violation of that treaty Germany proposes to destroy that commerce without warning and without regard to the innocent persons on the ship to be sunk.[1] The lawless bombardment of crowded cities which are not besieged, whereby civilians, men, women, and children, lose their lives, is another method which is contrary to all the aims and hopes of the nations parties to the Hague Conventions.

Moreover, we find the world covered by a network of German intrigue. When immigrants come to the United States, make their homes here, and become naturalized citizens, we expect them to give their absolute and unquestioned loyalty to the country of their choice. They take an oath of allegiance distinctly forswearing allegiance to the country of origin. This principle of a transfer of allegiance has been recognized, not merely in the legislation of the United States, but in treaties between the United States and other countries, with the North-German Union, the predecessor of the German Empire, for instance, in 1868. In 1913 the German parliament, however, passed an act providing that Germans who become naturalized in another country need not lose their German national character.[2] They may file their desire to retain that national character with the proper German officers, and with the consent of the German consul they may be regarded as still remaining in all respects Germans. After that they may then go through the process of naturalization, and in so doing distinctly perjure themselves. It was believed that by that method there would be in other countries a body of Germans ostensibly of those countries who yet would be primarily loyal to the country of origin, and could be counted on to influence the country of their home politically in favor of Germany, and in case of war could be counted on actually to join the German armies. Indeed, it was believed confidently that in case of war between Germany and the United States there would be a German insurrection in the central western states. These beliefs I think are entirely erroneous. Very few naturalized Germans in my opinion are not primarily loyal to the country to which they have sworn allegiance. Germany totally misunderstands the psychology of almost every other nation. But in this act of 1913, which was to take effect January 1, 1914, we can see plainly the intent, not of the Pan-German Union alone, but of the German government, to implant a source of treachery in other countries.

[1] See Appendix D.

[2] See Appendix F.

I need not dwell on the elaborate conspiracies carried on in this country under the direction of the imperial ambassadors both from Austria and from Germany in violation of the courtesy of a guest and in violation of the laws of the United States.

CONCLUSION

We are dealing, therefore, with a vast, world-wide conspiracy which has for its end the subversion in the long run of the liberty of practically every free nation, and which means, if the conspiracy succeeds, the overthrow of the independence of the United States. In other words, we are engaged in a great battle for the liberty of all free countries.

Anything short of a complete victory over the Teutonic powers will result in a mere truce, to be followed by a renewal of war within a few years. Every nation would have to arm and to keep armed. International relations would be on the one hand a series of German intrigues to divide the present Allies so as to renew the attack under more favorable auspices, and on the other hand endless attempts to frustrate such conspiracies. The whole world would be full of plots and counterplots, suspicion and fear, with the inevitable result of another bloody struggle. Assurance of a peace relatively permanent cannot depend on treaties; no treaty obligation would bind Germany or Austria-Hungary under their present ruling forces. The only safety for the world can be found in a complete victory over the Teutonic empires and in establishing as a guaranty a state of things which would make it exceedingly difficult for them to make another assault on civilization with reasonable hope of success.

APPENDIX A

WHAT GERMANY EXPECTS TO GET BY CONQUEST

Ernest Haeckel in *Das monistische Jahrhundert*, No. 31–32 (November 16, 1914), p. 657:

In my view the following fruits of victory are highly desirable for the future of Germany, and at the same time for the future of federated Continental Europe: (1) Liberation from the tyranny of England. (2) As a necessary means to this end, invasion of the British pirate state by the German navy and army, occupation of London. (3) Division of Belgium: the largest part, as far west as Antwerp and Ostend, a state in the German Empire; the northern part to Holland; the eastern part to Luxemburg—also, thus enlarged, a state in the German Empire. (4) Germany obtains a great part of the British colonies as well as the Congo state. (5) France must cede a portion of her

neighboring northeastern provinces. (6) Russia is to be made powerless by restoring the kingdom of Poland and connecting this with Austria-Hungary. (7) The German Baltic provinces revert to the German Empire. (8) Finland becomes an independent Kingdom and is to be connected with Sweden. . . . .

Petition to the Imperial Chancellor, voted June 20, 1915, at a meeting of professors, diplomatists, and higher officials in active service, held in the Künstlerhaus at Berlin. It was handed in with the signatures of 352 professors of universities and of special schools of the same rank, 158 school teachers and clergymen, 145 superior administrative officers, mayors, and city councilmen, 148 judges and advocates, 40 members of the Reichstag, 182 representatives of industry, commerce, and banking, 52 landed proprietors, and 252 artists, writers, and publishers. It was circulated only as a "strictly confidential manuscript." The full text is given in Grumbach, *Das annexionistische Deutschland*, 1917, pp. 132–40.

. . . . The military results already gained in this war at the cost of so great sacrifices should be utilized to the extreme attainable limit. This is the fixed determination of the German people.

1. *France.*—We must ruthlessly weaken this country politically and economically for the sake of our own existence, and we must improve against her our strategical position. For this purpose, according to our conviction, *a thorough improvement of our whole west front from Belfort to the coast is necessary. We must conquer as great a part as possible of the North-French Channel coast*, in order to obtain greater strategical security against England and a better outlet to the ocean. . . . .

To avoid such conditions as exist in Alsace-Lorraine *the enterprises and possessions that give economic power are to be transferred from hostile to German hands, the previous owners being taken over and compensated by France. To the part of the population that we take over no influence whatever in the Empire is to be conceded.*

We must also remember that this country has disproportionately large colonial possessions and that England can indemnify herself in these possessions if we do not anticipate her.

2. *Belgium.—We must keep Belgium firmly in our hands* as regards political and military matters and as regards economic interests. In no matter is the German nation more united in its opinion: to it the retention of Belgium is an indubitable matter of honor.

. . . . Belgium will bring us an immense increase of economic power. As regards population, she also give us an important increase, particularly if the Flemish element, which in its culture is so closely related to us, can in course of time be freed from the artificial Latinizing influences that surround it and be brought back to its Teutonic character.

. . . . *To the inhabitants of Belgium no political influence in the Empire is to be conceded; and, as in the districts to be ceded by France, the most important enterprises and landed estates are to be transferred from hostile to German hands.*

3. *Russia.*—On our eastern frontier the population of the Russian Empire is increasing at a monstrous rate—at a rate of something like two and one-half millions a year. Within a generation the population will amount to 250,000,000. Against this overwhelming preponderance on our eastern flank . . . . Germany can assert herself only if she sets up a strong barrier . . . . and if on the other hand the healthy growth of our own population is furthered by all possible means. *Such a barrier and also a basis for safeguarding the growth of our own population are to be found in the territory that Russia must cede to us.* This must be agricultural land adapted to settlement. Land that gives us a healthy peasantry, this fresh fountain of all national and political power. Land that can take over a part of our increase of population and offer to returning Germans who desire to turn their backs upon the hostile foreign world a new home in the old home. . . . . Such land, required for our physical, moral, and spiritual health, is to be found first of all in the East. . . . .

This land will also serve to defray the Russian war indemnity. . . . . *Russia is over-rich in land, and the land of which she is to cede us political control we shall demand . . . . freed for the most part from private titles.* . . . . . The Russian population is not so strongly rooted in the land as is that of Western and Central Europe. Russia itself has repeatedly transplanted large parts of its population to remote districts. . . . .

4. *England, the East, colonies, and the world across the seas.*—We admit that the blockade by which England has transformed Germany during the period of the war into a closed commercial state has taught us something. It has taught us above all that, as has been explained in the earlier sections of this memorial, we must make ourselves as independent as possible in all political, military, and economic matters, on the basis of an expanded and better-secured home territory in Europe. Similarly we must organize upon the Continent, in immediate connection with our land frontiers . . . . the broadest possible Continental economic domain. . . . . For this purpose *it is important permanently to secure Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, and Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf against Russian and English ambitions.* . . . . .

In the next place it is important to secure, in spite of England, our re-entry into the economic world beyond the seas. . . . . *In Africa we must rebuild our Colonial Empire more solidly and more strongly than before.* . . . . . Here again the importance of a permanent connection with the world of Islam makes itself felt, and also the necessity of secure passage over the seas independent of the good or ill will of England. . . . .

It has already been pointed out that we must keep Belgium firmly under our control and must also obtain as much as possible of the North French Channel coast. *It is important, besides, to break up the chain of maritime bases which England has thrown about the world or to enfeeble it by a corresponding acquisition of German bases.* Egypt, which connects English Africa with English Asia, and, with Australia as a further barrier, converts the Indian Ocean into an English lake—Egypt, which maintains the connection between

the mother-country and all its oriental colonies, is, as Bismarck expressed it, the neck of the English world-empire. . . . . There England may be struck in its most vital nerve. . . . .

5. *War indemnity.*—It is probably France that comes into consideration, primarily if not exclusively, as regards any financial indemnification for the costs of the war. *We should not hesitate, from any false humanity, to burden France as heavily as possible.* To ease the burden imposed upon her she may call upon her ally across the Channel. If the latter refuses to fulfil her duties as an ally financially, a secondary political result might be attained with which we could well be content. . . . .

6. *No policy of culture without a policy of power.*—If the undersigned, and particularly the men of science, or art, and of the church among them, should be reproached for setting up only political, economic, and perhaps social demands and forgetting the purely spiritual problems of the German future, our answer is a threefold one.

The care of the German spirit is not one of the aims of war nor one of the conditions of peace.

If, however, we are to say anything concerning the German spirit . . . . first of all, Germany must be able to live in political and economic security before it can pursue its spiritual vocation in freedom.

Finally . . . . we do not desire *a German spirit that is in danger of suffering decomposition and of working also as a decomposing agency*—a national spirit that, lacking root, is forced to seek a home in all countries, and to seek it in vain; *that must everywhere adapt itself and falsify its own nature as well as the nature of the nations that grant it hospitality.* . . . . In our demands we are seeking to gain for the German spirit a healthy body. . . . .

We are conscious of setting up goals that can be reached only through a resolute spirit of sacrifice and through most energetic diplomacy. But we invoke a saying of Bismarck's: "More than in any other domain it is true in politics that faith tangibly removes mountains, that courage and victory are not causally connected but identical."

Otto Richard von Tannenberg, *Grossdeutschland: Die Aufgabe des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, 1911, pp. 219, 220, 230, 231:

It would be the beginning of a world-empire, our first empire of the sort, if to East Africa, Cameroon, and Southeast Africa we should add Angola and the Belgian and French Congo. . . . . In the way of this first world-empire stand Portugal, France, and England. Portugal and France will be the mourners. England will not be able to hinder it. This will not be accomplished today nor tomorrow; but a day will come when Europe will settle her accounts. On that day the reservists of Nimes will go on strike, if the sons of the German heroes of Metz and of Sedan attack them in rainy weather. On that day the English Channel will be paved with French submarines of the

successful *Pluviose* type, if the German dreadnoughts bombard the French ports of the North Sea.

. . . . Our fathers have left us much to do. In compensation, *the German nation holds a position among the European Powers that permits it at once to reach its goal by a single rapid rush.* At the present time the German nation finds itself in a position similar to that of Prussia at the beginning of the reign of Frederick the Great. He raised his country to the rank of a great European Power. *It is Germany's task today to pass from the position of a European Power to that of a World-Power.*

The German people must take possession of Central Africa from the mouth of the Orange River to Lake Tchad and from the Cameroon Mountains to the mouth of the river Rovuna. They must take possession of Asia Minor, of the Malayan Archipelago in Southeastern Asia, and finally of the southern half of South America. Only then will Germany possess a colonial empire that will correspond to her actual power.

A policy of sentiment is folly. Enthusiasm for humanity is idiocy. Charity should begin among one's compatriots. Politics is business. Right and wrong are notions needed in civil life only.

The German people is always right, because it is the German people and because it numbers 87,000,000. Our fathers have left us much to do.

A. Oelzelt-Newin, *Welche Strafe soll die treffen, die Schuld am Weltkrieg tragen*, 1915, pp. 12–16:

Russia is by far the most dangerous enemy, not only of Middle Europe, but of all Europe and of the whole civilized world. . . . . The object of any treaty of peace must therefore be to preserve Russia's Asiatic character and, so far as possible, to weaken her position as a European Great Power. This can be done only by taking from her those western territories which are most valuable from the cultural and the economic points of view and by keeping her away at the same time from all European seas (except the White Sea). . . . . The boundary that should be drawn would . . . . run from Kronstadt by way of Brest-Litovsk and Taganrog to Baku, Finland, of course, being included. Besides the razing of all Russia's western fortresses, especially the fortresses on the sea, it would be necessary to take from her *Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Kurland, Poland, Volhynia, Podolia, Bessarabia, portions of Little Russia and of South Russia, Taurida (Krim) and the Caucasus.* . . . . In the Balkans, if these are freed from Russian assistance and intrigues, two kingdoms, *Servia and Montenegro, should be wiped completely off the map.* . . . .

There can be no united and powerful Middle Europe so long as *France* retains her present size and power. To deprive her of these must be the object of any treaty of peace. Of course it is not a question solely of acquisition of territory, for nations can be ruined by war indemnities or by commercial treaties, but of these we are not talking at present. We are asking only,

What cessions of territory are necessary in order to lessen by two the number of Great Powers in Europe? What is necessary for this purpose?

Whether the cession of *northern seaports* will come into question is a matter that had better not be discussed at present. Possibly the Middle States may even need a port on the Mediterranean like *Toulon*, which would necessarily involve the annexation of *Nice*. . . . . That France must lose all the *north coast of Africa* that belongs to her is the more certain because she would not be sufficiently crippled by war indemnities alone. Nor would it be enough to insist on the *transfer of her fleet*, but among her *fortresses* those that protect harbors must first be razed; and one of the most important conditions of peace that we should strive to obtain would be that she should maintain only a commercial fleet. *France should be forced into a position similar to that now held by Spain*. . . . .

. . . . The punishment that *England* would find most severe would perhaps be her *complete exclusion from the Mediterranean*. . . . . She would be shut off from Malta and the other islands if Gibraltar were taken from her and if Tangiers ceased to be neutral. . . . . If any part of these protecting walls is defectively constructed, our culture will be permanently injured or perhaps annihilated before another generation. Then the great sacrifice of life would have been made, not for life, but only for death.

Albert Ritter, *Der organische Aufbau Europas*, 1916, pp. 27–28:

Middle Europe must consider strategic necessities in fixing her eastern boundaries. . . . . *East Prussia needs stronger protection on the North and on the East*. . . . . In the west military considerations demand a greater extension of the geographic boundary. . . . . If the military object of gaining permanent security against France and also the freedom of the seas is to be really attained, *the northeastern part of France, as a number of leading statesmen have already indicated, must be brought within the German northwestern frontier*, as far as the mouth of the Somme, somewhere along the line Vignacourt-Bapaume-Verdun-St. Mihiel-Pont à Mousson. . . . . The establishment of this frontier, together with the taking of *Belfort and its environs*, which are necessary for the protection of South Germany, seems thoroughly justified. . . . . As regards the *annexation of Belgium* to Middle Europe, to which the majority of its inhabitants belong as regards language, no further words need be wasted; it is a matter of course.

In the southwest the geographical frontier must in like manner be pushed forward, in order that Triest, one of the most important points for Middle Europe, may be removed from hostile attack. . . . . *The northern part of Venetia*, the districts of Friuli and Treviso, up to a line running from the south end of Lake Garda to the mouth of the Piave, must be taken as a glacis at the foot of the Alps in order to ward off from Austria's Adriatic coast all future

menace. On national grounds, however, this necessary line of security may and will be pushed forward a few kilometers. . . . .

Albert Ritter ("Konrad von Winterstetten"), *Nordkap-Bagdad*, 1915, pp. 33, 34:

. . . . In general, the problem of making England . . . . innocuous and her overthrow as useful as possible for us may best be solved if we make ourselves masters (from a military point of view) of the European center of the British Empire. The road from Gravelotte and Verdun to Dunkirk and Boulogne might be continued by the occupation of a bridgehead at Dover—a castle on English soil. This proposal may seem fantastic, but it is quite as easy to carry it through as a landing on British soil, and without this the war must last for years. *Only the taking of London, which we shall live to see, will make peace possible*, and after the taking of London one treaty provision may just as well be exacted as another. . . . .

"Wann wird der Krieg beendigt sein?" by "Diplomaticus," October, 1914, p. 16:

[Our enemies] must also pay, and must pay a very high price, for the injuries they have inflicted upon our interests and upon our good name by the lies they have spread over the whole world. *Germany must insist that, in the treaty of peace to be signed by our enemies, they themselves shall confess that they forced the war upon us and that they have lied to the whole civilized world. So only can we stand justified before the tribunal of history.*

A memorial, dated May 20, 1915, was addressed to the imperial Chancellor by six of the most important agricultural and industrial associations of Germany: "Bund der Landwirte," "Deutscher Bauernbund," "Vorort der christlichen deutschen Bauernvereine," "Centralverband deutscher Industriellen," "Bund der Industriellen," and "Reichsdeutscher Mittelstandsverband." It was transmitted to the governments of the several German states and was extensively circulated in print as a "confidential" communication. Its publication in German newspapers was not permitted. The entire text was first published in the Paris *Humanité*, August 11, 1915. The complete German text is given in Grumbach, *Das annexionistische Deutschland*, pp. 123–32.

. . . . In addition to the demand for a colonial empire that shall fully satisfy the many-sided economic interests of Germany, in addition to securing our future in the matter of customs and trade policy and the attainment of a sufficient . . . . war indemnity, [the undersigned associations] find the chief aim of the conflict that has been forced upon us in the securing and improvement of the German Empire's basis of existence in Europe and particularly in the following directions:

Belgium . . . . as regards military and customs policy, and also as regards monetary, banking, and postal systems, must be subjected to German imperial legislation. Railroads and canals are to be made portions of our transportation

system. For the rest, after separating the country into a Walloon district and a preponderantly Flemish district, and *after transferring to Germans economic undertakings and possessions that are important for the domination of the country, its government and administration must be so conducted that the inhabitants shall obtain no influence upon the political destinies of the German Empire.*

As regards *France . . . . the possession of the coast beyond the Belgian frontier, perhaps to the Somme,* and therewith an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean, must be regarded as vital to our future importance on the sea. *The hinterland that is to be acquired with this coast strip* must be sufficient to secure complete strategic control and economic exploitation of the ports that we acquire on the Channel. Apart from the necessary acquisition of the ore fields of Briey, any further annexation of French territory is to be made exclusively on considerations of military strategy. It may be assumed as self-evident after the experiences of this war, that we . . . . cannot leave in the hands of the enemy the fortified positions which threaten us, particularly Verdun and Belfort, nor the western slope of the Vosges that lies between them. *The acquisition of the line of the Meuse and the French coast on the Channel involves, in addition to the above-mentioned ore fields of Briey, also the possession of the coal fields in the Departments of the North and of Pas-de-Calais.* After our experiences in Alsace-Lorraine, it is probably self-evident that in these acquisitions also *the people of the annexed districts are not to be put in a position to obtain any political influence upon the destinies of the German Empire, and that the economic resources to be found in these districts, including medium and large land holdings, are to be put into German hands,* with an arrangement that France shall indemnify and take care of the former proprietors. . . . .

The need for strengthening also the sound agricultural basis of our national economy . . . . demands a considerable extension of the imperial and Prussian frontiers toward the East, by annexing parts at least of the *Baltic provinces and the districts lying south of the same,* taking into consideration at the same time the object of making our East-German frontier defensible from a military point of view. . . . .

As regards the extension of political rights to the inhabitants of these new territories and the safeguarding of the German economic influence therein, what has been said as regards France is valid here also. The war indemnity to be paid by Russia must consist largely in the transfer of private titles to land. . . . .

APPENDIX B

GERMAN INTRIGUES AGAINST AMERICA IN TIME OF PEACE

BY THE U.S. BUREAU OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, JUNE, 1917

Evidence of the bad faith of the Imperial German government soon piled up on every hand. Honest efforts on our part to establish a firm basis of good neighborliness with the German people were met by their government with

quibbles, misrepresentations, and counteraccusations against their enemies abroad. And meanwhile in this country official agents of the Central Powers—protected from criminal prosecution by diplomatic immunity—conspired against our internal peace, placed spies and agents provocateurs throughout the length and breadth of our land, and even in high positions of trust in departments of our government. While expressing a cordial friendship for the people of the United States, the government of Germany had its agents at work both in Latin America and in Japan. They bought or subsidized papers and supported speakers there to rouse feelings of bitterness and distrust against us in those friendly nations, in order to embroil us in war. They were inciting to insurrection in Cuba, in Haiti, and in Santo Domingo; their hostile hand was stretched out to take the Danish Islands; and everywhere in South America they were abroad sowing the seeds of dissension, trying to stir up one nation against another and all against the United States. In their sum these various operations amounted to direct assault upon the Monroe Doctrine. And even if we had given up our right to travel on the sea, even if we had surrendered to German threats and abandoned our legitimate trade in munitions, the German offensive in the New World, in our own land and among our neighbors, was becoming too serious to be ignored.

So long as it was possible, the government of the United States tried to believe that such activities, the evidence of which was already in a large measure at hand, were the work of irresponsible and misguided individuals. It was only reluctantly, in the face of overwhelming proof, that the recall of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador and of the German military and naval attachés was demanded. Proof of their criminal violations of our hospitality was presented to their governments. But these governments, in reply, offered no apologies nor did they issue reprimands. It became clear that such intrigue was their settled policy.[1]

On the first of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico:

That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own

[1] "War Information Series": *How the War Came to America.*

initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.[1] (Signed) ZIMMERMANN

APPENDIX C

GERMAN DOMINATION IN SOUTH AMERICA

The German colonies in southern Brazil and Uruguay are the one bright spot in this gloomy picture of South American civilization. Here dwell some half-million Germans; and it is to be hoped that by the reorganization of South America, when the half-breed population—a cross between the Indians and the Latin races—has disappeared, the vast basin of the La Plata will become German territory. The Germans in southern Brazil—like the Boers in South Africa—have, on the average, twelve to fifteen children; so that, by this natural increase alone, the country is assured to us. In these circumstances is it not wonderful that the German people has not long since decided to take possession of this territory? For the people of the republics which have inherited the former domains of Spain and Portugal it would be altogether a blessing to become subject to German power. They would soon be reconciled to our rule and be proud of their part in the world-wide glory of the German name.[2]

APPENDIX D

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA—1785

ARTICLE XII.—If one of the contracting parties should be engaged in war with any other Power, the free intercourse and commerce of the subjects or citizens of the party remaining neuter with the belligerent Powers shall not be interrupted. On the contrary, in that case, as in full peace, the vessels of the neutral party may navigate freely to and from the ports and on the coasts of the belligerent parties, free vessels making free goods, insomuch that all things shall be adjudged free which shall be on board any vessel belonging to the neutral party, although such things belong to an enemy of the other; and the same freedom shall be extended to persons who shall be on board a free vessel, although they should be enemies to the other party, unless they be soldiers in actual service of such enemy.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA—1799

ARTICLE XIII.—And in the same case of one of the contracting parties being engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties and

[1] Intercepted dispatch of the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the German Minister in Mexico.

[2] Tannenberg, *Grossdeutschland*, p. 295.

misunderstandings that usually arise respecting merchandise of contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and military stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, or by the subjects or citizens of either party, to the enemies of the other, shall be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condemnation and a loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless, it shall be lawful to stop such vessels and articles, and to detain them for such length of time as the captors may think necessary to prevent the inconvenience or damage that might ensue from their proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable compensation for the loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors; and it shall further be allowed to use in the service of the captors the whole or any part of the military stores so detained, paying the owners the full value of the same to be ascertained by the current price at the place of its destination. But in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage.

All cannons, mortars, firearms, pistols, bombs, grenades, bullets, balls, muskets, flints, matches, powder, saltpeter, sulphur, cuirasses, pikes, swords, belts, cartouch boxes, saddles, and bridles, beyond the quantity necessary for the use of the ship, or beyond that which every man serving on board the vessel, or passenger, ought to have; and in general whatever is comprised under the denomination of arms and military stores, of what description soever, shall be deemed objects of contraband.

ARTICLE XXIII.—If war should arise between the two contracting parties, the merchants of either country then residing in the other shall be allowed to remain nine months to collect their debts and settle their affairs, and may depart freely, carrying off all their effects without molestation or hindrance; and all women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manufacturers, and fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, or places and, in general, all others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be allowed to continue their respective employments, and shall not be molested in their persons, nor shall their houses or goods be burnt or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted by the armed force of the enemy, into whose power by the events of war they may happen to fall; but if anything is necessary to be taken from them for the use of such armed force, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA—1828

ARTICLE XII.—The twelfth article of the treaty of amity and commerce, concluded between the parties in 1785, and the articles from the thirteenth to the twenty-fourth, inclusive, of that which was concluded at Berlin in 1799, with the exception of the last paragraph in the nineteenth article, relating to

treaties with Great Britain, are hereby revived with the same force and virtue as if they made part of the context of the present treaty, it being, however, understood that the stipulations contained in the articles thus revived shall be always considered as in no manner affecting the treaties or conventions concluded by either party with other Powers, during the interval between the expiration of the said treaty of 1799, and the commencement of the operation of the present treaty.

The parties being still desirous, in conformity with their intention declared in the twelfth article of the said treaty of 1799, to establish between themselves, or in concert with other maritime Powers, further provisions to insure just protection and freedom to neutral navigation and commerce, and which may at the same time advance the cause of civilization of humanity, engage again to treat on this subject at some future and convenient period.

APPENDIX E

TREATY OF LONDON, NOVEMBER 15, 1831

ARTICLE VII.—Belgium, within the limits indicated in Articles I and II, Sec. 4, will form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It will be required to observe this same neutrality toward all other States.

ARTICLE XXV.—The Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia guarantee to his Majesty, the King of the Belgians, the execution of all the preceding articles.

[The engagements contained in this treaty were renewed by that of 1839, which definitely established the status of Belgium and recognized that all the articles of the treaty of 1831 were placed under the guaranty of the five Powers.]

TREATY OF LONDON, MAY 11, 1867

ARTICLE II.—The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the act annexed to the treaty of April 19, 1839, under the guaranty of the courts of France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, will henceforth form a perpetually neutral State. It will be required to observe this same neutrality toward all other States. The high contracting parties bind themselves to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present article. The latter is and continues to be placed under the sanction of the collective guaranty of the Powers who are signatories to the present treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State.

APPENDIX F

STATUTE ENACTED BY THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT, JULY 22, 1913. TO GO INTO EFFECT JANUARY 1, 1914

A German who is neither domiciled nor permanently resident in this country loses his German nationality by the acquisition of a foreign nationality, if this acquisition is at his request or at the request of the husband or

of the guardian, and if, in the case of a wife or a ward, the conditions exist under which, according to articles 18 and 19, a petition is admissible to be dismissed from German allegiance. The German nationality is not lost by one who prior to acquiring the foreign nationality has upon his petition obtained the written authority of the competent official of his native state to retain his German nationality. Before this authority is granted the German consul must be heard. The Chancellor with the consent of the Federal Council may ordain that the authority provided for in this paragraph shall not be granted to persons who desire to acquire the nationality of designated foreign states.

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One of the innumerable Pan-German pamphlets which are significant is that issued by the Pan-German Union in 1895, *Grossdeutschland und Mittel Europa um das Jahr 1950.* A brief discussion of the contents of this pamphlet, especially as concerned with Tannenberg's book, will be found in Chéradame.

The National Security League is publishing many useful pamphlets and books on the war from the American point of view. One of the most useful of these is Hart and Lovejoy, *Handbook of the War*, New York, 1917. This *Handbook* contains in brief form many interesting documents and also a very considerable bibliography.

The Committee on Public Information at Washington, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and Mr. Creel as chairman, is publishing a series of authoritative documents, the "War Information Series." Of course, being official in character, they may be regarded as entirely reliable. Note especially:

How the War Came to the United States; No. 1. *The War Message and the Facts behind It;* No. 3. Hazen, *The Government of Germany;* No. 4. McLaughlin, *The Great War, from Spectator to Participant;* No. 6. *American Loyalty*, by Citizens of German Descent.

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No. 2

AMERICANS AND THE WORLD-CRISIS

By

ALBION W. SMALL

Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology
The University of Chicago

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AMERICANS AND THE WORLD-CRISIS

NOTE.—In its original form this paper was a Commencement address delivered at Colby College, June 17, 1917. It was published in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2. The present version omits certain portions which have meanwhile lost their pertinence.

Since August, 1914, the nations have been groping in darkness about the meaning of the world-crisis. At first the unsophisticated saw in it only a local European quarrel. Then it relentlessly engulfed the world. The stars in their courses have meanwhile merged into illuminators of the crisis. Slowly but surely the truth has dawned, even upon the reluctant mind of the patriotic but incredulous President of the United States. Never in history has the moral principle at issue in a war been clearer than in the present struggle. We have only to disregard details and to look straight at the substance of the whole matter. *The question which dwarfs and ought to silence all the rest is whether this generation will doom coming generations to live in a world in which might has reconquered right, or whether this generation will endow coming generations with a heritage of right controlling might.*

It is not necessary to find a convincing answer to the question, What caused the war? Whether we have a formula which suits ourselves in reply to that question or not, a much more important question is now foremost. Whatever the complex of causes and effects which literally released the forces at present beyond control, that complex is not identical with the group of problems involved in the task of restoring control. On the contrary, granting that the explosion of 1914 was a resultant of all the racial, commercial, dynastic, and political rivalries which have been charged with the responsibility; granting that neither of the combatants is guiltless of some share of the wrong which entered into the catastrophe; granting that each nation stands convicted of its own portion of these epic guilts; granting that neither of the powers, our own country not excepted, can conceal its Macbeth hands by historic

misdeeds deep-stained enough the multitudinous seas to incarnadine—the present crisis is none of these nor all combined. It is not primarily a struggle of race against race, of ruler against ruler, of trader against trader, of war lord against war lord, of this form of government against that form of government; although each of these antitheses is many times implicated. Least of all is it a purgatory out of which any nation will emerge absolved of any or all past sins. If we try to see with the eyes of future historians, and if we borrow a term from the vocabulary of the psychologists, we may reduce the situation to a trial of strength between two irreconcilable national psychoses. For convenience we may as well adopt the manner of Herbert Spencer and designate the conflicting forces as a militant versus a moral psychosis.

I will not apologize for this dangerous way of speaking. Always, of course, human affairs are matters, not of impersonal forces, but of intensely personal people. It especially behooves everyone who interprets the present crisis as I do to give this literal fact full force. For safety's sake, therefore, I will translate this convenient academic manner of speaking, to which I shall revert, into less convenient, but also less misleading, literal form: The world is divided today between a group of nations whose units have delivered themselves over to the dictation of an artificial, arbitrary, anti-moral, militaristically imposed code, according to which force is the arbiter of right, and another group of nations driven by the instinct of self-preservation into championship of a morality which makes its appeal to justice as its standard—to the level of which appeal I freely admit they might not have risen for many generations if they had not confronted the alternative of choosing between a self-assertion better than their previous best selves and consent that the foundations of all international morality should be destroyed.

Among the most indelible memory-pictures in my mind is a series reproducing incidents, trifling in themselves, but eloquent as reflections of popular feeling, which occurred in Bangor, Maine, on the day and the following days after the message had come over the wire: "A madman has murdered Abraham Lincoln."

Suppose the message had read instead: "Abraham Lincoln has become violently insane." Suppose the malady had taken the

form of acute mania, in the name of freedom, to force the conduct, not only of Lincoln's immediate associates, but of the whole world. The emotions of the people would not have been converted into hate toward Lincoln. Quite likely the latent love and veneration of the loyal states would have responded with pity more intense than the sorrow that surrounded his death. Nevertheless, after recovery from the first shock there would have been little difference of opinion in principle about the duty of taking all necessary measures to restrain the sufferer from violence to himself and others, of adopting every known means of restoration, and, above all, of reorganizing the administration in closest possible conformity with the fundamental law and with the most unequivocal devotion to the public good.

There are instructive analogies between the moral demands which would have challenged Americans if this fictitious reconstruction of the historical incident had been the reality, and the demands of the present world-crisis upon all people who believe in the rule of right rather than the rule of force.

Since August, 1914, it has been said countless times, all over the world, that Germany is a nation gone mad. As the Germans have committed themselves deeper and deeper, month after month, to detail after detail of the preposterous implications of their national prepossession, the rest of the world has been forced to the conclusion, often against almost invincible preconceptions, that the diagnosis is not a figure of speech but stark truth.

Did you ever have a dear friend, of gentle heart, of brilliant mind, of refined tastes, of sensitive conscience, of high purpose—but suddenly bereft of reason? Instead of becoming demented, did that rarely gifted friend re-enlist all his disordered powers in pathologically energized pursuit of an uncannily perverted purpose? Did that friend betray those enviable traits into unrestricted service of a ruthlessly destructive idea? If you have such a picture as that in mind, it is also symbolically a veracious miniature of present Germany. Never was more impressive unity than the Germans have been displaying for the past three years. Yet it is a unity that is terrific—appalling—because it is splendid physical, mental, and moral strength misdirected by a Satanic obsession.

This aberration has resulted from the most deliberate, the most insidious, the most methodical, the most mentally and morally stultifying, program of national self-intoxication that human imagination has ever conceived.

The book which on the whole has impressed me as the most astonishing literary betrayal of the present German state of mind was written, not from the soldier's standpoint at all, but by a man who speaks primarily for Germany's colonizing and missionizing—Paul Rohrbach. The title of the book is *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt.* Since the war began, an English translation has appeared. I have not seen a copy, but if literally rendered the title would be: *The German Idea in the World.* According to the author's explicit declaration, the "German idea" is conviction of the duty of the Germans to impose upon the rest of the world their superior ethical standard! Not content to let the absurdity of this self-righteousness stand by itself, the author actually makes the body of his book an argument to his fellow-Germans to realize this aim, *for the reason that thus far they have failed in every essential quality which is necessary to ethical superiority!*

In its large features, standing forth in results rather than demonstrable in terms of the precise details of cause and effect, the process which has culminated in the present perverted condition of German political consciousness is one of the most open secrets in history. In the main it has been an interplay of two reciprocating factors, each in turn stimulating and stimulated by the other, and even at times merely phases of each other. These factors have not conformed in minutiae to a discoverable scheme of rhythm, or of logical or chronological sequence. On the whole, each in itself and both in co-operation have been accumulating influence for more than two hundred years.

The first of these factors of the present German psychosis has been the increasing success of Prussia as a military machine. From the moment in 1713 when Frederick William the First began his drill-sergeanting of his Prussians, followed by the forty-six years in which his son more than satisfied the military conditions for his honorary title "The Great," through the vacillating reigns of Frederick William Second, Third, Fourth, and even of William the

First of the present Empire—a period in which all the artificialities of political, literary, and moral sycophancy had to be under sleepless mobilization to guard the Prussian people from discovering from what mediocre stuff the mythology of the Hohenzollern House was being constructed—to the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles in 1871, on the whole there was cumulative cogency in the militarists' appeal to fact: "Remember what a helpless folk the Germans were from the beginnings of the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, and behold what the Prussian monarchy and the Prussian army have achieved!" At our remove from the facts it is easy to remember that the epitaph of most military states might well be, "He that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword." Yet, if we can imagine ourselves open to conviction that a single case, and that a case which has not yet run its full course, may be generalized into a valid historical law, we are in a position to understand how the Germans yielded to the lure of the fallacy that military aggression is the sole assurance of national greatness.

The second factor is primarily subjective and schematic. It is the factor in which the deeds of Prussian men of action reappear, "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought"—the reconstruction of German deeds in the form of German political philosophy and political pedagogy. We may get at the truth central to our immediate needs, though only a fraction of the whole truth, if we disregard all the ramifications of this philosophy and confine ourselves to three of its taproots.

In the first place, early in the nineteenth century, while dread of Napoleonism still dogged German minds, Hegel, the most abstract of all German philosophers, crystallized a conception which had been in flux in German thought for many generations, and made it the keystone of his political system: "The State is reason at its highest power."

In spite of the limitation just prescribed, there is strong temptation to widen the discussion into a display of how Kant's noble though critically unconvincing ethical system, with its impressive emphasis upon "the oughtness of the ought," interplayed with the Hegelian idea in forming German minds. The reason, in brief, why the Germans of this generation are not to be

explained by Kant is that they now retain only a mechanical pantomime of his veneration for moral authority, while they have forgotten the essential content of his ethics—respect for persons as ends.

If Hegel meant that his dictum veraciously summarizes historical fact, it would be a weakling candidate for the Doctor's degree in history who could not make out a good case for the contradictory thesis: "As we have had it thus far in human experimentation, the state is unreason at its highest power." No matter. This Hegelian dogma has not been uncontested in Germany, of course, but it has steadily acted as a magnet upon philosophical and unphilosophical Germans alike, and it has attracted them into arrangement around itself as a focus.

If, on the other hand, Hegel meant that when reason displays itself at its highest power and when the state reaches its highest development the two will coincide, the dictum is an unscientific impertinence. Who knows? It is at least conceivable, it begins to affect increasing numbers as probable, that reason, when it is finished, will have brought forth internationalism. In this conceivable internationalism, whatever else may be true of it, the state, as we have it thus far, may be reduced to a merely subaltern rank. At all events, the Hegelian doctrine: "The State is reason at its highest power," turns out to be, not a logical absolute, but merely a precarious opinion.

Yet an acquaintance far short of exhaustive with German publicistic literature since 1812 might assemble ample evidence that this Hegelian conception has been a cardinal factor in molding the present dominant type of German thinking—this, both directly and by diffusion. In particular, it has served to create a spiritual soil in which has flourished the second taproot of German political theory—I hope the confusion of metaphors will not obscure the facts—namely, the increasing concurrence of the formers of public opinion in Germany since 1871 in propaganda of the faith which might as well have been officially codified in this form: *The Prussianized State of the Germans is reason at its highest power.* I have rejected the word "connivance," which volunteered for service in the last sentence, and have conscripted "concurrence" in its place.

At this point I am referring not to the whole self-hypnotizing policy which has been in operation among the Germans for two centuries, and which I have referred to as deliberate. My reference now is to a portion of the involved process which has played its part in recent years. In what ratio the actual agents of the school-mastering, first of Prussia, then of Germany, and, finally, in some measure even of the German portions of Austria, have been carrying out a deliberate program of glorifying Prussia and the Prussianized Empire may never be known. I venture the prediction, however, that some time there will come a school of American historians who will reconsider the records of German leading opinion between 1871 and 1914, and will find in them astonishing resemblances to the political callowness which marked the professions of American political leaders of both parties during that stage of our development indexed by the phrase, "the worship of the Constitution." While it is impossible to make out the proportion in which this public pedagogy was official, or semiofficial, or in any way perfunctory, and in what proportion it was spontaneous, our present concern is chiefly with results. As I intimated earlier, the sooner Americans understand that the Germans believe in their form of government with an intensity that may never have been equaled in a great state, the sooner shall we be able to emerge from the rest of our visionary attitude toward the whole crisis. If limits permitted, evidence in any desired quantity might be exhibited in support of my previous hint that this admiration of the Prussianized system extends, with nonessential reservations, even to the great body of the Social Democrats. Their support of the war is sufficient corroboration for our present purposes. It would be still easier to show that since 1871 the German groups which the majority of Americans would classify as the most reliably progressive have been consistent and impassioned in proclaiming their belief that one of the indispensable conditions of continued German progress must ever be the strengthening of the foundations of the Hohenzollern monarchy. One might begin with Gustav Schmoller of Berlin, whose name probably commands the respect of a larger circle of American students of the social sciences than that of any other living German;

and one might continue through the membership of the *Verein für Socialpolitik*, unquestionably since 1874 the most influential extra-governmental body of social theorists in the world. No matter how radical the measures advocated by these men, either as individuals or as a group, the weight of their influence has always counted toward increase of the prestige of the Prussian monarchy. More than this, whatever jealousy of Prussia and the Prussians survives in the lesser German states—speaking always in terms of the situation as it was before the war made inferences about later developments unreliable—it is as grotesque for Americans to suppose that non-Prussian Germany wants to undo the fusing process completed in 1871 as it was for certain Germans a few years ago to speculate that, if our government were drawn into a foreign war, our southern states would make it the psychological moment for another secession!

All in all, among the Germans since 1871 these two elements have been growing more evident, as attitude if not as explicit creed—first, conscious or unconscious deference toward the Hegelian superstition: "The State is reason at its highest power," secondly, inclination to accept the Prussianized Empire as the only extant specimen of that state which is reason at its highest power.

But with these two cardinal positions in the German reaction we have not yet brought to light the third and decisive factor on the mental side of German influence in the world-crisis. That factor turns out to be merely the German militarists' version of naïve savagery which began to function uncounted ages before people were capable of political thought at all—when they frankly did whatever their brutish strength permitted. It is the attitude, merely varying in detail, of the ancient military chieftains, of the later Caesars, and of the more subtle mediaeval benevolent despots.

All through the ages two contradictory conceptions of national life have urged for expression and for mastery. The more elemental of these tendencies has held its ground in more or less disguised form most of the time, in most of the world, down to the present moment. However concrete the visible symbols in which this tendency has been embodied, from the single chief, who got or kept his prestige by superior prowess with his club, down to the

latest autocracy of *Kultur*, all the cases of this type of which we have been able to find out very much have buttressed themselves upon the notion, implicit or explicit, that the state is a mysterious, impersonal, superior something, predestined to dominate over the people, and to make the people mere counters in its game. In its more evolved and plausible forms, this theory of the state has always enlisted the devilishly resourceful cunning of a few in getting this mystically impersonal conception of the state identified with themselves. As we look back upon it now, or as we look around, wherever in the world this view still holds, and if we poke underneath its disguises and find what the reality is that remains, it is evident that this supernaturalistic supposition, the "State," has usually been in actuality a very concrete, and self-conscious, and self-asserting person, or bunch of persons, masquerading as the "State" and compelling or cajoling the masses of the people into pulling their chestnuts out of the fire, instead of leading that kind of co-operation which would make most for the general good. Historically, with few exceptions, the actual state has been some tyrant, some oriental despot, some man on horseback, some commercial oligarchy, as in Venice under the Doges, some military caste, as in Germany today. In each case, with qualifications few or many, weak or strong, in numberless varieties, the aims of a usurping faction, rather than the general welfare, have controlled the destinies of the whole. Tradition has put in the mouth of Louis XIV the symbolic words: "The State? I am the State!" Whether the "Great Monarch" ever uttered the formula or not, the sentiment is the breath of life of the actual ruler or rulers in every state still controlled by any subspecies whatsoever of the primitive paganism of force.

The German military caste has enthroned the same old paganism, but it has furnished it with the frankest creed it has ever confessed since the earliest naïve creeds of deeds began to "clothe their naked shame" with creeds of words. The national obsession of the Germans has betrayed itself at its ghastliest in the most fanatical surrender to this pagan creed that has been exhibited on a large scale since the most sanguinary period of Islam. Bernhardi and Treitschke have been merely the best advertised among the

countless acolytes of this archaeological paganism in its German revival: "The State is power!" *Der Staat ist Macht!*

Now, as I have just pointed out, this creed of the resuscitated paganism to which the Germans have become unresisting perverts accurately indicates the character of a majority of the states that have actually occurred thus far in the moral evolution of society. As a mere matter of logic, however, the psychosis through which this generalization of fact has become domiciled in the minds of the Germans as the supreme imperative of their national religion is a case of one of the most elementary fallacies. It is as though one should reason: *Man is an animal; therefore, the supreme privilege and duty of man is to imitate the beasts of prey.* Ever since Aristotle it has been a part of the world's common sense that the whole story about anything is told, not by its beginnings, but by its beginnings plus its completions.

Simple as is the logical refutation of the German creed of power, the ethical refutation is still more decisive. Both in its academic expositions and in its applications in the conduct of the German government toward other governments and peoples, the creed, "*The State is power*," turns out to be insolent denial of every ancient or modern ethical or religious faith which has followed instinct or vision of the evolving sovereignty of the spirit. "The State is power" turns out to mean: If a weaker people possess anything that the rulers of a stronger people want, those rulers of the stronger people need only plead "military necessity," and no law of man or God may stay any hideous use of force which might enable the stronger to work their will. For three years the Germans have been proving their faith by works of ruthlessness more ferocious than the world has seen since the madness of the Inquisition.

Nevertheless, for the same time, some of the best men and women in America have done what they could to make a mistaken conception of righteousness embarrass the vindication of righteousness. They have talked of "compromise" or something equally inconceivable. Between morality and physical power there can be no more compromise than between assertion and denial of the multiplication table. One must rule. The other must submit.

Let me interject the explanation that by "morality" I do not mean my code of conduct, nor yours; not a set of rules which Americans or Englishmen might desire to impose upon other peoples. By "morality" I mean, now, simply that irreducible minimum for the security of which we must fight to a finish against the Germans, namely, *the principle that whenever their enterprises visibly affect the interests of other men or other nations, civilized men, whether individuals or groups, are bound to prefer legal and rational to violent means of promoting their interests.*

Our national folklore has joined the name of an American naval officer, whose loyalty was less dubious than his ethics, with the unfortunate attempt at a patriotic aphorism: "My Country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she ever be right, but, right or wrong, my country!" In their zeal for a more defensible patriotism honest pacifists have gone to the other extreme with a doctrine which practically means: Our country can never be right if, in the name of all its moral and physical force, it halts another nation that is violently wrong with the ultimatum, "Thus far and no farther."

At this moment the German cause reduces to the desperation of those militarists to vindicate themselves who for years have advertised the shameless creed that morality has no rights against the power of the state. For no one knows precisely how many years the German government has been a conspiracy to disfranchise morality in the conduct of nation toward nation, and to establish the military power of Germany in its place. So soon as we Americans take in this ugly fact, those of us with the rudiments of a conscience must realize that, until the Germans repudiate this military caste and the creed it imposes, to be at peace with Germany would make our nation a moral monstrosity.

In practice, the German system works out in two aspects which to outward appearance are contradictory. Whether at bottom they are contradictory or complementary is a question too involved for profitable discussion here. Let us glance at each aspect in certain of its distinctive manifestations.

We may refer to these two obvious aspects of the German system as the *domestic* and the *foreign*, or the *national* and the

international. Not only Americans, but Germans themselves, have been queered in their judgment of the German government by the fact that one and the same system presents appearances so contradictory that they cannot be reconciled. Both Germans and Americans have reasoned, in effect: "The domestic aspect of the German system reaches such benign results that the alleged badness of the German foreign policy cannot be real." It is one of the humors of our immature intellectuality that the most sophisticated of us still hunt for mental and moral consistency behind human actions!

For brevity let us call upon parable to picture the quality of the German domestic system.

My attention was first called to the town of Pullman by descriptions of it as a "model community." It was alleged that everything which intelligent benevolence could devise had been done to furnish the employees in the Pullman works with all the living conditions necessary for their comfort and happiness. Not long after, my lot was cast in such a way that only half an hour separated my home from Pullman. Very soon there were labor disturbances at Pullman, and, with others, I was called upon to investigate. I found that the descriptions which I had read of the physical equipment of the town had not been too highly colored. At the same time, I found the most discontented and bitter inhabitants that I had ever met. The burden of their complaints was not expressed in terms of wages, nor labor hours, nor any other physical standards of living. The worst-felt grievance seemed to be voiced in the assertion that they were treated like children, not like men and women. The most telltale bit of evidence that I discovered was the current sneer: "We are born in a Pullman house, cradled in a Pullman crib, fed from a Pullman store, taught in a Pullman school, confirmed in a Pullman church, exploited in a Pullman shop, and when we die we'll be buried in a Pullman grave and go to a Pullman hell."

It would be contrary to the evidence to doubt that, in motive, George M. Pullman was a conscientious philanthropist. His mistake was in principle that of all the genuinely benevolent despots. He confounded philanthropy with patronage. He had not found out that the best way for men to help men is not to do things for

them, but to do things with them, and perhaps better still to remove removable hindrances to their doing things for themselves.

When I became a citizen of Waterville, in 1881, and wished to walk abroad of a night when the moon was not in session, I always carried a lantern. There was not a street light in town. Neither was there a street car, nor a water-main, nor a sewer. Not a lawnmower had ever been in commission. The yards looked like pastures that had strayed in from the farms. The two most sightly spots for the landscape gardener in the center of the town were dumping places for débris. There was not a public schoolhouse which any of the prosperous citizens would have consented to use as a stable, and a little later I built the second, possibly the third, house in the town that contained a bathroom.

As I have looked about in Waterville at intervals during the past forty-eight hours, it has seemed to me that some mightier Aladdin had meanwhile been conjuring. I can see room for improvement still. You cannot control the rain, for instance, but some day you will control the mud. And many other kinds of progress will doubtless mark the next thirty years. As it is, the contrast between Waterville as I first knew it and the Waterville of today is the outward sign of a generation's advance in civilization. And you have done it yourselves! It has not been handed down to you from above! You would not have taken it as a gift; you would even go back a generation and do it all over again, if the alternative were to accept it out of hand, even from the most masterful of the public-spirited men who have lived among you in the course of these years. Rather than be policed in every detail of life outside of your domicile, and in many details within it, by the most magnanimous human beings you have ever known, you would elect a return to primitive conditions, and to the adventure of working out that salvation of personality which can be achieved only in the exercise of responsible self-direction.

In miniature, the contrast between the town of Pullman and the town of Waterville reflects the difference between German and American civic conditions, with the single difference that the Germans are proud of their kind and despise ours, while we hold to our kind and abhor theirs.

Now, the case is by no means as one-sided as either people think. If the worthy way through life for a moral being were a greater Cook's personally conducted tour, our American method would be a hopeless competitor with the German. In sheer bodily comfort and security and in certain guaranties of spiritual liberty, regardless of possible not completely stifled scruples about abdication of one's selfhood, the average German during the past generation has undoubtedly got more for what he paid than the average American. But there's the rub! The unreckoned part of the price which the Germans pay is their aborted personality. Von Buelow knew his Germans when he said, in his volume *Imperial Germany*, published not long before the war, that the Germans are not political beings, that they are incapable of parliamentary government. I began to find that out in my first contacts with Germans in 1879. As a deliberate experiment, I have many times, then and since, led conversations with casual acquaintances up to some political subject. Almost invariably, unless I happened to have met a member of the political class, although there had been no hesitation about expression of opinion upon all previous topics, the stereotyped answer would be: "O! That's a matter for the government!" We may not boast that the output of average individual American opinion upon political questions is impressive; but this is impressive, namely, the consciousness of every American that it is a part of his personality to exert his own unrestricted share in creating political standards and in shaping political policies.

As long as I live, I shall not cease to grieve that these two conceptions of what is best in civic life could not have worked side by side to their limit in peace. It may well be that there is more in each of these conceptions than those who can see good in only one of them are able to understand. It may be that civilization might have been served best in the long run if these two types of civic experiment could have developed in parallel columns, until the advantages and the disadvantages of each had demonstrated themselves to both.

However that may be, Americans have always reckoned liberty of political self-expression and self-realization among the choicest of human goods; while since 1848 the Germans

have made no formidable demand for individual self-expression in politics. Nearly twenty-five years ago Pastor Frommel, who had been frozen out of his position as Court Preacher at Berlin because of his pernicious sympathy with the wage-earning classes, told me that, when he began to get into personal touch with factory operatives, he was astonished at the nature of their demands. He said that regularly, in reply to his question, "What do you want?" the answer, from men and women alike, would be, "We want recognition" (*Wir wünschen Anerkennung*). Which, being interpreted, meant that they wanted to be met by their employers on the level of human beings and to be accorded the rights of human beings in representing their own interests. Up to the present moment there has been in Germany neither an effective concerted movement to gain similar recognition in politics, nor evidence that there is enough latent demand for such recognition among the Germans to make such a movement respectable.

Worse than this, domineering militarism has kept civil life in Germany in a cowering menial attitude toward the army, and it has put official premiums upon an overbearing attitude of the army toward civilians.

One morning, ten or fifteen years ago, I happened to be in Potsdam when the order of the day included presentation of the colors to a regiment of new troops. The guard of honor was drawn up on one side of a square of which a church formed the second side, the spectators the third, while the fourth side was to be occupied by the approaching regiment. The Kaiser had returned that day from a vacation, and in the corner by the church he was chatting with members of his staff. I was near enough to see every detail in pantomime, without hearing a word. The Kaiser had said something flattering to a big handsome officer, who stood in his bravery of gala uniform and decorations preening himself after the Kaiser had passed on to the next in line. Just then a little girl of perhaps five or six years appeared through a narrow archway in the wall near the church. She looked searchingly in every direction, then stretched her hand above her head, and I saw that she had been sent to post a letter in a box behind the tall officer. It was too high. The little girl raised herself on tiptoes, but could

not reach the opening. She turned and stood irresolute for a moment, her disappointed, bewildered look perfectly legible from my point of observation. Then she took notice of the big strong man, and her face lighted up with a glad smile at the instinctive feeling that he was the solution of her difficulty. She lifted the letter toward him. He took it mechanically, with one or two glances back and forth between it and her. His intellect was evidently less brilliant than his uniform. Presently the idea took shape in his brain that this slip of a girl had called on him for help. With an arrogant toss of his head and a contemptuous snap of his wrist, he threw the letter to the ground.

Volumes might be written on German militarism without telling more about its essential spirit than this incident revealed. It was merely a mannerism, too matter-of-course to be questioned by Germans, of the same civilization which struck medals in commemoration of the murder of women and children on the Lusitania. I repeat that, whatever the other excellencies of the Germans, a national sentiment which tolerates an army with that spirit toward the people is demonstration of pitiably aborted personality.

But it is in the other aspect, in its attitude toward other nations, that the soulless paganism which the Germans have accepted from their militarists as the national religion most immediately appears. Again I forbear generalities and testify from my own experience.

In the summer of 1903 I was in Germany on business which gave me occasion to sample the opinions about our country of more different classes of Germans than I had ever interviewed before. The itinerary scheduled stops at Cologne, Lucerne, Vienna, Budapest, Munich, Dresden, Berlin, and thence an excursion into Russia. At each of these points, and in the intermediate travel, I had opportunities to talk with many men of prominence and with as many more whom I could classify merely as ordinary specimens of their various types. I soon became aware that, quite aside from the direct purpose of my trip, I was gathering from these sources a collection of significant and cumulative evidence. Over and over again Germans of different social positions, living in as many different parts of Germany and neighboring countries, volunteered the same opinion in almost the same words: "You Yankees are all

right, but it is only a question of time when we Germans will have to fight you, not with trade regulations, but with cannon." And my question "Why?" invariably brought the stereotyped answer: "Because you are trying to get some of the world's foreign commerce."

Up to that time I had firmly believed in the pacific intentions of Germany. I had regarded the pan-German agitation as a joke. I had interpreted the familiar grandiose utterances of Kaiser, and professor, and editor, and Reichstag orator as the harmless word-painting of an imaginative people who delight in setting national commonplaces in a heroic light. But these coincidences started my reflections in a new direction. It was incredible that so many men, of such different kinds, from such widely separated places, could have arrived independently at such an astonishing consensus. Such a state of mind must have been the result of some central influence or influences. A captain of infantry, whom I met in the home of a friend in Berlin, strengthened this inference when he gave me a book which contained the same sentiment in almost the same words, with the comment which afterward proved to carry accrued interest: "It is the most popular book of the year among German officers." Then I began to pick up other threads of association. I recalled a lecture which I had heard during my student days by Professor Gneist, of Berlin, who at the time was reputed to be the foremost continental expositor of the British constitution. The argument expanded these propositions: "The United States of America has no sovereign. Therefore it has no sovereignty. Therefore it is not in the proper sense of the term a state. Therefore it is not entitled to the full rights of a state among states." I had listened with amusement to the exposition and had scarcely thought of it meanwhile, because I had taken it as a choice specimen of academic pedantry, with no practical bearing. Presently I began to recall, however, that in my reading since my student days I had come across many German expressions of the same idea, with the implication that it was something to be taken for granted.

On my return to Chicago, I reported my experience in a newspaper interview, with the conclusion that we Americans would be living in a fool's paradise until we provided ourselves with a

navy so strong that, even if the creed which I had heard should proselyte all Germany, it would be too unsafe to follow it into practice. For two or three weeks following publication of the interview, at a signal from Consul Wever, of Chicago—one of the most efficient promoters of German interests that has ever represented that country in the United States—the German-language press of America and not a few publications in English bristled with abuse of the ignorant American tourist who had insulted Germany by drawing such an inference from such data.

Up to the present hour the Germans have pursued the same policy of denying the significance of any and every fact which tended to fix on them the stigma of militarism in general or responsibility for the present war in particular. No matter what German has indorsed the creed of force, or of terrorization as the technique of the creed, even the Kaiser, or the Crown Prince, or the chancellor, or authors with readers by the hundred thousands, the professional German apologists have always given the cue for a world-wide claque to shout the repudiation: "That particular utterance, or that particular man, cuts no figure in Germany."

We have always had a few men in American politics who waxed great in their own eyes by declamation of the manifest destiny of the United States to be "bounded on the north by the Aurora Borealis, on the south by the Southern Cross." Usually the saving sense of the people, ably aided and abetted by the obduracy of things, has rendered such politicians innocuous. But suppose the inconceivable had become actual, and we had found ourselves under an administration which had deliberately committed this country to the aim of annexing Canada. Suppose we had made it a test of loyalty to support this administration in waging a war for the conquest of the Dominion. Suppose we had persisted in accepting without question the administration's fiction—"The war was forced upon us!" Suppose we had refused to cast in our lot with any peace movement which might involve overthrow of the administration or of the party that had seduced the country into its immoral course. In that case our deeds would have spoken louder than our words. American character would consequently have to be known, not by what Americans had denied in terms, but by what we had actually done.

The outstanding fact, to which the Germans have been delivering themselves with accelerated motion till the incredible culmination of 1914, and since, is that all the Germans have adopted as their own the cause of those leaders who have advertised their trust in war as the foremost means of satisfying national ambitions.

I have said that all through the ages two contradictory conceptions of national life have urged for expression and mastery. We have been reviewing the form in which the one conception has taken its latest shape in German word and deed. Time remains for only the briefest allusion to the alternative tendency. A part of the next great constructive task of mankind is to give distinctness and reality to the opposite conception.

In spite of those ancient states to which history has given the name "republic," it is not certain that the antithesis of the present dominating German idea of the state ever began to be articulate in the voice of a great public until more confident than convincing expressions of it were heard in the American and the French revolutions. Today we are trying to symbolize the whole truth by the slogan: "Democracy against Autocracy!" While that watchword may be suggestive enough for rallying purposes, a nation which accepted that antithesis as either precise or exhaustive would soon resolve itself into a wholesale case of the blind leading the blind. We have the task of finding the crystal truth in contradiction of the turgid lie: "The State is power."

I venture the opinion that we shall never separate the truth from vitiating error until we have broken utterly with all our traditional doctrines of the state in terms of that plausible philosophical conception, "sovereignty." The real truth, and the whole truth, will be found only after we have taken our departure from the homely fact that a state is essentially like any other human group—a bridge club, a philharmonic society, a merchandizing firm, a banking corporation, a charity organization, a religious community, a counterfeiters' gang, an artists' guild—*a state is a company of persons behaving themselves in a certain way.* Whatever distance in comprehension or in character may separate a group which we call a state from each and every other type of human group, a state continues its identity with each and every other human group, at least in this: it is composed of human

beings, with all the moral liabilities of human beings. By forming themselves into, or by finding themselves in, any sort of grouping whatsoever, human beings cannot release themselves from the universal obligation of human beings to respect the humanity of one another. They cannot exempt themselves from a jot or a tittle of one of the laws of physical or mental or moral cause and effect, which are bound to assert themselves sooner or later as the inexorable conditions of the human lot.

The central, supreme, paramount issue of this war is whether civilization is to instal the principle of aggression as its highest law; whether for a defiant epoch morality is to be suspended; whether, during an era of the most cynical apostasy that the record of mankind will have registered, that nation is to be greatest which can mobilize the most terrific force and use it in the most savage way.

In his zeal to reassure the American people and to convince all other peoples that the United States does not want anybody's goods, or chattels, or lands, or anything that is our neighbors', President Wilson unintentionally left it possible for the stupid and the designing to assert that Americans are fighting for nothing.

On the contrary, as the President's later utterances up to the message of January 8, 1917, have consistently explained, those Americans who are morally awake are fighting for everything above the mercenary level that makes life worth the living. We are fighting for the decision that henceforth this world shall be a place in which physical power shall be, not the standard of right, but the servant of right. No other generation in history has had an equal opportunity to promote the moral achievements of mankind. The remaining catastrophe most to be feared is not that more thousands of lives may have to be offered upon the altar of this century's high decision. If coming generations could look down upon us, their anxiety would be, first and chiefest, lest we should stay our hands before we had secured the primacy of morals in the affairs of nations.

No state since the days of the Decalogue has committed itself to a loftier political ideal than that which our country professes. Citizenship of the United States involves loyalty or treason to that ideal. Coined into terms of today, that ideal requires that progres-

sive sense of justice shall enact the laws; and that law shall control force, not force the law, both in domestic and in foreign relations. No other people ever received so rich an endowment of physical resources as we have inherited. Are we to squander that endowment upon our physical and moral softnesses, or shall we use it to support the prodigious moral experiment to which we are committed? The world being what it is, Americans of this generation can neither improve nor retain their birthright unless they are resolved to continue instalment payments of the same price of suffering with which our fathers bought our birthright.

Few native Americans have more or weightier reasons for gratitude to Germany than I have been accumulating for nearly forty years. None can be more willing in every possible way to acknowledge the debt which can never be discharged. And yet! And yet! This will be an intolerable world until the Germans have once and forever recanted, with all it involves, that most hellish heresy that has ever menaced civilization: THERE IS NO GOD BUT POWER, AND PRUSSIA IS ITS PROPHET!

The Germans are still so unsuspicious of their rulers that they do not want to be disillusioned. President Wilson never uttered more literal truth than when he told us that in fighting with the Germans we shall prove in the end to have been fighting for the Germans as well as for ourselves, just as our fight with the English in '76 proved to be a fight, not for our own liberty alone, but for the enfranchisement of every subject of the British crown.

With the most cordial hopes that in the days to come the Germans may enjoy all the prosperity of every sort which they can win on their merits, without violating the equal rights of any other people, we should be numbered among the betrayers of mankind if we did not now exert our utmost physical and spiritual strength to convince the Germans that their Baal is asleep, never more to wake, or on a journey, never again to return.

Now is our nation's Gethsemane. In the beginnings of our agony and bloody sweat we are still praying, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me!" God grant that the generations to come may forever cherish the memory of the cross which we shall bear, as the symbol of their redemption unto spiritualized political life!

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DEMOCRACY THE BASIS FOR WORLD-ORDER

By

FREDERICK D. BRAMHALL

Instructor in Political Science

University of Chicago

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DEMOCRACY THE BASIS FOR WORLD-ORDER

The United States is a pacifist nation—I believe and hope an incurably pacifist nation. Our entrance into this war, reluctant as it was, and hesitant as for a time it continued, will be increasingly realized, I think, as a measure, not of our departure from, but of our devotion to, the cause of peace. We dislike all wars; we incline to distrust even our own; and I, at least, believe that the slowness with which the national fervor has been rising to this war is a not unencouraging evidence that we insist upon being definitely persuaded that this is no sordid war in which the common treasure and common lives are being spent in the service of nationalistic rivalries of dynasties or business or investments. You remember the passionate denial of our Chicago poet in 1898, when doubts of the same sort forced themselves on his mind:

> Lies! lies!
> It cannot be! The wars we wage
> Are noble, and our battles still are won
> By justice for us ere we lift the gage.
> We have not sold our loftiest heritage!
> The proud republic hath not stooped to cheat
> And scramble in the market place of war.
> Her forehead weareth yet its solemn star!

We do well, therefore, not to be impatient of popular scruples upon our entrance into war, but to be proud of them, and to regard the present task of leadership, not as the autocratic one of imposing this war upon a reluctant mass, but as the democratic one of winning their hearty support by demonstrating its worthiness. There may be some irony in the nature of some of the conspicuous leadership in our various war councils; but we may surely feel confident that sooner or later democracy will take effective charge of its own war, and hold it to its purpose.

> Blindness we may forgive,
> But baseness we will smite.

And especially, since we have decided upon the method of conscription for our armies, we owe it doubly to the young men whom we take, and to their fathers and mothers, to make it certain beyond the

shadow of a doubt that no unworthy uses at home or abroad shall be allowed to tarnish their New World victories.

What then is our purpose? It is expressed in the topic I have taken for my discussion in this series as the cause of democracy as the essential basis of a world-order. That was the principal theme of the last half of the President's war address to Congress; subsequent events and discussion have increased its significance. I want to try to indicate in what sense it is true that Germany stands as the chief enemy of democracy; how it is impossible for her, so long as that enmity lasts, to be a good neighbor in the world, and how that is the chief obstacle to our American hope for peace and world-order.

The first task, then, is the unpleasant one of proving an indictment, not against a nation, but against a state—for I think it would be well for us to confess with Edmund Burke that we do not know how to indict a nation. And may I say parenthetically that I suppose that it is still possible to hate wrong without hating the wrongdoer, and that if we seem to claim virtue for ourselves and impute sin to the Germans, it behooves us to remember that it is largely sheer good luck that has enabled us to be right, and bitter, blinding pressure that has made Germany wrong. If Prussia is today trying to construct Mittel-Europa, it is largely Mittel-Europa that has made Prussia what she is.

Well, then, what do we mean when we say that Germany stands for autocracy against the democracies of the world? We do not mean anything so shallow as that her institutions of government are badly planned and should be amended. I suppose that may be said of the United States without treason, even in war time; and if this were a war to force Germany to adopt the United States Constitution, several of us might feel strongly inclined to be conscientious objectors. Such institutions are rather the manifestations and symptoms of something more fundamental—of an attitude toward life and of settled principles of public conduct. Democracy is not a set of devices, a form of machinery of suffrage, of representation, of elections, of relations of executive and legislature, and the like, though they may all have something to do with it. It is not a thing to be enacted, not a goal to be attained and enjoyed. If it were that, and if we had attained it, why then the sooner we found something more important to talk about the better. No! Democracy is a method of progress. It is a faith—unproved like other faiths, but with heartening gleams of promise—a faith in a common humanity; a belief that men are essentially the same kind of stuff; that in this long pilgrimage of history all travel a common road, and that only by the

co-operation of all, by the recognition of all as common partners in the enterprise, with the common dignity of membership, the common experience of failure and achievement, can any sound and permanent advance, any progress worth the fighting for, be attained. It denies then that there can be any such thing as a governing class. To attempt to set aside any such class is in the first place an intolerable waste of human spiritual resources; and in the second place it thwarts the hope of civilization. The progress of organized society is the progress of justice between men, and the fruitful ideas of social justice are not handed down from above, but forced up from below. Democracy holds that only by raising a whole people to higher levels can any part of that nation ultimately prosper, and that only as participating and co-operating members can the whole people be raised. It stands for the appeal to reason.

And what, by contrast, is autocracy? It is the appeal to authority as such, to prescription, to the method of power. It denies the righteousness and the profit of general co-operation. It believes in the management of many wills by the competent few. Where democracy holds that men are in general such that they will respond to opportunity and turn toward the light, autocracy holds that they must in general be managed for their own good and that of the state by a will that is not their own. Democracy invites the ranging human spirit to experiment with life. Autocracy proposes to order and regiment it. Democracy respects intrinsic human life with a respect touched with humility; autocracy distrusts and suppresses it.

Germany in its organized capacity stands for autocracy. This is not the time to discuss in detail German imperial institutions. They have been much discussed during this war, both intelligently and unintelligently. A Reichstag based, it is true, on universal suffrage, but in a positive sense endowed with little power and elected from districts none of which have been changed since 1870, and most of them not since 1867, in spite of the fact that the movement of population has been greater and more politically significant in the Germany of the last generation and a half than almost anywhere else in the world; districts which the government refuses to reform because as they stand they grossly over-represent the backward-looking reactionary elements and under-represent the democratic, forward-looking elements; a council of German executives set over it, made up of representatives appointed by and responsible to the monarchs of the states; all under the presidency of a Kaiser who does not know how, if indeed it could be done, to distinguish between his Prussian kingship by divine right and his imperial presidency by

constitutional enactment. That sort of utterance which was described in the Reichstag at the time of the famous *Daily Telegraph* interview in 1907 as "the impulsive manifestations, the effervescences, the explosions of monarchical subjectivism" is apparently made without distinction between Prussian and imperial authority. "That which was lacking in the old Hansa," said the Emperor in the nineties, "a strong united empire obedient to one will, we now have, thanks to the grace of heaven and the deeds of my grandfather. Only one is master in the Empire and I am that one—I tolerate no other." And the Junkers join in maintaining the confusion. "The king of Prussia or the German emperor," said von Oldenburg-Januschau in the Bundesrat on January 29, 1910, "must always be in a position to say to any lieutenant: 'Take ten men and close the Reichstag.'"

It would be a mistake of serious consequence, however, to believe that the essence of German autocracy was spread evenly throughout the Empire. Its source and its home are Berlin and the dominance of Prussia. Prussia has since 1870 commanded the Empire, and the more artistic, easy-going, and amiable parts have yielded an implicit obedience to the strenuous discipline of the drill-sergeant of the Elbe. It is necessary to remind ourselves that Prussia is in population and area more than three-fifths of all Germany; that her king is *ipso facto* German emperor; that by special arrangement he commands effectively the entire military power of the Empire; that Prussia has an absolute veto upon any constitutional change, as well as upon any change in the laws governing the army and navy. In spite of some evidence of occasional irritation, the right of Prussia to dictate the character of the new Empire has not been seriously questioned. And it is not strange that this is so. No German can forget how the long-deferred hopes of the idealists and liberals came to apparent wreck in 1848 and the prospect of a Germany united under democratic auspices seemed permanently defeated with the refusal of the Prussian king to accept an imperial crown by the gift of the people; nor how the strong and ruthless hand of Bismarck took charge of the forces of German nationality, beat down liberal opposition, re-created the Prussian army, and through three planned and "willed" wars forged the German Empire. Nor can any German forget how in the short space of ten years, under Prussian militarist leadership, the German name rose in the world from a position of political insignificance if not ridicule to a practical primacy in Europe, signalized by the meeting in Berlin of a Congress of Powers under the presidency of Bismarck himself to settle that very Eastern question out of which this present

war took its origin. In the eyes of patriotic Germans Prussia earned its leadership; but liberal Germany has paid the cost in its submission to the arrogant and overbearing Prussian autocracy—an autocracy hardened against the voices of reform by the intoxication of success. Movements toward democracy in the rest of Germany have either made their way against Prussian opposition, as in Bavaria, or have been killed by the Prussian veto, as in the Mecklenburgs.

For the Prussian malady, in political terms, is the "monarchical principle"; and Prussia resents as a threat to her position and prestige any impairment in Germany (and even, as we have recently been enabled to see, in Russia) of the doctrine of royal power. "All that the Emperor gains," said Yorck von Wartenburg in the Prussian House of Lords in January, 1914, "is a loss for the King of Prussia. Now Prussia represents in Germany the monarchical principle." What then is this monarchical principle? It is the doctrine of the hereditary executive, not as a form within which the popular will operates, as in Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, but as an active and dominant power. It is monarchy by divine right. The monarch is not within the constitution, as in truly constitutional states, but outside of it and above it; not an organ of the constitution, but anterior to it. What political institutions exist have their being by the king's grace. He consults for his own guidance and information, but not for the control of his judgment, a legislature one house of which is in the absolute control of the hopelessly reactionary Junkers, who are more royalist than the king, and the other based upon a travesty of popular suffrage which practically excludes the mass of the people from all representation, and which Bismarck himself denounced as the most senseless and miserable in the world. The king, say all the commentators, is responsible to God and his conscience, and to nobody and nothing else. In Great Britain and other liberal monarchies the maxim that the king can do no wrong has long since yielded the practical corollary that, since any human being may do wrong if he does anything, the king must be constitutionally prevented from doing personally any act whatsoever that can have any political significance. Not so in Prussia. There the doctrine still holds that what an active king does is politically unchallengeable—a doctrine that disappeared in Great Britain with the Stuarts in 1688, and in France with the Bourbons in 1830. It is of some interest to remark that the last body of systematic glorification of monarchical absolutism which can be compared with the chorus of the Prussian professors since about 1870 is that which accompanied from

1814 to 1830 those restored Bourbons of whom it was said that they forgot nothing and learned nothing. The present King of Prussia has constantly expressed the high monarchical view. "Regarding myself as an instrument of the Lord," he said on one occasion, "I go my way, whose goal is the welfare and peaceable development of our fatherland, and in so doing I am indifferent to the views and opinions of the day." And on another occasion: "Those who will work with me I welcome; those who oppose me I will smash." With the gift of a statue of the Great Elector to the city of Bielefeld he wrote that it was sent as a permanent sign that "as in this ancestor, so in me, there is an inflexible will to go forward in the way once deemed right, in spite of all resistance." In 1890, addressing an academic audience, he said: "Gentlemen, my ancestors, feeling the pulse of the time, have always discerned coming events. Then they have placed themselves at the head of the new movements, resolved to direct them and lead them to new ends. Similarly I think that I, too, have recognized whither the new spirit and the century nearing its end are tending."

We might well dismiss such utterances as the vagaries of a somewhat unbalanced mind if it were not for two facts. In the first place the lack of balance is not personal merely, but institutional; no man can be a Prussian king and be wholly sane; a measure of insanity is a prerequisite to any full occupancy of the office. And in the second place a potentate who so conceives his office and hears it always so described by others is pretty sure to be the unwitting instrument of more matter-of-fact minds and more realistic forces, which avoid public scrutiny by thrusting him forward. The real political struggle in an absolutism goes on in the shadow behind the throne.

Let me refer finally, for illustration of the Prussian idea of kingship, to the Kaiser's famous Koenigsberg speech of August, 1910, in which he said that he would take his inspiration from God alone, who had given him his crown, and never from public opinion or the will of assemblies. This utterance raised in the Reichstag a storm of criticism coming from two angles: first, from the non-Prussian members, who resented the apparent transfer of the doctrines of the Prussian monarchy to the Empire; and secondly, from the democratic members, both Prussian and non-Prussian, who attacked its antidemocratic substance. The official defense by Bethmann-Hollweg on November 26, 1910, denied the first and unqualifiedly defended the second. He said:

> The Koenigsberg speech which the King of Prussia pronounced to his subjects in a Prussian province ["Very good!" from the Right] does not constitute, as has been

asserted, a proclamation of absolutist views in contravention to the constitution, but a somewhat energetic affirmation of that monarchical principle upon which the Prussian public law rests ["Very good!" from the Right]; an affirmation joined with the expression of profound religious conviction shared by the great mass of the German people. The kings of Prussia are united to their people through a logical evolution of several centuries. That evolution did not take such a course that the people created its kingdom; on the contrary, by a labor almost unexampled in history, it was its great chieftains issuing from the House of Hohenzollern, it was this House which, finding a firm support in the capacity and tenacity of its population, it was this House which forged the Prussian state ["Very good!"]. Upon the basis of this historic evolution the Prussian constitution knows not the conception of popular sovereignty. That is why the kings of Prussia are, so far as their own people are concerned, kings by their own right ["Very good!" from the Right. Laughter from the Left]. Gentlemen, your laughter does not change history. And if, at the present moment, from the democratic side, the pretension is energetically raised that the King of Prussia is to be regarded as a great dignitary established by the people, it is no matter for surprise if the King asserts with the same vigor his will never to submit to any popular sovereignty ["Very good!" from the Right]. The personal irresponsibility of the king, the self-sufficiency, original, autocratic, of the monarchical power, these are the fundamental ideas of the life of the Prussian state, which have remained vital, even through the constitutional period of its historic evolution. They are the ideas which the King of Prussia has asserted in the old city where the kings of Prussia were crowned according to the ancient formula "By the Grace of God."

With this proclamation, from the mouth of one whom we have learned to regard not as an extremist but as a moderate in Germany, of the doctrine of absolutism, of royal absolution from the common restraints of men, we may turn from the "monarchical principle."

We must look back of the throne. Behind the monarchical principle stands Prussian militarism and the whole system of caste control knit together by the military cult. It is the misfortune of Prussia that it has so demonstrably prospered in the long history of its upbuilding as a European power by the use of non-moral, if not immoral, force. The faith in arms, in force per se, as an instrument of Providence, through the agency of the Hohenzollerns, for the advancement of Prussia and of Germany, has been drilled in for many generations. It was Mirabeau who said: "War is the national industry of Prussia"; and to him is also attributed the other epigram: "Prussia is not a nation that has an army; it is an army that has a nation." Reference has been already made to the part played by arms in the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership, and the process was summed up in those words of Bismarck, the towering figure of the new Empire, spoken September 30, 1867: "The great questions of the present are not decided by arguments and the decisions of majorities, but by blood and iron." These words are

of the currency of thought of Prussian statesmen. Although Maximilian Harden is not always a reliable spokesman of the mind of Prussia, he was unquestionably echoing, not inventing, when he said: "If our jealous enemies force us to it, the *furor teutonicus* will reawaken, and Germany will remember that war has more than once been the most profitable of its industries."

It is of some significance that the present King of Prussia made his first address upon his accession to the throne to his army, and that not until three days later did he address the Prussian people. His speeches to soldiers are full of his insistence upon the priority of the military profession in the life of Prussia, and of his soldiers' complete subjection to the king's will. "Now, as ever, the one pillar on which the Empire rests is the army." "The chief pillars of the army are courage, honor, and unconditional blind obedience." "The soldier has not to have a will of his own; you must indeed all have one will, and that is my will; there is only one law and that is my law." These are random samples from Wilhelm's addresses to soldiers.

Americans will like to contrast with these the words of Abraham Lincoln when he addressed a regiment on its way to the front in 1864:

> I always feel inclined when I talk to soldiers to try to impress upon them the importance of success in this contest. . . . . I happen temporarily to occupy this White House. I am a living witness that any one of your children may look to come here as my father's child has. It is in order that each one of you may have an open field and a fair chance for your industry, enterprise, and intelligence; that you may all have equal privileges in the race of life with all its desirable human aspirations. It is for this that the struggle should be maintained, not for one year only, but for two or three.

We may congratulate ourselves upon being the inheritors of the tradition of Abraham Lincoln rather than that of the Hohenzollerns.

Two more quotations, neither from a military man, will help to emphasize the position assigned to the military caste in Prussia. Professor Hans Delbrueck, of the University of Berlin, in his *Regierung und Volkswille*, published in the spring of 1914, after declaring that the army stopped at a form of sentiment anterior to the modern notion of patriotism, and that German soldiers serve the king, not the fatherland, goes on: "The king is their comrade, and they are attached to him as to their war leader, and that is the foundation of our national life. The essence of our monarchy lies in its relations with the army. Whoever knows our officers must be convinced that they would not tolerate the government of a minister of war dependent on the Reichstag." And Bethmann-

Hollweg in the Landtag, January 10, 1914, said: "The dearest wish of every Prussian is to see the army of the king remain intact under the management of its king, and not to become an army of Parliament." Whoever recalls the long struggle in England and America to establish the principle of civil control of the military arm will realize the gulf which lies here between Prussia and the Western democracies; and I know of no more instructive contrast than that between the army crisis over Ulster in the spring of 1914 with the debates of the House of Commons upon the resignation of Sir John Seeley as Secretary of State for War, on the one hand, and the Zabern incident and the Reichstag proceedings of December and January, 1913–14, on the other.

The incident of Zabern shed such a sudden illumination upon the Prussian militarist spirit that it deserves a passing notice. In the fall of 1913 the Prussian garrison in this little Alsatian town had got itself into a state of intolerable friction with the townspeople—this, be it remembered, more than forty-two years after the region had passed under the German flag. An officer who was reviewing some cases of discipline came upon that of a soldier charged with stabbing a peasant. "What!" he exclaimed, "Did they fine you for sticking an Alsatian blackguard? I'd have given you ten marks for it, myself," and remitted the sentence. Immediately all the popular resentment flared up, and there were many clashes of varying seriousness. The soldiery proceeded to put down opposition with ruthless severity. Civilians were beaten and imprisoned. A boy was arrested for "intending to laugh" at an officer. Civil authorities, including magistrates, were suspended. The incident which finally commanded the attention of all Germany was the sabering of a lame shoemaker. Democratic and liberal members launched a series of interpellations in the Reichstag, and the arrogance of the Prussian war party received a more complete and general denunciation than it had ever had before. The net result, however, was the turning into hollow mockery of all attempts of the Reichstag to subject the military authorities to any substantially greater restraint; the acquittal of all the officers concerned; the famous telegram of the Crown Prince to the Colonel at Zabern: *Immer feste daran!* ("Keep right at it!"); and a coveted decoration for the Colonel from the Emperor.

A more humorous but scarcely less significant illustration of military domination is the exploit of the renowned Cobbler of Koepenick in 1907. A shoemaker got possession of a captain's uniform, dressed himself in it, marched into the city hall of a Berlin suburb, demanded and was yielded complete possession of the place, helped himself to what pleased him,

and marched out again, to the accompaniment of hearty guffaws from the South German comic journals. The cobbler was later arrested and, I believe, adjudged insane—a fresh instance of the well-known difficulty of drawing the line between the sane and the foolish.

And the monarchy, which omits no opportunity of proclaiming its reliance upon the army, co-operating with, as it always does, or used by, as it always is, all those vested interests whose hope of life lies in the appeal, not to the common sense of men, but to reverence, tradition, authority, and blind force, has maintained since 1870 a systematic cult of king and army, a vast propaganda for the militarist-monarchical idea. In the army, caste rules supreme and is carefully isolated from civilizing influences. Universal service is robbed of much of its democratic significance by a system of classification of recruits partly based upon, partly itself creating, social distinctions in civil life. The officers belong overwhelmingly to a narrow social group and are systematically kept in the spirit of caste. It is of more than passing significance that the Emperor, who has helped to decrease drinking, has been unwilling to discourage in the least degree and has even positively countenanced the caste-enforced system of dueling still maintained in the German army.

To all this the Prussian popular mind is carefully molded by the public-school system, whose organization serves in considerable degree to widen rather than to obliterate class distinctions, and in which the Prussian nationalist cult is methodically inculcated. There is an interesting Royal Decree of February 13, 1890:

> German history, and especially that of modern and recent times, must be emphasized, and ancient and mediaeval history must chiefly be taught for the purpose of making the pupils susceptible to the heroic and to historic greatness by the use of examples out of these times.

This was followed by the following more explicit order of the Prussian Minister of Education:

> That which was said at the time of Frederick the Great, that "the other nations envy Prussia her King," is still true today. A wealth of vivid reflections and profoundly suggestive incidents will be furnished by a recital of the uninterrupted work for their country and people in which the Hohenzollerns have been engaged for nearly half a millennium. Hence all the Prussian kings should occupy a prominent place in your teaching.

The elementary schools, the upper schools, the universities, and even the stage have been the agencies of the Prussian state system. Speech, press, and public meeting have been carefully controlled. The

right of association has been rigidly limited. The government with all its resources of social, economic, and intellectual pressure has entered actively into political contests to support the forces of reaction and suppress the promptings of change. Never has there been an attempt on such a scale, so competently engineered or so nearly successful, to distort a people's mind by the pressure of authority. At the time of the Zabern affair there happened to be at the University of Chicago an exchange professor of theology from a Prussian university, to whom I mentioned the incident casually, expecting the sort of reaction one would, I think, naturally expect from a man of his sort in Great Britain or America. Not so! We could not in this country understand, so his reply ran, how necessary it was at all costs to maintain the prestige of the military, and in that strain he continued with some vehemence. We may thank heaven that we cannot understand; but we cannot at the same time help asking ourselves what power it is that produces truculent professors of theology, and sets them to preaching at home and abroad their truculent theology and philosophy. There is but one answer: the Prussian militarist autocracy—and as time goes on we shall realize more and more clearly that the blackest crime of that autocracy is the poisoning of the wells of the generous German spirit.

But you may be asking yourselves, Why is all this our business? Why can we not leave the democrats of Germany to settle this business for themselves? Why can we not leave the Prussian autocracy to run its inevitable course to ruin? For surely none of us believes that such an enterprise can possibly in the long run succeed; the seeds of disaster are planted deep within it, and their roots were visibly spreading before this war began. The answer is, on the one hand, simply the commonplace that no nation can nowadays live unto itself alone, that in this day of growing international interests and activities isolation is impossible; and, on the other hand, that Germany under such management cannot possibly be a tolerable neighbor. The same small group that is dominating Germany's domestic affairs is managing also German world-politics. The same men who clashed the saber in the streets of Zabern are the men who, in the name of Germany, have been swashbuckling through the streets of Europe, sending the gospel of the Hun to Asia, and spreading intrigue and the threat of war from America to India. The same blind pride of caste that they display at home, the same ruthless pursuit of power, the same contempt for the intrinsic value of humanity, are reflected in their disregard of smaller nations, of different cultures, and of international right.

They have attempted to erect Germans into the high caste of humanity. The naïveté with which they express that view is explicable only on the basis of the spirit which informs their daily doings with their own people. Let me quote at random only three or four typical expressions of this curious national egotism. One is from the Kaiser. "Great ideals," he said at the formal opening of the Sieges Allee in 1901, "have become for us Germans a permanent possession, while other nations have lost them. The German nation is now the only people left which is called upon to protect, cultivate, and promote these grand ideals." Professor Lasson, writing to a correspondent in Holland in September, 1914, said: "Germany is the most perfect political structure known to history. We are morally and intellectually superior to all—without a peer. It is the same with our organization and institutions." Professor Delbrueck, in the same book which I quoted a moment ago, writes: "The Germanic constitution, adapted as it is to the exigencies both of peace and war, wants no amendment; for it represents the loftiest of the many forms of political organization now existing in the world." And finally the Prussianized Scotchman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, in his *Kriegsaufsätze* of 1915, rises to this lyric conclusion: "A liberty which is not German is not a liberty."

This is the spirit which we are called upon to meet. In a war certainly not of our seeking we have been forced to the reluctant realization of a duty we cannot avoid if we are to be permitted to hope for a peace of the world based, not upon domination, but upon mutual tolerance and the appeal to reason; not upon autocracy, but upon democracy. That duty appears now to be simply this: to see to it with every power we possess that the Prussian militarist autocracy comes out of this war unmistakably beaten at its own game; that its boast of unbroken national advancement by the appeal to arms be clearly shattered; and that it be sent back discredited in its only claim to support to be dealt with by the liberty-loving German people over whom for two generations it has so strangely domineered.

Then, and not until then, will the road be open for the next step toward a juster order of the world, toward that league of honor and of peace based upon the method of democracy that President Wilson so admirably pledged us to in his address to the Senate on January 22, and his war address of April 3. How long the first step may be we cannot now tell, but surely it is not only our right but our duty both to dream our dreams and see our visions and to study shrewdly the limits of the practical. Nor should we be so blind as not to see that one of the most

practical of facts is the capacity of human nature in any possible social significance of that term for growth and change, all wiseacres to the contrary notwithstanding; and that one undeniable direction of change in the last half-century has been the transformation of vague hopes of a world-order based, not upon the old, impossible balance of selfish national egotisms, but upon democracy and the appeal to reason into fairly definite programs. New things are possible, and it is the privilege of the New World to insist now upon their possibility.

And finally, let us not in the meantime forget that in entering this war and offering to co-operate in plans for peace in a world made safe for democracy, we are again solemnly dedicating ourselves to the democratic principle of progress. At home we set our faces anew against irrational power and prescriptive authority, against any system whereby the wills of the many are subjected to the uses of the few, and address ourselves again to the business of furthering the "depth and width of human intercourse" among us. And abroad we commit ourselves to the principle of enlightened internationalism, and renounce that old false competitive nationalism which is not an instrument but an obstacle to the main current of progress—to the "fruitful processes of co-operation in the great experiment of living together."

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No. 4

SIXTEEN CAUSES OF WAR

By

ANDREW C. McLAUGHLIN

Professor and Head of the Department of History
The University of Chicago

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SIXTEEN CAUSES OF WAR

"Politics, as Prince Bismarck often said, is an art. Hence good-will, which in matters of morality is everything, is of little or no account, and ability is the only thing that tells." (*Imperial Germany*, Prince von Bülow [new and revised edition, 1917], p. 322.)

He [the Emperor of Germany] stated that, anyway, there was no longer any international law. To this last statement the chancellor agreed."—James W. Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany*, p. 340.

The forces which brought on the world-wide war can be understood fully only when we know a long course of historical events. In the few words of this pamphlet that long preparation, the social and economic reactions, and the diplomatic controversy cannot be even summarized; we must content ourselves in general with a very brief statement of what has taken place in the last four years. It is necessary to begin with the time before America was plainly and openly affected by European conditions if we would see how we became entangled until we had to take part in the conflict or accept unbearable wrong and turn our backs on principles that are part of our lives.[1]

1. GERMANY BEGAN THE WAR

Not only does the guilt of the imperial government appear perfectly evident from the examination of the public documents which were issued by the various European governments, including those of the German Empire, but it is made doubly certain by other evidences that have come from various sources since the war began. Had we believed that Germany was set upon by envious neighbors who had planned a criminal attack upon her life, we should have instantly sympathized with her; had we believed Germany to be the victim of malicious attack, possibly we should have been even more patient than we actually were under the burden of insult and ignominy which Germany heaped on us. However that may be, we did not find our sympathy interfering

[1] The purpose of this pamphlet is not to make an argument for war or to give an extended account of the reasons for our entrance, but to answer briefly and sharply the question as to what our direct charges against Germany are. The individual facts stated are not to be considered as proofs but rather as illustrations.

with our duty; for we knew that the crime of precipitating the world into this terrible agony is chargeable to the military clique that surrounds the imperial throne of Germany.

2. GERMANY BEGAN WAR, NOT FOR SAFETY, BUT ON ACCOUNT OF AMBITION

If the purposes of the German government had appealed to us as being high-minded or noble, our feelings would not have been so wantonly outraged; but the motives added to the criminality of the attack. In part no doubt the war was due to internal explosion, the natural and inevitable result of militaristic doctrine and a state of mind begotten by continuous discussion of war, by continuous cultivation of a sense of national jealousy. It was, however, brought on by deep-laid plans of world-domination, of extending the political authority of Germany, of reaching out with mailed fist till all the other nations of the world would cower at the sight of German might. *Weltpolitik* was *Machtpolitik;* the principle of world-politics was to be based on the strength of the mighty, and Germany was to show herself the mightiest. Even the word *Machtpolitik*—the policy of force—is itself a reproach and an indictment. These plans of the war-mad military clique, with the supporting body of big merchants, pedants, and large landowners, are so startling in their magnificence that they stagger our powers of belief and we need not wonder that many are still incredulous. Indeed, it is only when we see how nearly these men have come to making their plans real that their hopes do not appear as the dream of mad men. The project was halted in its hurried fulfilment by overhaste, the defeat of the Marne, the skill of the French soldiery, and Germany's own blunders in France. But had it not been for England's power on the sea, even after the Marne the world-empire might have been at Germany's feet. In fact today, "balked but not defeated," she has fastened her clutches on much that she wanted and has laid the foundations for a political economic system engrossing large portions of Europe and stretching across Asia Minor to where the Turks face the British in Mesopotamia. She now rules a vast territory, partly by virtue of possession, partly by terrorism and guile—those instruments by which she hoped to hold the world in her hand.

3. GERMANY INVADED BELGIUM

The invasion of Belgium brought sharply to American minds the fact that we were face to face with a power which had no intention of respecting the rights of others if they stood in her path. Her philoso-

phers had prepared the way; her procedure was all a perfectly natural product of *Machtpolitik*, the policy of might. Treaties were "scraps of paper"; the small state was presumptuous and insolent if it stood in the pathway of imperial progress. The invasion was premeditated, secretly planned, and wantonly carried out. The imperial Chancellor, with certain strains of straightforwardness in a complicated make-up, confessed at the beginning that the invasion was contrary to international law; but there has been no evidence of regret, though the action stained Germany before the eyes of the world. The attempts which were early made to charge France with beginning the invasion of Belgium or intending the invasion have recently been thrown to the winds; for a member of the General Staff has published a glorification of that body in which he points to the cleverness of attacking France through Belgium along a route where France was not mobilized for resistance.

4. THE GERMAN TROOPS SACKED BELGIUM

The story of wanton devastation and cruelty is as plain as any fact in history, though equaled in enormity by nothing in modern history before the war, unless possibly the horrors of the Thirty Years' War in Germany itself. Once more the truth was so nearly unbelievable that only slowly did we accept the facts; and today there are some who do not believe, chiefly because the facts are so revolting that one naturally shrinks from accepting them as real. It is not necessary, however, to dwell on this; anybody willing to examine any considerable portion of the mass of evidence, even that of German origin, will have to believe. Had we no enmity against a power that could do such things even if they were only the product, again, of the horrible spirit of military might, an outburst of the ferocity begotten by the psychological effects of militarism? Here we saw cold, calculating terrorism, one of the instruments of world-domination. Must we live in terror of the power that devastated Belgium?

5. GERMANY DISREGARDED HER PLEDGES IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

At the very beginning the German authorities flung aside the maxims and precepts which had been growing up for the purpose of lessening the ferocity and the desolation of war. If one looks at the Hague codes, which Germany helped to make, he will get some idea of how far her armies disregarded accepted principles and practices of warfare. They bombarded unfortified towns, they resorted to pillage, they took

private funds, they held communities responsible for alleged acts of individuals and wreaked vengeance on the communities, they used poisonous gases, they dropped bombs in the night on sleeping villages.[1] In short, Germany carried out on land and sea a characteristic plan of terrorization and snapped her mailed fingers at agreements making for decency in conflict; her answer was "This is war."

6. GERMANY FLUNG ASIDE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Germany openly and flagrantly wiped out international law, the accumulation of centuries of effort to reach a higher stage of civilization. As Germany had reached the height of civilization, why should she be blocked in the course of her glorious march by the principles of international law? This position she of course could defend with scholarly ability and cunning, for what was the use of professors of jurisprudence if they could not find a philosophy of law consistent with the principle of *Machtpolitik*?[2] When we recognize these facts we see why nearly the whole outside world is arrayed against Germany. There could be no room for security save under the steel-clad wings of the German Empire. Does this affect us? Only as it affects every other self-respecting nation and as it affects the hopes of mankind. In fact all these things affected us. We may well consider whether we should not have been more than justified in entering the war even if we had seen no immediate peril to ourselves. Even if we should be left untouched in life and property, even if we should know that we could ward off actual physical attack, could we stand by and see the success of these principles of action and could we be witnesses, and only witnesses, of a conflagration which consumed inter-

[1] Germany did not ratify the portion of the Hague declaration prohibiting discharge of projectiles from balloons. Such an operation, one must think, is to be considered illegal on general principles, when the town, bombarded from the air, is undefended. In the regulations on the laws and customs of war on land, Art. 25 says: "The attack or bombardment, *by whatever means*, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings, which are undefended is prohibited." (*The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907*, edited by J. B. Scott. p. 117.)

[2] "The predatory state is the state which violates the fundamental duties of international law. The state which is power, which inculcates a theory of infallibility, which sets force before right in international dealings and commits the performance of that policy into the hands of an irresponsible man or group of men, is the antisocial factor in international society. So long as it exists, there is no safety for democracy or for international law. The existence of both democracy and international law is now at stake."—Professor Jesse Reeves, "Democracy and the Law of Nations," in the *University Record*, III, 264, 265.

national law, and democracy where it could be reached, and trampled peoples under the foot of ruthless conquest? But the world was indeed too small, its parts were too closely joined, its spaces too narrow, for one nation to run wild without directly and immediately encroaching on the rights of others.

7. GERMANY PURSUED THE POLICY OF TERRORIZING ON THE HIGH SEA

As the war went on, it became apparent that whether we were moved to action by Germany's attack on other nations or not was to be no very practical question; we had rights of our own and a certain amount of self-respect which Germany openly flouted. For the sake of brevity we must omit detailed description of the injuries inflicted on us by the submarine warfare. Sinkings by the submarine are now so much a matter of daily discussion that our minds are dull to the enormity, the formidable atrociousness, of the whole proceeding; we are likely, possibly, to accept that atrocity, too, as a normal incident of war instead of a violation of the fundamental rights to freedom of the seas of which the Germans speak so much. Submarine warfare is, not to put too fine a gloss on it, piracy, a return to the golden age of the ocean highwayman.[1] The seas belong to no nation or to no body of highwaymen; their waters are free to the nations of the earth; no nation can calmly say, "This stretch of the ocean is my fighting area"—what the German war officials called a "war zone"—"if you or yours come within it, my torpedoes will blow you out of the water." The right of blockade and that of search to enforce blockade or to seize contraband constitute the only legally acknowledged exceptions to the principle of the neutrality of the ocean. Noncombatants traveling on merchantmen have the right to travel without fear of death at the nose of a submarine. In passing on the legality of submarine destruction our government went very far, farther probably than many would *now* say it ought to have gone; for the government was anxious, apparently, not to be unfair, and anxious, too, to avoid if possible our entrance into the war on any issue that might appear merely technical. If a

[1] "This proceeding amounts to a return to the war methods of the time of the corsairs. . . . . A murky German philosophy attempts to justify these iniquities by contending that the Germans are obeying the law of Prussian expediency, by them exalted as the reason for the existence of the world. Thus their national egotism is to become the arbiter of human destinies." These are the words of a native of Ecquador, Nicolás F. López, in *South American Opinions on the War*, p. 21, in the "Publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace."

merchant vessel is destroyed at sea by the war vessel of a belligerent, as under some circumstances it properly may be, the crew and the passengers should, by the principles of international law, be put in a place of safety, not left to drown and not left in boats on a storm-tossed sea scores or perhaps hundreds of miles from land. If the U-boat cannot act without wanton destruction of noncombatant life, its use against merchantmen is barbarous and lawless. Our government, however, appeared, though reluctantly, to acknowledge that a chance to get into a lifeboat might be considered sufficient guaranty of safety.

There is no need to dwell on the "Lusitania" crime and the drowning of a hundred and more American citizens, among them women and children. It is unnecessary to do more than mention the succession of other outrages as criminal if not quite so destructive of human life. No nation that sought to maintain self-respect could put up with such lawlessness and revolting cruelty. Germany believed that we would do so, or she was willing to run the risk. She believed that we could be *frightened* into making no defense of our citizens in a place where they had a perfect right to be. It was all part of her theory of *Schrecklichkeit*.[1]

Nothing could exceed the patience with which our government dealt with this menace. Protest followed protest and argument followed argument. After the "Sussex" outrage in 1916, in reply to repeated demands made by our government, the German government promised not to sink without warning and without saving lives unless the vessel should resist or attempt to escape. This promise was coupled with the condition that the United States should compel Great Britain to surrender what Berlin asserted to be an illegal blockade; but our government answered this by declaring that Germany's obligation was not "in the slightest degree contingent upon the conduct of any other government." To this statement Germany did not reply, and by diplomatic usage, common sense, and ordinary honesty she was bound therefore by an unconditional pledge.[2]

[1] Some eight American ships were sunk or attacked before January 31, 1917. After that date there were eight others. American lives were lost by the sinking of at least twenty vessels, some of which were American. Up to the declaration of war, April, 1917, "226 American citizens lost their lives by action of German submarines, and in most instances without the faintest color of international right."

[2] Let us notice that the pledge was the very least that we had the right to demand. The author of this paper, though pretending to possess no great legal learning, does not believe that submarine warfare *against merchantmen* is legitimate at all or should be so acknowledged.

8. GERMANY OPENLY DEFIED THE WORLD

But that pledge was soon openly violated, though for a time conditions were not so perilous and we actually hoped that we could escape war; we hoped that President Wilson's arguments and warnings had had effect. The respite, however, if respite it can be called, was short.[1] The German government announced in January, 1917, that after February 1 vessels entering a barred zone surrounding the British Isles and inclosing nearly the whole coast of Europe should be sunk without warning.[2] Even after this our government waited; we tried armed neutrality in vain; we hoped against hope. But even our excessive patience was at length exhausted. In declaring this policy of ruthless sinking without warning, Germany defied the world. She did this openly and with calm, dastardly assurance that the world could place no check upon her cruelty.

9. GERMANY FILLED OUR LAND WITH SPIES

In the meantime we had been harassed and beset by German spies. Bombs were placed in merchant vessels in our ports; plots against nations with whom we were at peace were planned in a carefree way as if we had no regard either for the lives of our people or for our duties as neutrals.[3] This was but a part of what the world was suffering;

[1] "It needed but the words reported to have been uttered by the German Chancellor to complete the picture of the character of his Government when he announced that the only reason why the intensified submarine campaign was delayed until February last was that sufficient submarines could not be built before that time to make the attacks on commerce effective. Do you realize that this means, if it means anything, that the promises to refrain from brutal submarine warfare, which Germany had made to the United States, were never intended to be kept, that they were only made in order to gain time in which to build more submarines, and that when the time came to act the German promises were unhesitatingly torn to pieces like other 'scraps of paper'?"—"America's Future at Stake," by Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, in *A War of Self-Defense*, p. 4.

[2] Certain privileges promised to an occasional American ship, marked and branded and pursuing a certain narrow route, may be passed over without comment. The proposal was a mixture of crude humor and polished insult.

[3] There are probably many matters that our government has not disclosed. "Some day," said Secretary of State Lansing, "I hope the whole tale may be told. It will be an astonishing tale indeed. But enough has been told so that there no longer remains the shadow of a doubt as to the character of Germany's rulers, of their amazing ambition for world empire, and of their hatred of democracy." The House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs formally listed twenty-one crimes or unfriendly acts committed on our soil with the connivance of the German government after the beginning of the European war! Probably nothing after all

German spies ranged the world. Nothing hardened our hearts more than this—because we realized the malevolent and malignant character of the whole system; and it is probably true today that the policy of unremitting intrigue is more dangerous to the world than the German armies. For how many years the German agents of ill-will have been sowing discord between Mexico and ourselves, and pouring oil on the embers of suspicion and jealousy between ourselves and Japan—embers which quite possibly they first kindled—we do not know; but certainly these criminal plots are not new. Can there be anything more criminal than attempts to arouse hostilities between two nations at peace, unless it is an effort to break down the morale of a nation which wishes only to be left alone to develop its own life? Zimmermann's instructions to propose to Mexico an alliance against the United States, and that Mexico should draw in Japan and be rewarded by the acquisition of New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona, is a well-known episode in Germany's shocking and shameless foreign policy. These instructions were to be carried out only in case we went to war over the unrestricted submarine policy; but they were sent when we were still at peace and when Germany pretended to be observing her pledge to us.[1] German agents and officials took advantage of their positions and of our easy tolerance to participate in plans for fomenting strikes and industrial disorder.[2] Perhaps the most glaring little piece of evidence of German methods

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is so interesting or perhaps so creditable to our character as a peace-loving nation as our putting up with this sort of thing so long. "The Prussian autocracy," said President Wilson, ". . . . has filled our unsuspecting communities, and even our offices of government with spies, and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries, and our commerce."

[1] The dispatch was so vulgarly immoral that the German-American papers declared, when it was published, that it could not be genuine; but the German foreign office made only the excuse that the proposal to Mexico was to be made only in case war broke out. "Decent nations do not go around preparing schemes for the dismemberment of other nations with which they are at peace." Irrespective of other evidence—see, for example, the correspondence between Lansing and the Japanese commissioner recently published—it is incredible that Zimmermann should have thought of this thing unless there had been long preparation of the ground.

[2] "German official documents, seized in Capt. von Igel's office, present as an argument against Austro-Hungary's cutting off the subsidy to a pretended employment bureau, which was in reality a branch of the German Secret Service, that this 'Liebau Bureau' had been highly successful in fomenting strikes and disturbances at munition factories." See the *President's Flag Day Address, with Evidence of Germany's Plans*. The sum of $600,000 was spent on the attempt of Huerta to stir

is the request sent to Berlin by the ambassador at Washington that he be given authority to expend $50,000 "in order, as on former occasions, to influence Congress through the organization you know of."

10. GERMANY'S CONSPIRACY AND ESPIONAGE THREATENED DEMOCRACY

Everyone at all appreciative of the danger realized that Germany's policy of unremitting intrigue, her sly cunning, and her patient efficiency in deceit were a source of danger to us and our institutions. Those institutions and the principles of our daily life were detestable to the men whom Professor van Dyke has well called the "predatory Potsdam gang." Democracy, simple-hearted, hospitable, unsuspecting democracy, cannot breathe in the fetid air of constant conspiracy. We thus found ourselves arrayed against the whole system, policy, and philosophy of indecent world-politics (*Weltpolitik*, the dear handmaid of *Machtpolitik*). We saw ourselves endangered by a principle as well as shocked by its application. Must we go on trying to develop, enlarge, and make more real the fundamental ethics of democracy—trying to solve, on the basis of justice and propriety and human right, the multitude of social problems which beset us—and must we do this knowing that a suspicious, intriguing nation is watching our every step and spying upon our every action—a nation whose unworthy government nurses the delusion that her pathway to power leads over the misfortunes and the distress of others? Or must we, too, become secretive, vulgarly ambitious, and love darkness better than light?

11. GERMANY MENACED OUR SAFETY

We came to see that German success in the war meant attack, perhaps immediate attack, upon ourselves. A thoroughly triumphant Germany almost surely imperiled us. Again, this danger will seem somewhat fantastic to anyone who has not carefully read, watched, and studied during the last three and a half years; but Germany's need of indemnities to replenish her resources would at least conceivably

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up a revolution in Mexico in 1915, in order that we might have to step in and shoot Mexicans instead of protecting ourselves against Germany (*ibid*, p. 5).

When we consider what was done by German agents in government pay on our soil against the allied nations, especially Britain, with whom we were at peace, we get some idea of our obligation and the extent to which our neutrality was insultingly violated. We were on the verge of war with England during our Civil War because England allowed things to be done there much less vicious in character.

tempt a victory-drunk government to pounce upon our coast cities. Be that as it may, a victorious Germany was sure to be our enemy. Possibly only the student of psychology of militarism will see why she should be our enemy; but most of us now have some slight knowledge of that psychology. It rests, not on the basis of friendliness or good-natured rivalry, but on intrigue and force, on the supposition that a rival must be beaten either by foul means or by fair, open brutality[1] —if not by intrigue, then by war.

German leaders (for all the way through I have in mind the predatory classes) included America in the "Anglo-Saxon block"—the British and ourselves—whose upbuilding endangered, they believed, the extension of their own power. Not that there was any block, with political aims or secret purposes; but Anglo-Saxon progress was supposed to rival or overreach Germanic world-influence, not to say power. We came within the scope of their world-policies: First, *der Tag*, the day in which the British fleet should be beaten (happily still a distant day), and then America, peace-besotten, incoherent, incautious, and unwise, should be taken in hand.[2] No one can seriously suppose that a successful Pan-Germany stretching from the North Sea, where she today holds Norway, Denmark, and Holland by fear and holds Belgium in her icy grip, down to and across the Bosphorus and over Asia Minor—no one can seriously suppose that that nation would suddenly become peaceful and law-abiding and be willing to live decently with other nations, when she has hesitated at nothing odious in her war of conquest and has trampled on the rights of distant nations like ourselves.

12. GERMANY THREATENED THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Germany has long been a menace to the Monroe Doctrine. The writer of this pamphlet intends to hold no brief for the Monroe Doctrine as a "doctrine." But nearly a hundred years ago we determined that the free nations of this continent should not be tied to the tail of the European kite, or be pawns in the game of European diplomatic intrigue. We owed this principle to ourselves and to our neighbors who were

[1] Fourteen years ago many Germans told one of the professors of this university that Germany must fight America some day, and the reason given was simply that America was beginning to reach out for the world's trade!

[2] Can anything be more imperially magnificent than Kaiser William's impudent statement to our Ambassador Gerard that he would not tolerate any more nonsense from America after this war? America! which even then was enduring German ferocity with dignified patience!

trying for sober self-government; we owed it to the decency of the world; and so in recent years we have not looked on with complacency as Germany, the embodiment of the old rotten principle of world-politics, carried on her confidence game in Latin America.[1]

13. GERMANY IMPERILED THE INTEGRITY OF OUR NATION

Not content with watchful jealousy of American progress in the two continents of the Western Hemisphere, Germany endangered our national unity and wholeness. It is difficult, probably impossible, to know just how far she went in an attempt to segregate and hold to herself the Germans in this country.[2] There were plans for maintaining the devotion of the people who, we supposed, were part of ourselves. To the extent that this was planned, an attack was made upon the very inmost spirit of American democracy—hospitable, uncritical, open-hearted democracy; it aimed a vicious blow at our character, at our *selves;* it sought to poison the sources of our national vitality.

14. IN PEACE AND WAR GERMANY THREATENED THE PEACE OF THE WORLD

Before the war she scorned disarmament or retrenchment. She scorned attempts at arbitration; this must be put down to her credit, for she was *honest* about it; she had no intention of entering arbitration agreements; her reliance was on her "shining armor." This much, I say, must be placed to her credit, for it shows that even *Realpolitik* has its own element of honesty. Arbitration was so distasteful to militarism that even the promise to arbitrate was loathsome. After the war

[1] At the outbreak of the war Germany officially informed the United States that she was not seeking expansion in South America! And Dr. Dernburg said that when she was victorious there would be "enough property of her antagonists lying about to keep Germany from the necessity of looking any further." The full disclosure of her militaristic imperialism has justified our previous suspicions. Possibly some eyes have been opened; the eyes of Brazil are, where Germany planned to build up *Deutschtum* in her midst. And there is nothing more refreshing in its quaint, piratical barbarism, with all the qualities of primitive savagery, than the advice of the German minister to Argentina, if the Berlin authorities decided not to let certain Argentine ships through on their peaceful voyage, to sink them without trace—*spurlos versenken.* There is the basis for a genteel *Kultur;* for dead men tell no tales.

[2] Particular attention might well be paid to the German law passed shortly before the war which provides that, if a German is naturalized in a foreign state, he can go to the German consul and take steps to retain his German citizenship. Notwithstanding that on being naturalized he swears to give up all allegiance to every prince, potentate, or state, all he needs to do is to notify the German consul that he does not mean it.

began and as it went on, we saw all this more clearly. Unregenerate Germany led by the war lords of Prussia in a league to preserve peace—weak, timid, flabby, sodden peace! And if the blood-stained government, flying the tattered emblems of self-sufficient military autocracy, should sign a league-of-peace agreement, what would the signature be worth except as a curio?

15. GERMANY MADE THE WORLD UNSAFE FOR DEMOCRACY

America came to see, by April, 1917, that she must enter the struggle and sacrifice, if need be, all but honor to put down arrogant militarism and strutting autocracy, the remnants of an outworn practice of life and mode of thought. The world was too small to contain two fundamentally hostile principles of life. It took the devastation of this horrible calamity, the death of millions, the crippling of tens of millions, the semi-starvation of a continent, the drowning of our own people, the slimy intrigue in our own nation, the practice of studied cruelty in Belgium and Poland—it needed all this to open our blind eyes; but at last we saw. There was no use in arguing about it; the world was too small, too organically united; it could not encompass two warring principles of life—warring, that is to say, and deadly in their antagonisms even in times of so-called peace; for the deadliest of enemies are ideas and ideals that in, of, and through themselves lead to differing goals. There was no use in talking about it; the world cannot permanently exist or longer live half-slave and half-free. We have to make the world safe for democracy.[1]

[1] President Wilson has not, as some people think, asserted that Prussia must adopt a democratic government. He has simply said that German rulers cannot be trusted; any arrangement with them for peace, unbacked by the people of Germany, would be a bauble. Does anybody doubt that the German government is not trusted?

The question is not whether it ought to be trusted; as to that, some ignorant person might break into an argument. The question is not whether we may ultimately have to sign a peace with the gilded and brazen rulers of Germany; on that point some faint-hearted person might start a discussion. The question is: Does anybody trust the government?

The President has also pointed out that a peace which is really vital must be a peace of peoples. Anybody doubting that has not got very far into the meaning of this horrible catastrophe. We are not, let us hope, giving up the lives of our boys for a "peace" hanging on the shaky word of a Berlin government. And nothing but the righteous sense and serene judgment of everyday people who have seen light and love the sunshine of friendliness—nothing else can give us hope for humanity.

While we do not demand that Germany adopt the forms of democratic government, we do insist that peace and the security of nations be based on the democratic principle.

All this does not mean that democracy is conquering and combative, or that it is exclusive, narrow, self-seeking; by its very nature in the modern world it is and must be frank, hospitable to ideas, unrevengeful, hating deceit, loving the open. Secrecy, suspicion, and cold, calculating preparation to stab a neighbor—these are the qualities which true democracy cannot endure. If we must live in a state of sullen antipathy, on our guard to protect our own culture from invasion of new ideas, cherishing a sense of peculiar and insulated superiority, we give up most of the things or all of the things that make democracy worth while. Democracy, if true to itself, must have "freedom and fulness of human companionship."

If the world, divided into four or five alliances each bristling with bayonets, must organize from top to bottom for war and live in constant suspicion and hatred, breathing the air of intrigue and sharp practice, then democracy cannot last; then democratic nations must put on the full armor[1] and carry the poisoned arrows of autocracy; for where under those conditions are freedom and fulness of companionship? About one-half of democracy consists in giving the other fellow his fair chance; that is the salt of democracy, and if the salt shall lose its savor wherewith shall it be salted? Not from Berlin.

16. GERMANY'S CONDUCT AND PRINCIPLES CONFLICT WITH ANY PLAN OF WORLD-ORGANIZATION FOR PEACE

Before we entered the war we were committed, as far as the President could commit us, and as far as our unspoken longings would go, to a league to preserve peace; we had determined that the world must have some scheme, some series of institutions, to which we might with reasonable hope intrust the preservation of civilization to save it from demoniac destruction by scientific warfare. Unless we entered the war, to take our part and bear our suffering, in the awful task of conquering the militaristic, sword-proud government that boasted of its prowess, unless we did our part in overthrowing the predatory classes that openly preached the philosophy of war, we could do little or nothing for peace. Germany might be triumphant; and even if she were not, peace based

[1] It is worth while to calculate what must be done if, when this war ends, all nations must proceed to prepare for another war. What has been done will be nothing in comparison—organization from the cradle to the grave, millions of men taken from useful employment, consumption of vast stores of material, the consequent lessening of productivity and the maintenance of poverty, the use of science and intelligence to kill. All this must be given up some time if civilization is to survive.

on justice and hope seemed practically impossible without our help. Europe was drenched in blood, shattered in its very being. So we entered the war for peace. We cannot be accused of seeking financial gain or profiting by territorial conquest. And thus to our bounden duty to defend ourselves was added a duty to the world. This peace, if it be real, must, as the President has said, find its lasting support in the hearts of peoples.

We are offering a terrible sacrifice. National self-respect, resentment at unbearable wrong, indignation at barbaric cruelty, might be enough to justify the exertion of our utmost strength; but the call was louder than that of fear or anger, and we shall have to bear in mind those deeper and higher purposes if we are to do our part in making democracy safe and civilization reputable. The German government, and above all the autocratic principles of Prussia, are a remnant and a survival of hoary doctrines and practices of an early age. Those principles and practices are tenfold more dangerous than ever before because they have summoned to their support modern science, modern industrialism, and a crude and awful materialism.[1] If Germany cannot cleanse herself and emerge into the light, the outside nations must either do the task for her or themselves adopt with resolution the conscienceless program of suspicion, intrigue, and forcible material conquest. The latter alternative is revolting. Germany can be brought and must be brought within the circle of co-operating nations.

[1] If anyone doubts the existence of this crude materialism beneath the patriotic exaltation of the people, he should read thoughtfully General von Bissing's *Testament*. There he will find an interesting example, though only an example, of the hard, relentless policy of vulgar, materialistic *Kultur*.

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No. 5

THE WAR AND INDUSTRIAL READJUSTMENTS

By

HAROLD GLENN MOULTON

Associate Professor of Political Economy
The University of Chicago

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THE WAR AND INDUSTRIAL READJUSTMENTS

How may American industries most effectively aid in the successful prosecution of the war? What readjustments, if any, must be made in the coming months to insure the production of the perfectly stupendous quantities of supplies and materials that war imperatively demands? Can we secure these supplies by speeding up production in existing factories and workshops, or must we transform in considerable measure the character of our industries, eliminating the nonessential and thereby diverting productive energy more largely into war channels?

In the present paper an attempt will be made to throw light upon these vital questions. First, we shall make a simple analysis of the industrial requirements of the war; secondly, a statement of the lessons that are to be learned from the experience of Europe during the past three years; thirdly, a brief statement of the lessons from our own experience to date; and finally we shall give an account of the plans for the future that are now being formulated at Washington.

THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE SITUATION

Someone has said—I think it was Napoleon—that three things are necessary to wage a war successfully: money, more money, and still more money. There is a great deal of truth in this statement in ordinary wars, but as applied to the United States in the present conflict it is entirely misleading. Money is of paramount importance when a nation may buy its war supplies from abroad. England and France, for instance, before our entrance into the war, purchased with money vast quantities of war supplies from the United States. But it is impossible for us to use money, to any great extent, in buying goods from other nations, for the simple reason that the entire commercial world is now at war. With his money Uncle Sam can buy war supplies only from himself. There are of course a few exceptions to this, such as nitrates and rubber; but, substantially speaking, Uncle Sam must produce all the things

which he is to use in the war. We the people turn funds into the Treasury and then Mr. McAdoo buys from us the supplies needed. The amount that he can buy is determined, in practice, by the amount of war supplies we have produced. Similarly, when we extend *credit* to our allies we really say to them, We will furnish you with materials and supplies now and you may pay for them after the war is over. This point must be strongly emphasized; for many people fancy that furnishing credit to our allies means merely sending them money, or perhaps some sort of draft or credit instrument. In the last analysis it always means that we send them goods, which they are to pay for at some future time.

To understand, then, the real problem with which we are confronted, we must think in terms of goods rather than in terms of money. Three things, in the main, are required of us, aside from soldiers:

1. Ships—as many as can be constructed.
2. Supplies and munitions—as many as can be furnished.
3. Food—as much as can be produced.

While these are the specific *things* that are required, it is obvious that to produce these things in utterly unprecedented quantities will require the development first of many industries that are auxiliary to shipbuilding, war manufacture, and farming. The modern industrial world is extraordinarily complex, and every fundamental industry has a multitude of handmaidens.

Now let us see precisely what this involves in the way of industrial mobilization. We have in the United States, let us say, 60,000,000 working people. Ordinarily these 60,000,000 workers produce (1) essentials, (2) nonessentials. In time of war many of these workers are drawn off from productive industry to war service, but enough others are pressed into the industrial ranks to take up much of the slack—possibly they fully replace the number who are called to the colors. Let us assume that we have 60,000,000 workers who must produce the indefinite quantities of ships, supplies, munitions, and food that are demanded.

Now there are just two possible alternatives before us: First, these 60,000,000 workers must be speeded up to a point where they will be producing, not only the usual quantities of (1) essentials

and (2) nonessentials, but in addition the unlimited quantities of ships, supplies, munitions, and food that are required; or, secondly, we must produce (1) essentials; but then, instead of producing (2) nonessentials, transfer, so far as may be practicable, the factory power and the labor power ordinarily devoted to producing luxuries to the production of the indispensable ships, munitions, and other war materials.

When the war began it was generally assumed in the United States that the first of these alternatives would be adequate to meet the requirements of the situation. We assumed that the production of war supplies could be undertaken as an *extra*—that we could speed up our factories and our workers sufficiently to meet all war demands. We did not understand how utterly insatiable are the demands of modern warfare. The notion that war production can be carried as an *extra* is, however, no longer held in government circles. It is now conceded that we must resort to the second method. In order to understand clearly the reasons for this change we must consider the lessons that the United States has learned from Europe in this connection.

WHAT GERMANY HAS DONE

One of the best ways of ascertaining the problem that lies before us is to study the German method of industrial mobilization. We have all wondered many times how Germany has been able to finance the war, how she has been able for four years—though largely cut off from the outside world—to resist the economic pressure of the Allies and at the same time procure the necessary war supplies for campaign after campaign—yes, let it be faced squarely—for victory after victory against her united enemies.

There is just one answer to this question. As soon as it became apparent that the war would be long-continued Germany set about the eliminating of all nonessential industries; factories which had been producing luxuries were converted into munitions or supplies plants, where possible; and where this was not possible they were closed down and the laborers transferred for war service in essential industries. Germany thus early got right down to brass tacks. Indeed, in some instances Germany did not even

wait to discover whether the drive on Paris would be successful. Secretary Baker tells us that he knows of one case where within twenty-four hours after the outbreak of the war one-half of the laborers in a large nonessential industry were placed in the army and the remainder transferred to war industries. A selective draft for industry appears to have been a part of Germany's war preparedness.

Germany recognized, in other words, that for every soldier at the front there must be several (industrial) soldiers at the rear; and the principles of military organization were made to apply to every aspect of national life. A certain percentage of the national energy was put on the battle fronts; a certain percentage was devoted to the creation of submarines; a certain percentage to the manufacture of supplies and munitions; and a certain percentage to the production of foodstuffs. All useless effort, all waste motion, as far as possible, was thus eliminated—everything was arranged with an eye single to military victory.

THE EXPERIENCE OF FRANCE

It was quickly realized in France that "business as usual" would be nothing short of national suicide. Three-quarters of the male laboring population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were called to arms literally overnight, with the result that French industry during those first awful weeks was largely paralyzed. France was relying upon her accumulated stores of supplies, plus importations from England and America. But after the pressure on the west was somewhat relieved and after it became clear that a long struggle was inevitable, France recalled from the trenches skilled laborers and mechanics who could henceforth serve the nation more efficiently in the industrial army. But when these men were withdrawn from the front it goes without saying that they were not delegated to produce luxuries and nonessentials; they were set to upbuilding war industries to the end that the armies might be certain of obtaining a steady replenishment of the indispensable weapons and materials of warfare. There cannot be the slightest doubt that France would have been crushed during those endless months of waiting for England to

get ready if she had not been making her national energy count effectively in the struggle in which she was engaged.

It is necessary to state, however, that France has not gone as far as Germany in the elimination of nonessentials. It appears that some luxuries have continued to be manufactured and sold in France, at least until very recently. Need we add that every ounce of national power thus misdirected is an ounce of power lost in the struggle against Germany?

THE LESSONS FROM ENGLAND

England, across the channel, and hence free from invasion, long deluded herself with the notion that she could have business as usual and at the same time cope successfully with an enemy that was wonderfully efficient in its organization for war. But England eventually awoke—in about two years—to the real requirements of the grim business of war. I quote from Hon. R. H. Brand, vice-chairman of the British War Mission to the United States: "We discovered to our surprise at the beginning of the war, that war apparently meant prosperity and not poverty. Wages advanced and millions found that they had more money than they had ever had before. The result was that consumption actually tended to go up among the poorer classes, and labor and materials vitally required for war purposes were *diverted* to meeting these new demands. But we found that 'business as usual' is impossible. The ravenous demands of a modern war compel every nation at war to choose between peace and war; if they have elected for war, they must order their economic lives accordingly; they must turn their industry from a peace to a war basis, and they must see that every war demand has a prior claim to every peace demand." Now England's industrial energy is mainly devoted to the production of war supplies. Whole industries have been closed down and the laborers engaged therein have been transferred to war occupations.[1]

[1] Mr. Brand's address, from which the above was taken, was delivered September 26, 1917, before the American Bankers' Association. Unfortunately the address was not published in full in the official *Journal of the American Bankers' Association*. The important parts were, in fact, omitted. The writer has a transcript of the stenographic report of the full address.

It was argued by many in England, as it is being argued by some in the United States, that to readjust industry in such fashion would be to decrease wages and profits and thereby render more difficult the task of paying taxes and subscribing to government loans. The fallacy of this notion was revealed by experience, however, for when labor was shifted to war industries and factories were rehabilitated for the manufacture of war supplies, it was found that wages and profits were quite as large as before. And what is the vitally significant factor, it was found that these wages and profits were earned in producing *things that could be used in the waging of the war*. The war supplies obtained by this diversion of energy represented clear gain in fighting strength.[1]

UNITED STATES WAR PRODUCTION INADEQUATE

While this country has been learning these lessons from the nations that have been through the fire we have also been acquiring some experience of our own. It was the general notion at the beginning of the war that if the government were able to secure the necessary funds from the sale of bonds and the raising of taxes, the purchase of the necessary materials and supplies would follow as a mere matter of routine. The utter fallacy of this idea is revealed in the figures made public by the war department on January 31, 1918. Exclusive of loans to our allies, the government planned to spend during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, $12,316,000,000. In fact, the government has spent in the seven months from June 30, 1917, to January 31, 1918, only about $3,150,000,000. That is, in seven-twelfths of the year the government has been able to spend only three-twelfths of what it planned to spend. With coffers filled to overflowing the government could not buy the supplies needed, for the simple reason that not sufficient energy had been devoted to the production of war supplies. Money alone was thus seen to be impotent; and this experience has focused attention on the real requirements for waging war, namely, materials and supplies.

[1] To guard against misunderstanding here it should be stated that some luxuries are still manufactured in England; for England's reorganization is not 100 per cent efficient. Moreover, it must be observed that the manufacture of certain luxuries to be shipped abroad in exchange for necessities may within limits be wise.

These figures show more clearly than mere words could possibly do that the United States has thus far not accomplished anything like what it confidently expected to accomplish. They prove that we are falling far short of rendering our maximum aid. Moreover, it is concrete evidence such as this which has forced our government to conclude that we must resort to the second of the two alternatives stated above; that is, secure a thoroughgoing readjustment of industry.

It is possible, of course, that we may continue with present methods and still blunder through to victory somehow. It may be that Germany is nearly done. But the evidence of the past year all points to an opposite conclusion. Not since the first year of the war has Germany gained such marked successes as during recent months. We may bolster up our courage by tales of "strategic retreats," of occasional recaptures of lost ground, and of the rumblings of internal discord in the Fatherland; but when are the allies to have something positive to offer in the way of gains of their own? We have been saying for over two years that Germany is "about through," and all the time the evidence shows that she is getting relatively stronger, at least so far as the European forces are concerned. Indeed, with the disintegration of Russia we are at the gravest period of the war since the Battle of the Marne. And really effective aid on our part cannot be given until the year 1919 at best.

But even granted that victory is ultimately assured for the allies, it must never be forgotten that every month of prolongation of the war means billions of additional cost and the sacrifice of the lives of thousands of our finest sons. All will agree that consciously to leave any stone unturned to render our maximum service and to bring the war to the earliest possible successful termination is nothing short of criminal. The supreme requirement of the hour would seem to be industrial mobilization that will go to the very foundations of our national organization.

WHAT OUR GOVERNMENT IS PLANNING

The government of the United States is, as already indicated, now fully aware of the necessity of such an industrial mobilization

as we have been discussing. It is important, therefore, that we all understand what developments are in store for us, to the end that we may co-operate in fullest measure with the government in its efforts.

First, the government is urging us to save as never before; and to save with a view to the elimination of nonessential industries. The Liberty Loan Committee states:

> Luxuries and extravagance must go completely out of fashion—should, in fact, be considered little short of treachery. . . . . There is not enough capital, labor, transportation, or raw material to go around, if those industries which are not essential to the conduct of war are continued at their normal productiveness. Every unessential industry which continues in operation must be considered as bidding against the nation for its life's blood. . . . . Every unessential industry which burns coal deprives the essential industries by just so much of the supply available for their purposes. Every man who buys a new overcoat is bidding against Uncle Sam, who is buying overcoats for soldiers. And every dollar spent on a luxury is helping to support an unessential industry in the competitive consumption of essentials.[1]

But the government is not to rely exclusively on voluntary saving as a means of bringing about industrial changes. It is also developing agencies of central control. In September a priority committee was established in Washington with power to decide what industries should be given prior claims in the matter of raw materials. This committee has drawn up a classification, as follows:

Class A comprises war work: that is to say, orders and work urgently necessary in carrying on the war, such as arms, ammunition, ships, etc., and the materials required in the manufacture of same.

Class B comprises orders and work which, while not primarily designed for the prosecution of the war, yet are of public interest and essential to the national welfare, or otherwise of exceptional importance.

Class C comprises all orders and work not embraced in Class A or Class B.

There are various subdivisions of these classes, indicated by a suffix number, thus: A1, A2, etc., B1, B2, etc.

All orders and work in Class A shall take precedence over those in Class B, and those in Class B shall take precedence over those in Class C.

[1] See *Economic World*, January 12, 1918, p. 54.

When rigidly applied to such fundamental materials as iron, it will be readily seen that this priority system reaches into nearly every branch of industry, and that people who wish iron and steel for ordinary industrial requirements will be forced to wait—and wait indefinitely, since the demands of the war industries are certain to be simply insatiable.

Very recent developments in connection with the problem of the nonessential industries may be indicated by quotations from a statement issued by the War Industries Board of the Council of National Defense late in February, 1918.[1]

Shortages of many classes of raw materials and of labor in different lines are evident. Transportation, both water and rail, is obviously short and the need of industrial readjustment is apparent to make room for the war requirements of our government and our Allies. . . . . In many cases, the facilities of less essential industries should be converted to essential production.

. . . . Our industrial equipment is limited. We do not have materials, machinery, transportation, labor, or capital sufficient for fighting the great war and for normal business at the same time. The war must be prosecuted to the utmost . . . . and to that end business must, where necessary, be diverted from its established channels into new channels.

With reference to the coal situation, it is stated that—

The demands for 1918 to carry out the program for the production of necessities for the war, in addition to the normal business, would greatly exceed any possible production and distribution of fuel, so there is but one remedy, i.e., to limit the production of non-war industries sufficiently to provide for:

a) War needs—direct and indirect.

b) Necessities for the public welfare and domestic consumption.

In accomplishing the desired end, it should be our effort to divert the energies of non-war industries as far as possible to the production of the essentials for war, that each industrial center may use existing facilities, with its labor living at home, happy and contented.

In the readjustment process it is inevitable that the normal business of some industries must be interfered with in order that the production of war and public necessities be kept at the maximum. It may be that some plants because of lack of power, shortage of labor, raw materials, or transportation may have to suspend entirely. These sacrifices must be endured in the interest of our first object, which is to win the war. If we secure complete co-operation between Government and business, it is hoped that our industries may emerge

[1] This statement is issued by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, as War Bulletin No. 34, entitled "Industry in War Times."

from the disturbed condition caused by the war, intact and strong for the economic problems which must face us.

It would seem to be the immediate duty of the War Industries Board—

1. To list, by classes or otherwise, and to define those industries whose operation as a war measure are of *exceptional importance*, classifying them as far as practicable in the order of their relative urgency, measured by the extent of their contribution, directly or indirectly, toward winning the war.
2. To consider carefully and, after due notice and hearings, to determine what are the less important industries, measured by the extent of their contribution, directly or indirectly, toward winning the war.
3. To promulgate such findings and to prepare, present, and, if practicable, enforce such definite and concrete plan or plans as will result in—
   a) Stimulating the operation of industries of exceptional importance.
   b) Curtailing the operation of the less important industries or, in the alternative, encouraging such industries so to change their operations as to produce war needs.
   c) Conserving the supply of essential raw materials as reserves to be drawn to meet the war requirements.

The task of bringing about the necessary reorganization with the minimum of loss and suffering is so tremendous that the machinery for its accomplishment is as yet far from being perfected. While the details cannot be given in this paper, it is generally known that the government is now developing the machinery for transferring laborers with a minimum of loss or suffering to the jobs in war industries for which they are adapted. Plans are also being matured which will provide for adequate housing facilities in the vicinity of war industries. Various financial policies are also being worked out which will insure that investments shall be diverted from the nonessential industries, and that businesses which transfer to war work will be given adequate financial support and a guaranty of adequate profits.

It should be added here that the rapidity with which this readjusting may be accomplished largely depends upon the developments in shipping. The materials and supplies for war must pass through a narrow-necked bottle on the way to Europe, and the rate at which this neck expands will determine the rate at which we can effectively mobilize our resources for war purposes. Now, to increase our shipping capacity as rapidly as is required involves not only speeding up the work in existing yards, but also

enlarging our shipbuilding facilities by diverting labor and capital from less essential work. It means that parts of ships must be manufactured by industrial plants wherever readjustment for such work is practicable. It means, further, that imports and exports of nonessentials must be curtailed in many instances to the end that tonnage may be released for war business. And the restrictions of these imports and exports in turn necessitates readjustments in the domestic industries dependent upon such trade; the labor and capital employed in such industries must be diverted to the production of forms of war materials to which they may be adapted. In short, the problem before us is nothing less than the organizing of all the productive resources of the United States of America with a single end in view—that of building a bridge of ships across the Atlantic and sending across that bridge in minimum time a maximum of troops and supplies. The task we are undertaking is thus one gigantic business proposition, in comparison with which the largest individual business ever known is utterly insignificant. To carry such a stupendous task to successful completion will require not only the best organizing ability the nation possesses, but infinite patience and willing self-sacrifice on the part of those whose ordinary occupations are inevitably to be disarranged.

HOW BUSINESS CAN HELP

It goes without saying that American business men are anxious to assist in every possible way in effecting these industrial readjustments with a minimum of loss. Patriotic impulse alone will lead every American business man to do his part. He merely needs to be shown how he can help most efficiently. But quite apart from patriotism or the possibility of a curtailment of raw materials or transportation facilities there is another reason which should lead business men to make readjustments wherever possible just as quickly as they can. It is inevitable that the nonessential industries will shortly have greatly reduced sales; indeed, in many cases there is already a serious falling off in sales. The reasons why this is inevitable may be briefly indicated.

In the first place the perfect barrage fire of argument as to the necessity of saving that has been hurled at the American public in

recent months is bearing fruit. It is now regarded as unpatriotic not to save as never before in our history.

In the second place it is impossible for the rank and file of the American people to buy Liberty Bonds and spend as usual. If they buy bonds it must be at the sacrifice of accustomed luxuries. Moreover, we are now looking forward to the payment of taxes, and we are making our preparations for this by economizing in our normal purchases. It must be borne in mind in this connection, also, that at a time when the future is so uncertain a great many people are saying, "I had better save all I can now, because there is no telling whether it will be possible for me to save anything in the next few years."

Finally, it must be noted that the rapid rise of prices in nearly every line is *forcing* rigid economy among the masses. Statistics just published by the government show that retail prices of foodstuffs in the United States are now 57 per cent higher than they were in 1914, while general wholesale prices are 81 per cent higher. Students of the question are unanimous in the belief that prices will continue to rise here throughout the war, just as they have in the nations of Europe. It will therefore shortly be impossible for the masses of our people to devote much of their earnings to the purchase of nonessentials. They will count themselves fortunate if they are able to purchase enough of the necessities of life to sustain themselves in a state of normal efficiency. Already in many cases the pinch of war prices is beginning to mean real privation.

In the light of the situation which we have been discussing it is obviously imperative that business be readjusted to a war basis wherever practicable and as soon as possible. The great problem is, How? There are two attitudes which business men may assume. One is that of "watchful waiting"; the other that of active and constructive effort directed toward conversion of their plants to war manufacture. The former leads to bankruptcy and to neglected opportunity for service to the government; the latter is the avenue to participation in profits and to effective assistance to the nation in its hour of need. A large number of concerns have already been forehanded enough to divert a portion

of their plants to war work; and it is hoped that the facts about these may soon be made generally available. In the meanwhile it may prove suggestive to present here a very brief statement of some of the adjustments that have been made in England. Instead of gramophones, the gramophone company now makes fuses and delicate shell parts; instead of cloth for ordinary clothes, the woolen factory makes khaki; instead of motor cars, the motor-car maker makes shells; glaziers make cartridge clips; music-roll plants make gages; infant-food plants make plugs for shells; advertising agencies make shell adapters; watchmakers adjust fuses; baking-machinery plants make six-inch high-explosive shells; jewelry houses make periscopes; cream-separator factories make shell primers; and textile machinery firms make field kitchens.

The outstanding need of the time is for the managers and staffs of technical experts in non-war industries everywhere to be studying the problem with the greatest care in order to discover in what ways their plants may be adapted to war production. They should, moreover, actively co-operate with the agencies in Washington which, under the appointment or approval of the government, are wrestling with the problem of industrial readjustments. On the manufacturing side there is the Bureau of Manufacturing Resources of the Council of National Defense, which is giving its attention to the problem of plant conversion. On the commercial side there is the Commercial Economy Board of the Council of National Defense, which "has undertaken to co-operate with business men . . . . in eliminating needless uses of men, materials, equipment, and capital in all lines of commercial business." Business men who desire to place themselves in line with this movement may very properly enter into correspondence with these agencies. Such correspondence may well have the double result of proving helpful both to the business interests and to the governmental committees themselves. There is opportunity here for some really constructive co-operation.

I think it is not putting it too strongly to say that the outcome of the greatest struggle in history for the rights of a common humanity very largely depends upon the rapidity and the effectiveness with which American business rises to the task before it.

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ENGLAND AND AMERICA

By

CONYERS READ
Associate Professor of History

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ENGLAND AND AMERICA

Among the Allies of the United States on the Western Front in France, England is on the whole regarded with least favor by the Americans of the Middle West. This is probably to be explained in part by the fact that two large elements in our foreign-born population, the Germans and the Irish, are and long have been violently anti-English. No doubt it is to be explained in part also by the facts of our national history as they have been set forth in the school textbooks of the last generation. Most of us who contribute to the formation of public sentiment were brought up to regard England primarily as the enemy of our national liberties in the Revolution and the violator of our rights of trade in the War of 1812. When the French sent Lafayette and even the Germans von Steuben to fight on our side, England sent Lord Howe and Lord Cornwallis to subdue us. Facts like these are bred in our bones, and they furnish excellent material to the German sympathizers for the development of anti-English sentiment among us.

In a certain measure also this sentiment is fostered by the English themselves. We do not see many Englishmen in the Middle West, and the chance one whom we are likely to encounter proves on the whole to be uncongenial to our middle-western temper. He is not a likable fellow according to our standards. He speaks our language, but with a difference, and generally with precisely that sort of a difference which we usually associate with the dude and the snob in our funny papers and in our farce comedies. His clothes are loose where we think they ought to be tight and tight where we think they ought to be loose. His shoes, which he will call boots, are obviously wrong. He has strange names indeed for the commonest objects. Worst of all he does not laugh at our jokes, and his own feeble attempts to be funny persuade us that he has at best a strangely perverted sense of humor. If he were frankly a foreigner we would accept him as such and concede to him perhaps the right to be different. But he is just enough like us to appear to be a freak of our own breed. His very similarities

accentuate his differences. A bulldog might take up with a greyhound, but no self-respecting bulldog can make friends with another bulldog whose nose lacks the proper wrinkles and whose ears and tail are hung at the wrong angles.

All this Anglophobia is very unfortunate, particularly at a time when the successful prosecution of the war demands the closest possible co-operation and the strongest possible sympathy between the English and ourselves. And a great deal of it is without any real foundation. The questions of shoes and clothes and even humor may be dismissed at once. We could hardly get on with our next-door neighbor if we were not prepared to admit his right to a difference of opinion in such matters. There is really no more reason why we should decry England because we dislike her tastes in words or in raiment than that we should decry the Bostonian because he calls a washstand a commode and likes baked beans for breakfast.

The historical prejudice is more serious, though fortunately it is giving way to a better understanding of the part which England has played in the making of America. Our children have better textbooks than we had. They know that the efforts of the English government to coerce the American colonies at the time of the Revolution met with almost as much opposition from liberal sentiment in England as from liberal sentiment in America. They know that the foremost Englishmen of the times, men like William Pitt and Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox, openly espoused the American cause. They know, in short, that the Revolution was not so much a war between America and England as between liberalism and conservatism on both sides of the Atlantic. We had our Tories over here in 1776, plenty of them, who supported Lord North and his policy of oppression just as England had her liberals over there, plenty of them, who opposed him. And it is not easy to say whether the defeat of Cornwallis by the Americans at Yorktown or the defeat of Lord North by the English liberals in the House of Commons contributed more to the termination of the Revolution. Certainly when the English liberals came into power they proceeded at once to negotiate a peace with America on the basis of independence.

Our children are even beginning to regard the War of 1812 somewhat differently from what we were taught to regard it. It clearly arose out of England's efforts to enforce an effective blockade against Napoleon. She had to face then, as she has to face now, the menace of a militaristic power seeking to dominate the whole Western World. Her most effective weapon was her fleet and the readiest means at her disposal to strike at her enemy was to cut off his foreign trade. Inevitably her blockade of French ports interfered with the free trading rights of neutrals. Inevitably American traders suffered and remonstrated. We have suffered in the same way by the British blockade of German ports during the present war. But we recognize more clearly now than we did then that the triumph of militarism in Europe is fraught with greater disaster even to America than a temporary interference with her trade. The German government tried hard three years ago to embroil us with England over this question of blockade just as Napoleon tried to embroil us with her in 1812. Kaiser Wilhelm, we thank heaven, failed; Napoleon, we know, succeeded. A comparison of the two situations sets us to wondering whether we were not after all, in spite of some legitimate grievances, exactly the same sort of tool in Napoleon's hands in 1812 as the German Emperor tried to make of us in 1915. The matter is certainly open to question. In any event our experience in the present world-war ought to enable us to see that there is something to be said for England's side of the case in the world-war of 1812.

Yet even if we insist that both in the Revolution and in the War of 1812 America was altogether right and England altogether wrong we shall have to admit that the story of Anglo-American relations does not begin nor end there. We must not forget that during the first two centuries of our history we were politically a part of England; nor should we regard those two centuries, as we too often do, merely as a period of preparation for the breach with England which was to follow. Strange as it may seem, there are more significant facts in our colonial history than Navigation Acts, Writs of Assistance, Boston Tea Parties, and such like matters. Perhaps the fundamental fact is that during the formative period of our national growth we were, in spite of developing differences,

still essentially English. Our language was English, our laws were English, our political and social institutions were English, our habits of thought, our point of view, our very standards of right and wrong were English. We were even prepared to assert by force of arms that our political ideals were English. There is no doubt about these facts. They are indeed such commonplaces that textbook histories have scarcely deemed them worth the mentioning. Yet they are the facts which have given our nation its character. The Revolution did not change them, political independence has not changed them. Our language, our customs, our laws, our moral standards, our political ideals are still very much what they were at the beginning. In the development of our national civilization we have borrowed much from Germany, much from France, much from other treasuries the world over. We should not fail to acknowledge the debt. But we owe most of all to England. Take away from America all that is English within her and she would be a wilderness again.

Even apart from this, it is a curious state of affairs that our sentiments toward England have been more influenced by the fact that we fought two wars against her a century ago than by the fact that we have lived next door to her in peace for over a hundred years. Of course it may be argued that we have, for that matter, lived in peace during the same period with all the other great European powers. But England is after all the only one of the great powers in a position seriously to menace our security. She dominates our ocean highways; in the Bermudas she holds a naval base at our very doors; in Canada she commands our whole northern frontier. And yet these matters trouble us very little. Out here in the Middle West we rarely hear of the Bermudas, except in connection with nothing more warlike than spring potatoes, and as for our undefended northern frontier it disturbs us no more than does the fact that the hedge between our back yard and our neighbor's will not stand siege. Frenchmen and Germans are amazed by our indifference at what would seem to them vital matters of defense. We in turn are mildly amazed at their amazement. The truth is that we hardly realize how altogether unique a thing it is for two powerful nations to live side by

side in peace without the normal European accompaniment of standing armies and bristling frontiers. And this is not because our differences with England during the past hundred years have been trivial. As a matter of fact they have been grave, far graver than those we have had with any other great power. It is rather because there has grown up between America and England during a century of peace a conception of international relationship different from the conceptions current in the Old World. As a nation we simply don't think of England in terms of war any more than as individuals we think of our next-door neighbor in terms of the duel. We dispute with him, we say nasty things about him, we may go so far as to hale him to court on occasions, but we don't load guns and sharpen knives against him even in our most belligerent moods. In the same way our disputes with England inevitably formulate themselves in terms of discussion, of abuse, or, as a final resort, of arbitration. Somehow or other we have long since ceased to reckon on their going any farther. We may explain it as we will, the fact stands fast. That undefended frontier stretching from Maine to the Pacific establishes it beyond dispute.

The trouble is that too often we don't bother to explain it at all. We accept it, we even acknowledge it to be one of our great national assets, and then, as like as not, we stop thinking about it. To tell the truth, before the present war we were not given to speculating much about European nations or our relations with them. Long ago President Monroe formulated our national attitude of mind in such matters when he said that we did not intend to meddle in the affairs of Europe and that we expected Europe not to meddle in ours. We have not meddled; we have indeed deliberately ignored. The consequence has been that in the case of England our knowledge of the country proves to be a curious crazy quilt patched together out of such odds and ends as schoolboy prejudices against red coats, Irish-American Anglophobia, the jokes in our comic supplements, and the scandals in our daily press. That is why it was so easy for the German propagandists during the early years of this Great War to poison our minds against England. Had we known England better they would have labored to no purpose. As it was they succeeded far too well.

Yet it can hardly be denied that quite apart from the exigencies of the present war England has a special claim upon our intelligent understanding. And this is so not simply because we share with her a common heritage and a common culture, not simply because she is our next-door neighbor in Canada, but above all things else because she is the great European exponent of our own democratic ideals of government. It is indeed hardly too much to say that she is the mother of European democracy. In the seventeenth century, when the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns were rapidly eliminating all popular elements from the governments of Continental Europe, the English were cutting off the head of one king, driving another into exile, and establishing for good and all the principle of the sovereignty of the people. In the eighteenth century when absolutism was almost universal on the European mainland England had in working order a system of parliamentary government which had not only taken away from her king all his legislative powers but was also making large encroachments upon his executive powers. It was to England that our own forefathers turned for a model when they undertook to organize a democratic government for independent America. In the early decades of the nineteenth century it was to the English system that the political reformers of Continental Europe pointed as the goal of their own efforts toward liberalism. When democracy after a century of struggle finally triumphed in France in 1875, she modeled her constitution on English lines. Italy did the same thing. So did Spain; so did Portugal. Even in Germany the program of the Liberal Reform party is today essentially an English program. We in America fondly believe our own government to be the best existing expression of democracy in power. Liberal Europe with our own example before its eyes has preferred the English one.

This is a hard morsel for us to swallow because it is hard for us to comprehend that popular government can find expression in other forms besides that of a republic. England we know has a king; England is therefore a monarchy, and if she is a monarchy she cannot in the very nature of things be democratic. Such is the drift of our argument. The fallacy of it lies in the assumption that

because England has a king she is therefore governed by a king. As a matter of fact, which everyone knows who has the slightest acquaintance with English institutions, the king of England is merely a figurehead. He reigns, but he has long since ceased to govern. Men say in England that the king can do no wrong. What they mean is that politically he cannot do anything at all. The power which is nominally his is really exercised by a group of ministers who constitute the cabinet. And these ministers are nothing more in essence than an executive committee of the English House of Commons. Their tenure of office depends upon their ability to command the support of a majority of the members of that house. When they can no longer command that support they must give place to others who can. The king, it is true, names them, but it would be idle for him to name anyone not acceptable to the House of Commons, and as a matter of fact he never does. Everything which the cabinet does is done in his name, for he remains the symbol of the executive power. But he is no more responsible for these doings than George Washington is responsible for the two-cent stamps which bear his image.

The English Parliament is in fact the source of all governmental power in England. It makes all the laws and through the instrumentality of the cabinet it executes them all. Without doubt it is the most powerful assembly in the world. Our own national Congress is limited in its powers by the terms of our national constitution. Congress cannot change our constitution. It cannot, except under very unusual circumstances, name our chief executive; it cannot, except for grave misbehavior, remove him. It cannot legislate in matters of purely local concern. But the English Parliament can and does do all of these things. It can change the fundamental laws of England overnight; it can and does regularly choose and remove the English chief executive; it can and does legislate about the pettiest of local matters. England, in fact, though she calls herself a monarchy is governed not by a king but by a parliament, and the question as to whether her government is democratic or not can only be answered when we have decided whether or not government by parliament means government of the people, for the people, and by the people.

Everybody knows that the English Parliament like our own Congress is made up of two houses, a House of Lords and a House of Commons. And pretty nearly everybody knows that the House of Lords is not, in our American sense of the term, a representative body at all. The great majority of its members sit either because their fathers sat before them or else because the king has expressly invited them to sit. It is true that the king's invitation is really given by the prime minister, and it is true also that a large majority of those invited could properly be considered representative Englishmen in the best sense of the term, but the same thing might almost be said of the House of Lords in Prussia. Liberal Englishmen have indeed long realized that the House of Lords is an anomaly in a democratic system of government. They have long entertained projects for changing its composition and curtailing its powers and within the past ten years have taken one very definite step forward in that direction. Since the so-called Parliament Act of 1911 the Lords have lost all power over financial legislation and have retained only a limited power to delay legislation of any other sort. Yet even with these limitations it must be conceded that the House of Lords is out of place in a modern democracy and can only be justified on the grounds that it has had a long and a distinguished history. The same thing can be said of some historic survivals in our own constitution. No doubt we ought to get rid of them; no doubt we don't, or at least only very slowly. Yet we very properly resent the suggestion that we are therefore undemocratic. We claim to be judged not only by our political performances but also by our political ideals and by the general direction of our progress toward them. England is entitled to the same consideration. Judging by those standards the significant fact is, not that England has inherited a House of Lords which is inconsistent with her democratic professions, but that she recognizes the inconsistency, deplores it, has taken steps already and promises to take others to correct it.

When the worst has been said that can be said about the House of Lords, the fact remains that the essential powers of the English Parliament reside in its other House, the House of Commons. It not only has the decisive voice in making the laws of England but

it chooses the instruments to execute them. It is the Commons and not the Lords who decide what ministers shall govern England, in what manner they shall govern her, and for how long they shall govern her. In America we distinguish between the executive and the legislative branches of our government. Both proceed ultimately from the people, but they proceed in a different way and at a different time. This is so much the case that the president whom we elect at one time may belong to a different party from the Congress which we elect at another time. In England that could never be so. There must always be an agreement between the House of Commons and the ministers because the ministers can only retain their position so long as their policy agrees with that of the Commons. A striking illustration of this fact was offered only the other day when General Maurice made certain charges in the public press against Mr. Lloyd George, the prime minister. The matter was brought to the attention of the House of Commons and became the subject there of a debate and of a vote. The Commons, as it happened, supported the minister, but if they had supported the opposition there is little doubt but that Mr. Lloyd George would have been forced to resign office.

His only alternative would have been to appeal from the House of Commons to the English people. Such an appeal is provided for by the custom of the English constitution, for if it maintains that the English ministry shall reflect the prevailing opinion of the House of Commons it also maintains that the House of Commons shall reflect the prevailing opinion of its constituencies. If Mr. Lloyd George, even though defeated in the Commons, had felt confident that the English voters favored him, he might have dismissed the House of Commons and invited the voters to choose a new one which would support him. He could, in a word, have submitted his policy to a popular referendum. In this particular the English system is rather more democratic than our own. Our president continues to hold office for the four-year term of his election, though he may cease to reflect the popular will before he has served a year. It is the same way with our Congress. In England the House of Commons can get rid of an unpopular minister or a popular minister can get rid of an unpopular House

of Commons in no longer time than it takes to refer the question to the voters.

Enough has been said to show that the sovereign power in England lies in the House of Commons. It remains to be considered how far the House of Commons really represents the English people.

The answer to this question is far simpler today than it would have been a year ago. The war, which has so marvelously quickened the progress of England toward democracy, has given her within the last few months a parliamentary franchise which is a great deal simpler and on the whole a great deal more liberal than the congressional franchise in our own country. Practically every adult Englishman and a considerable proportion of the adult Englishwomen will have the right to vote for members of the next House of Commons.[1] But the condition of the franchise when the present House of Commons was elected was far different and far more characteristic of England as she was in normal days of peace. This ante-bellum parliamentary franchise was, it must be confessed, a confused and complicated affair, interesting historically but not easy to justify from any rational point of view. It was in fact the result of endless patchings and alterations of old institutions to meet new conditions. Parts of it survived from a time long before Columbus set sail for America. Other parts of it were added within the last forty years. It would hardly be worth while to analyze it in detail. The net result of it was that by curiously

[1] The terms of the new English parliamentary franchise are set forth in the Reform Act which became law in England on February 7, 1918. It confers the franchise upon every man in Great Britain and Ireland over twenty-one years of age who has resided in the same place or occupied business premises in the same place for six months preceding the election. It confers the franchise upon every woman in Great Britain and Ireland over thirty years of age who has heretofore enjoyed the privilege of voting in local elections or who is the wife of a local elector. (The qualifications for the local franchise is six months' ownership or tenancy of land or premises. Lodgers in furnished rooms do not qualify.)

It is estimated that this Reform Act has added 8,000,000 voters to the lists, of whom 6,000,000 are women (5,000,000 of them married women) and 2,000,000 are men. With these additions there will be about 16,000,000 people in Great Britain and Ireland qualified to vote for members of the House of Commons—or about one in three of the population. (Cf., for a more detailed statement of the terms of this Reform Act, the *London Times*, weekly ed., February 18, 1918, p. 145.)

indirect ways it did arrive at something not far short of manhood suffrage. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about it was that though it debarred many from the franchise its discriminations were not undemocratic in spirit. It did not favor the rich as against the poor, the well educated as against the ill educated, the highborn as against the lowborn. Doubtless it was absurd, yet doubtless for all its absurdity it distributed the voting power among the different social classes in the community in just about the same way as we distribute it on this side the seas. In England as in America the representative assembly was chosen, as it will be chosen, by the general mass of the common people. There as with us the government derives its powers from their consent.

The charge is commonly made by German critics that in spite of the apparent liberalism of the English constitution England is in fact governed by a Tory aristocracy. What they mean by a Tory aristocracy is not altogether clear, but apparently they would have us believe that it is a class of people in England analogous to the landed aristocracy, that is to say, the Junkers in Prussia. There is this much truth in the charge that the English voter prefers on the whole to be represented in the House of Commons by men of social position. But the German is altogether misleading when he attempts to draw an analogy between this state of affairs and the rule of the Junker class in Prussia. In Prussia the Junker dominates the so-called House of Representatives because the inequalities of the Prussian franchise make it practically impossible for the voters to elect representatives of any other sort. The English voter has full power to choose whom he likes, and if the English House of Commons is largely made up of the gentry it is because the English people will it so. They might very easily fill the House with chimney-sweeps tomorrow if they wanted to. What is more to the point, the English gentry retain their position simply upon condition that they reflect accurately the wishes of the people behind them. In Prussia Junker rule has meant legislation in the Junker interests. In England gentry rule has meant legislation in the popular interest. If the English gentry are really, as the Germans insist, Junkers in English clothes, then it is clear that during the last ten years or so these English Junkers

have been seriously contemplating suicide, for nowhere in the world perhaps during recent years has the landholding aristocracy suffered more severely from hostile legislation than in England. What with inheritance taxes, income taxes, unearned increment taxes, and the like the large English landowner bids fair to become an extinct animal. On the other hand nowhere perhaps in the world has recent legislation been more liberal in providing for the necessities of the poor. Old-age pensions for the aged poor and national insurance against sickness, disability, and unemployment for the laboring classes are sufficient evidences of that fact. More than that, in child-welfare acts, sweatshop regulations, minimum wage laws, and national employment bureaus England has gone much farther than we have ourselves in the direction of preventing the exploitation of the poor by the rich. Indeed the common complaint in England among the better-to-do classes is that recent legislation is much more than democratic; it is positively socialistic. If Tory aristocrats can do this sort of thing, then we are bound to confess that whatever their social pretensions may be their political ideals are quite as democratic as those of the meekest among us.

The fact is that whether we test the English government by its organization, by its leaders, or by its work, the truth of the statement is easily established that English ideals of government are essentially our ideals and that England has quite as fair a claim as we have ourselves to be numbered among the great democracies of the earth. That is the best of all the good reasons why the relations between America and England are and of right ought to be different from other international relations. That is why they belong side by side, shoulder to shoulder, in the war which is to make the world safe for democracy.

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DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN SCHOOLS

By

CHARLES H. JUDD

Director of the School of Education
The University of Chicago

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DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN SCHOOLS

For long centuries education was the exclusive privilege of the few. The ideal of a broad education for all the people, paid for by public funds, is less than a hundred years old. Even today it is only in North America that this ideal has approached realization. In the other parts of the world the traditions of aristocratic society are still dominant, and only limited opportunities of education are open to the common people. When the United States advocates the spread of democracy, it is seeking, perhaps more than most people understand, to give to the common people everywhere in the world more education and a broader education than they have been allowed to enjoy up to this time.

We have not recognized until very recently how unique our American schools are. We have thought of ourselves and all European nations as very much alike in intellectual matters. The contrast in education between the white races of Europe and America on the one side and all the other peoples of the world on the other side has often been drawn. We have science and letters; we have schools and universities. They are intellectually backward or undeveloped; with them institutions of learning are inferior or wholly wanting.

We are beginning to understand that there is another contrast less noticed but no less significant. America is to be contrasted with Europe because in the older countries across the Atlantic education is so organized as to cut off a large percentage of the population from higher opportunities. In America every possible agency is at work to bring all the people into as full contact as possible with as much education as they will accept.

This highly important contrast can be made very vivid by comparing the school system of Germany with that of the United States. In Germany the common boy goes, at six years of age, to a school known as the *Volksschule.* Here he is taught the common branches for eight years. He learns to read and write his native language. He learns arithmetic and some geography and history. In the last-mentioned subjects his attention is almost exclusively concentrated on Germany. He is also taught religion. This is an essential part of the course of study of every year. Beyond this he gets a little science, some music, and some physical education. At fourteen years of age he is confirmed in the church and his schooling is over. He now enters some trade and

is given training a few hours a week in a trade school. There is absolutely no possibility before him of a higher calling. This school does not lead him to any higher school. He cannot become a doctor or a lawyer. He may, indeed, by six additional years of study in a special institution for the training of teachers of the common school, prepare himself to be a teacher in the *Volksschule*. But this special institution is absolutely unrelated to the university or to any other higher institution. Only a small number of those who complete the course in the *Volksschule* are needed as teachers, and only the small number actually needed as teachers are allowed to take the training.

The son of an aristocratic family, on the other hand, goes, at six years of age, into an institution which is organized to give him all that can be had in the way of foreign languages, higher mathematics, and science. This aristocratic institution has no connection with the *Volksschule*. It is not, like the American high school, based on the common school. The aristocratic school is wholly separate from the school open to the common people. Its teachers are trained in the university. Graduates of this school go into the professions and into the higher government positions. The products of this school are trained for the army by service of one year, while graduates of the *Volksschule* serve two or three years. The products of the aristocratic school are allowed to become officers in the army; the *Volksschule* graduates may not have commissions.

The aristocratic school always charges tuition; the *Volksschule* is free. There were, before the war, only 8 per cent of the youths of the empire in the aristocratic school. The other 92 per cent were in the *Volksschule*.

The education of girls is much less fully provided for in Germany than is the education of boys. So far as the *Volksschule* is concerned, boys and girls get much the same training. In the cities there are separate schools for the sexes, but the courses of study are the same. In the small towns boys and girls are taught together. The education of the common school is so restricted that it is not reduced in amount or kind for the girls. Higher education of girls is very limited; education was open originally only to boys. Girls grew up in the home; their duties and their training were domestic. In recent years there has been an increasing demand for a larger recognition of women. They have been reluctantly admitted to the universities, and a few higher schools have been organized for them. It may be remarked in passing that it was the urgent demand for university courses on the part of American women who went to Germany, as much as any other influence,

which led to the opening of the German universities to all women. The higher schools for girls are quite separate from those for boys. The courses of study in the girls' schools are more restricted than those in the schools for boys. In short, there is even today little enthusiasm for a general higher training for girls.

The schools of Germany are social devices for dividing the people into distinctly marked classes. The common people are given a kind of education suited to their humble lot. The courses of study in the *Volksschule* are rudimentary and meager. The official regulations constantly call attention to the fact that the common people are to be educated to obedience; they are to serve the state and their rulers; they are to be kept contented with the trades followed by their parents. The aristocracy, on the other hand, is to be brought to as high a level of superiority in power and position as is possible through knowledge and science. The courses in the schools for the aristocracy are elaborate and advanced. The boys are to be carefully selected and trained as members of the ruling class. The girls are to be trained for a social position different from that occupied by the boys.

There is in all this no ideal of equality and universal franchise. There is rather a set policy of aristocratic selection and preservation of social control in the hands of the sons of the aristocracy.

When the character of the German educational system is thus summed up in brief and definite statements, we see at once how sharply that system contrasts with our American system, which is controlled in every phase of its organization by the ideal of unlimited opportunity for all. In our country there is one public school to which all children go at six years of age. The high school is free to all and open on the same terms to the boy and girl from the poor home and to the boy and girl from the rich home. The American school excludes no one who has brains and energy. From the high school the road is open into the college or technical school.

There may be a contrast between the schools of the Orient and those of Europe. We may point out that in the Western World science and letters have been more extensively cultivated and that they have been given larger institutional support in great universities and higher schools. But this contrast between Europe and the Orient should not blind us to the fact that though we are a branch of European civilization our school system is as different from that of Germany as our democracy is different from German autocracy.

We shall understand this contrast if we consider briefly the history that lies back of present-day differences. German schools have merely

retained the rigid separation of social classes which came down from the mediaeval period. In the twelfth century the only schools in existence were those which educated the sons of the aristocracy. The schools of that day were for those who were to make and enforce the laws of the state and church. The common man did not read or write or possess any of the intellectual refinements. There was no school for the boys and girls of the common people. Only princes and the nobility were trained. The education of that period had in it no motives of equalizing social privileges. Indeed it was the deliberate purpose of the rulers of that day to retain their superiority over the masses and to hand down that superiority unjeopardized through an exclusive bestowal on their own class of all the secrets of wisdom.

In later centuries a meager education was opened by the rulers to the common people—first of all, as a part of their religious instruction. As was pointed out in an earlier paragraph, religion is today a prominent item in the German school program. In the days of the Reformation it was the dominant factor in all programs for the education of the people. Since the Reformation additions to the courses of the *Volksschule* have been allowed by the rulers, but these additions have never been permitted to endanger the distinction between social classes which has come down from the early days when the aristocracy was in full possession of all education.

Perhaps the extent to which American schools have evolved away from the rigid European tradition can be made clear by referring to the English system which stands halfway between the completely divided system of Germany and our extremely democratic, unified system. In evolving her schools England traversed in the beginning the same road as Germany. England's first schools and universities were for the training of the upper classes. As in Germany, the common school originated in England as a missionary enterprise for the religious instruction of the people. In England the movement was more of a democratic movement, however, in that religious bodies rather than the rulers of the state organized the schools. Religious denominations organized missionary societies, and these in turn organized and supported the common schools which were known by the various names, charity schools, poor schools, and pauper schools.

In democratic England the hard-and-fast distinctions which existed in earlier days and have been maintained rigidly in Germany could not survive. There is today in the English system a liberal possibility of transfer of the common boy or girl from the people's school into the aristocratic school. This transfer is on the basis of an examination.

The pupil who passes the examination well is also in many cases given a scholarship, which makes the upper school free for him. But the aristocratic school is not a free institution and it does not welcome all comers. It is still in some measure the school of the selected class in society.

The American educational system was in its beginnings not unlike the European system. There were higher schools and colleges which had for their chief purpose the training of the clergy. There was, on the other hand, a common-school system which had for its chief purpose religious instruction of the common people. But social conditions were not favorable to the development of a divided system. There were no hereditary aristocrats. All the families of a community had common democratic interests, and the school system took on a unified form altogether different from the form known in Europe.

In order to understand what happened in this country, let us think of a band of settlers going inland from one of the early New England coast towns. This little group of families was usually headed by a pastor and consisted of only a few households. They settled on the banks of some stream and built their church and their homes. There were no class distinctions. They were frontiersmen banded together in the search for liberty and opportunity. The school they set up for their children was the common institution of the whole community. These people believed in reading because it gave them access to the Scriptures. They believed in intelligence because they were selected individuals who had possessed the initiative to migrate in search of independent opportunity. They supported a school, but it was only one school and it was for all the children.

Later, when the settlement grew these ambitious people wanted their children to have more opportunities, so they enlarged the school and added to its courses. The higher school which thus came into being was an institution attached to the common school and merely continued the education of the pupils who had completed the common-school course.

The pioneer condition in American settlements thus led to the organization of a single continuous school system. The United States developed a new institution, a single democratic school system. Canada followed the example of the United States. The systems of the two great northern countries of this continent are unique in the opportunity which they have for generations offered to the common people. They threw off at the outset the duality which aristocratic tradition imposed on European schools.

It would not be in keeping with the facts, however, to state that American schools achieved at once complete democracy. Indeed there

can be no overlooking the fact that even today the traces of aristocratic tradition are present in our American schools. The lower school, while it is the foundation on which the upper school is built, is in some measure restricted in the opportunity which it offers. Perhaps the matter can be put more clearly by reference to the higher schools. In some measure they are exclusive schools in spite of their connection with the common school.

The high schools are exclusive, in the first place, because the common family does not always find it possible to afford the time for its sons and daughters to continue their schooling. There is, therefore, in some measure an exclusiveness of wealth still present even in the free high school. This departure from complete democracy is rapidly disappearing with the improved economic conditions of the average family. In 1890 there were in round numbers 300,000 students in American high schools. Since that date the number has doubled twice until in 1915 there were over 1,300,000 students in high school; that is, the increase in twenty-five years was more than 300 per cent. The general population of the country in 1915 was only about 60 per cent more than in 1890. These figures make it clear that the children of the United States are able to take advantage of the democratic opportunity for a higher education in ever increasing measure.

There are indications also that the country is ready to extend the period of compulsory education. A number of states are providing for some kind of required schooling beyond fourteen years of age, and it is not at all unlikely that we shall move in the direction of a high-school education for every boy and girl; at least the obstacles to such a universal participation in higher education are rapidly being removed. High schools are being erected even in sparsely settled regions, and state laws are providing that where there is no high school in the district the tuition of pupils shall be paid so that they may go to a neighboring school.

When the barrier of expense has been removed so that a child can afford to pass from the elementary school into the high school, there still remains the fact that there is a break between these schools because of the marked differences in their courses of study and methods of dealing with pupils. For example, the elementary school teaches arithmetic; the first year of the high school teaches algebra and drops arithmetic. The elementary school teaches no foreign languages, while the high school lays great emphasis on Latin and French. The elementary school teaches oral reading and penmanship; the high school does not.

In matters of class organization and discipline the contrast is equally striking. The elementary school holds together in a single class the

children of one grade. The high school with its elective system and its departmental teachers breaks the group into separate divisions for the different subjects. High-school students, furthermore, are given more independence in matters of study and movement about the building.

The break between the elementary school and the high school is placed by tradition and common practice in our schools at the end of the eighth school year. The pupil is supposed at this time to be about fourteen years of age. This is one of the remnants of European influence on American schools. The Prussian common school is an eight-year school. During the decade between 1840 and 1850, when our schools were not fully organized, American educational leaders were greatly influenced by the Prussian *Volksschule*, which was at that time very well organized. The common school of America was thus patterned after the restricted common school of Prussia.

In recent years there has been a strong movement to undo the evils of this borrowing from Prussia. The elementary schools and the high schools are being brought closer together in subjects of instruction and methods of teaching. The change is affecting most obviously the seventh and eighth grades of the elementary school and the first year in the high school. In the elementary grades the courses are taking on a more advanced character. This is appropriate because the school year has been lengthened and the training of teachers has been improved so much that the pupils in the seventh and eighth grades are better prepared for advanced courses than they used to be. Furthermore, the upper-grade pupils are being allowed some choices in order to adapt instruction to their individual needs. The type of discipline and class organization in these grades is also coming to be more like that in the high school.[1]

Considerations of this type explain why America has been slow in perfecting school organization. There can be no doubt that Germany has for generations been the model of the world in educational organization. Her rulers and her educational leaders have understood longer than the rulers of any other country the possibility of a complete control of social institutions through education. The schools have been a part of the political life of Germany. They have been charged with the duty of making a disciplined nation. Germany is what she is today because of her conscious self-control through her schools.

The perfection of organization which Germany has worked out renders the contrast between her school system and that of America

[1] Frank F. Bunker, *Reorganization of the Public School System.* United States Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 8, 1916; Charles H. Judd, *The Evolution of a Democratic School System.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1918.

the more pronounced. German schools do their work so completely that when they aim to maintain class distinctions they succeed to the full. When they bulwark the aristocracy and make the common people subservient, there is no mistake about the effectiveness of their operations. Germany has a perfect scheme of its kind.

From time to time other nations, impressed by the perfection of organization of the German schools, have imitated those schools. England and the United States and Canada have often taken lessons of the Germans in educational matters. There are some people who are asking today whether it is not foolish and partisan for these nations which have borrowed so much from German organization to turn violently and denounce German institutions.

The answer to all such people is to be found in the one word "democracy." The German school is a perfect organization, but it is an organization developed to prevent the growth of democracy. The German schools are the instruments of aristocratic control built up systematically by a powerful state for the accomplishment of a definite political end.

The lesson for democracy to learn is that organization is not the only aspect of a situation to be studied. Organization is always aimed at some goal. Democracy has set itself a goal wholly different from that at which German education has aimed. The school system which aims at the ends of democracy cannot be content to follow the forms adopted by an aristocracy. Democracy can, however, well observe with the closest attention how completely an organized school system can control public ideas. This kind of observant attention will lead America, not to imitate Germany, but rather to so perfect the democratic school system which it has worked out that there shall be in the world an efficient rival for the powerful and highly perfected aristocratic system that today threatens the broad, free training of all common people.

The lesson which these considerations teach can be reinforced by extending the study which we have made of elementary schools and high schools by a review of the development of colleges and universities.

During the earliest years of its history the American college was an exclusive institution. It took at first only those who were preparing to enter the so-called learned professions, and the number admitted was small. The college selected those who were to enter its higher course by drastic and often arbitrary examinations based on rigid requirements.

Since the close of the Civil War there has been a rapidly accelerating movement in the direction of what may be properly called a democratization of higher education. The courses offered by these institutions cover a vast field of new interests which were wholly unknown to the college

curriculum of 1860. Many of these courses are practical in character and aim at the improvement of agriculture or industry or commerce. The entrance requirements of the higher institutions have been liberalized and related more directly to the plans of the high schools below them and to the interests of a great variety of students. The result is that students from every level of society are attending college and are going from college into every kind of business and practical calling as well as into the professions.

The expansion of higher education has been due in no small measure to the development, especially in the central states, of great state universities. In these institutions the idea of a democratic opportunity for every intellectually able citizen has been carried to its highest expression and has demonstrated that a democracy can be interested in the fullest degree in intellectual progress.

To be sure, critics of American higher education can find in the history of our universities disquieting evidences of political interference and many striking examples of the reluctance exhibited by legislatures to take an interest in those forms of research which are not directly capable of practical application. The optimist will answer these statements drawn from history with the hope that democracy is gradually being brought by its mistakes to a fuller appreciation of the highest science. He will parallel every example of backsliding offered by the critics with equally striking evidences of a larger and more willing public support of the arts and sciences.

What has been said about the democratization of higher education can be supported by citing the results of two recent studies.

In the first of these studies 1,000 pupils in the high schools of New York were examined with reference to the nationalities and occupations of their parents. Some of the typical results are as follows: Of the 1,000 pupils investigated, 446 were sons and daughters of fathers born in the United States. Of the rest, 96 had fathers born in Russia, 143 had fathers born in Germany, 76 in Ireland, 47 in England, 35 in Austria, and so on, including practically every country of Europe. As to the occupations of the fathers the following returns are given: 36 were professional, 36 semiprofessional (as artists, teachers, or the like); 61 were federal or city employees; 150 were artisans; 46 were engaged in transportation; 41 were in personal service (as barbers, waiters, or the like); 106 were middlemen; 226 were engaged in manufacture and trade.[1]

[1] Joseph King VanDenburg, *Causes of the Elimination of Students in Public Secondary Schools of New York City.* Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City, 1911.

To the European such a list as this would seem like a motley mixture of social classes—and so it is. To the American this is evidence of a familiar type of democracy.

In 1913 in Leipzig the writer was discussing the American high schools with a professor of education in the University of Leipzig. The conversation had been on the number of pupils in these schools as well as on their miscellaneous social antecedents. "Such a number of students in our secondary schools," said the German, "would constitute a grave social menace."

Another study which deals with graduates of typical colleges can be summarized in the following quotations:

> It is plain that educated men no longer seek the cloth as they did when the nation was younger. It may mean much or little that the percentage of ministers among the graduates of typical colleges has declined from 60 or 70 per cent to less than 10 per cent. The broadened activities of the institutions themselves are undoubtedly responsible for most of that; percentages always need abundant explanation. But there is no denying the significance of the actual decline in numbers shown in these tables during the past generation, notwithstanding the unprecedented increase in the population of the country.
>
> During the earlier years included in this study a college education was considered solely as a preparation for a learned profession, and the few graduates who entered commercial pursuits as a rule were those who were not successful in any learned profession. During the first third of the eighteenth century there seems to be an increasing tendency for college graduates to enter business, and during the nineteenth century the general trend of all curves for the first group is to rise from a general average of approximately 10 per cent to about 30 per cent.[1]

The facts thus far set forth in this paper show clearly that the American educational system differs radically from the European systems, especially those of the inflexible German type. It remains to discuss some of the criticisms of our democratic system which have been made by European observers. These criticisms will help us to understand the problems which are unsolved in the experiment which we have undertaken of evolving a unique system of unified and continuous schools, supported by public taxation and open to all comers.

Three such criticisms or problems will be discussed briefly. (1) It is said that our system is not adapted to the training of leaders because we do not concentrate our best training on a few but dissipate our energy in trying to educate everybody. (2) It is said that our system does not provide laborers, since it aims to raise all to the higher levels

[1] Bailey B. Burritt, *Professional Distribution of College and University Graduates*, pp. 62, 72. United States Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 19, 1912.

and does not provide the training for the practical arts which will make contented and efficient workers. (3) It is said that our organization is vacillating and unsteady because it is constantly redefining its ambitions and constantly deferring the local demands. In short, it is said that our schools reflect the instability of a democratic society.

It would be a fruitless task to answer these criticisms by merely citing facts to show that the assertions made by those who do not think well of our system are not entirely true. We shall do much better to admit that there is some truth in each of these criticisms and to seek to find methods of meeting the problems more effectively than in the past.

The problem of making experts in a system designed to improve everybody is indeed a difficult one. We train the mass, but it is doubtful whether we have felt the need as keenly as we should of training those who are to lead the mass. European critics say of our system that it is vastly expensive and defective at this crucial point.

We have a theory that society will do its selecting of leaders after men and women get into the practical engagements of life. We let anyone who wants to be a lawyer try. We are not quite so free with doctors, but nearly so. We are altogether lenient with those who go into business.

Some beginnings of a solution of this problem have been made in scientific studies of the demands of various occupations and of the personal qualifications of those who are preparing to enter these occupations. For example, the various industries have been analyzed. One calls for alertness and delicacy of touch, another for ability to sustain attention for a long time. . One calls for a keen discrimination of color and sound, another for powers of generalization. If we can find out by such studies what qualities are required for success, we can follow the pupil more intelligently through his training. If he cannot or will not cultivate what is demanded by one calling, he can be deflected into another. Thus we may hopefully look forward to a scientific selection as a substitute both for our present expensive plan of unorganized trial and also for the European plan with its arbitrary selections on the false grounds of hereditary membership in an exclusive class or of arbitrary selection by a school examination administered to the pupil at an early age.

Democracy means, not a neglect of the problems of selection, but rather a complete mastery of these problems. We may accept the criticisms of those who see the defects of our system without seeking a remedy through imitation of European practices. It is the opportunity of democracy to set up a new plan of selection which shall recognize every individual and at the same time avoid the waste of treating all individuals alike during the period of education.

The program thus projected will require a more elaborate school organization than we now have in order to provide adequate special opportunities for selected individuals. Our elective system, now well under way, furnishes the administrative model on which we can proceed in meeting this demand.

The second criticism, that we do not train skilled workers, must be met by an enlargement of the school program through the introduction of vocational courses. This movement has now passed beyond its beginnings, but it is crude in its methods and confused in many of its conceptions.

It seems not unlikely that this program will call for a recasting of industry as well as for the development of industrial courses. The present industrial and wage systems are insistent in their demands for narrowly specialized workers. The future is likely to make clear to industry that some of its methods will have to be adapted to the individual. Industrial evolution and educational evolution will take place together in the fuller democracy that is at hand. Complete democracy will never result merely from the training of workers to obey the present demands of industry.

This statement needs to be made with resounding emphasis because there is grave danger that manufacturers will try to control education in the effort to fit it to the present scheme of industry. Evidences have not been lacking in recent years that certain shortsighted advocates of a narrow industrial education are willing to throw aside all the ideals of a broad popular education which have been evolved in the course of American history in order to set up a thoroughly undemocratic system of narrow trade training. These shortsighted people will ultimately come to recognize, first, that a narrow trade training is impossible in a democracy. Such a plan is at home in lands where class distinctions are forcibly maintained, but not in America. They will learn, secondly, that industry itself must inevitably require for its own proper evolution more general intelligence on the part both of producers and consumers.

This is no place to advocate at length any particular reform. It will not be out of place, however, to suggest that industry will be given its proper place in our social scheme only when it is dignified by all the intelligence which science and study can bring to its support. When this is fully understood, children in the schools will study more science; they will have reading material which will acquaint them with industry; they will consider the problems of industrial and social life with the same intellectual seriousness that they now devote to abstract matters. Furthermore, while studying science and reading and industry the

pupils will know that they are preparing for practical life. The school will thus contribute to industry but will not be converted into a workshop. Pupils will learn industry and respect it without being enslaved by its present-day narrow routine.

The third criticism, that our control of education is vacillating, must be taken very seriously. From the beginning American schools have been under local control. This has made for democracy in some measure, for the schools have been very near to the people. But the result has been in many cases nothing less than calamitous. There are boards of education that fatten on the community because democracy has intrusted them with a public responsibility which is little defined and correspondingly flexible. A good board can do the community a great service; a bad board can work endless mischief. What is true of the board of education is true of all officials connected with the school system.

There is only one corrective for this. We are sure, in this matter as in others, to reject the example of Europe. There local irregularities are avoided by concentrating authority in the hands of a dictator. Local interests are regulated by this superior central authority.

American schools are seeking and finding an adequate substitute for arbitrary central control in a body of scientific principles which will ultimately compel even the most obstinate local board to obey established principles. We have standards of classroom work which are derived from a careful impersonal study of what pupils do in all parts of the country. In like fashion we are working out standards of administration. In such concrete matters as school costs and the construction of school buildings we know what is right. We are coming to estimate teachers' qualifications and courses of study on definite, well-established principles. Standards of this type drawn from the study of experience are more cogent in the long run than the dicta of central authority.

One of the most striking facts with regard to American education is that the science of education has flourished only in this, the youngest of the great civilizations. Germany has no science of education. All her schools are official and assumed to be right in organization and satisfactory in results. Other European nations are somewhat of the same mind about their educational systems. It has remained for America to commit all the sins in the educational calendar and to develop also the beginnings of impersonal scientific methods of exposing and finally correcting these shortcomings. The irregularities of past practice in American education are fully compensated for by the science of education, which is one of America's largest contributions to democracy.

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DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN ENGLAND

By

EDITH ABBOTT

Lecturer in Sociology
The University of Chicago

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DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN ENGLAND

Two years before the beginning of the Great War a prominent Liberal member of the British House of Commons published a book called *Democratic England*. The author was well known in America because of his frequent visits here, and his book has fortunately been widely read in this country and has helped to remove some of our national misunderstandings of British social policy. In particular, this book helped those Americans who had no time for the reading of official reports and parliamentary debates to understand that England was proceeding much more rapidly to embody our democratic ideals into social legislation than were many, if not most, of our American states. *Democratic England* sketched briefly but vividly those vast schemes of social amelioration undertaken by Liberal England during the decade that preceded the war—provision for the aged through old-age pensions; for the sick through an extensive scheme of national health insurance; for the unemployed through a national system of labor exchanges and insurance against unemployment; for the underpaid, sweated workers by the establishment of minimum-wage boards; for the children of the state by the prohibition of child labor, by a great national effort to prevent infant mortality, including birth-registration and the establishment of municipal milk depots, by the provision of free meals and proper medical care for school children. There was a picture, too, of the well-governed British cities with their directly democratic and incorrupt councils proceeding toward municipal ownership of gas, water, electricity, street railways, decent and attractive houses for working people, harbors, docks, public markets, wash houses, cemeteries, and the provision of "free libraries, recreation grounds and parks, and fifty other public services tending to improve the condition of the town population and to increase the honesty and efficiency of local government."

Americans have often looked upon England very much as a child regards his grandmother—as providing opportunities for pleasant holidays but as altogether "behind the times" in the presence of the vigorous and buoyant ideals of youth. Moreover, because our English cousins are inclined to depreciate their government and to criticize their political leaders instead of glorying them, it became traditionary among us that

in the field of social legislation it was to the Germans, who talked so generously and so persistently about their system of state socialism and state insurance, and not to the English that America should look for lessons in social reform.

SOCIAL LEGISLATION THE RESULT OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

It is the purpose of this paper to review briefly some of the English legislation that has set standards in the democratic control of industry far in advance of our own and to show that, in spite of the insistence on German *sociale Fürsorge* before the war, England had quietly provided a much more adequate scheme of social insurance than Germany. It would be unfortunate, indeed, if we continued to accept the erroneous theory that social legislation is a peculiarly German product and therefore to be shunned by every democratic nation. As a matter of fact social legislation in England is an evidence of the growth and expansion of democracy. Much of this legislation is industrial, protecting the workers and tending to raise the standard of life even for the poorest wage-earners. But it is democratic, not paternalistic, legislation; it is "the conscious and deliberate substitution, in industrial as well as political matters, of the collective self-government of the community as a whole, organized on a democratic basis, for the individual control over other men's lives which the unrestrained private ownership of land and industrial capital inevitably involves."

Mr. Sidney Webb has traced, in an interesting chapter of the *Cambridge Modern History*, the growth in England of the desire to extend the spirit of democracy from the political to the industrial sphere and from relationships that are merely political to those which are definitely industrial or social.

> In the United Kingdom [says Mr. Webb] we have been silently extending the power of the people to regulate, by means of their elected representatives, the conditions under which they work and live. . . . . Although the power that kept the worker in the unregulated factory for fourteen or fifteen hours, or that subjected him to insanitary conditions, was not the tyranny of king or priest or noble, the wage-earner felt that it was tyranny all the same, and he has sought to curb it, and to enlarge the individual liberty that he enjoyed, by the substitution of collective for individual control . . . . the application of representative democracy to all the industrial conditions of the worker's life.

ENGLAND'S PIONEER FACTORY ACTS

The powerful new impetus to social reform that came with the Liberal and labor victories in the general election of 1906 has not passed

unnoticed in this country; but, if we go back for nearly three-quarters of a century, we shall find industrial standards for the protection of wage-earning women and children, fixed by the British Parliament during the period from 1833 to 1850, superior to our twentieth-century standards in the United States. For example, our Supreme Court has practically declared that the federal government cannot constitutionally abolish child labor, and the Federal Child Labor Law, so tardily passed by our American Congress, was entirely nullified in June of the present year (1918) by the Supreme Court decision in the case of the *United States* v. *Dagenhart*. In England, on the other hand, a long series of statutes following the great Factory Act of 1833 have progressively regulated the conditions under which children may be employed, prohibited their employment below a minimum age, limited their hours of work, and prohibited night work and work on dangerous machines. These things the industrial democracy of Great Britain has done for its children for more than half a century. Perhaps it is because our Constitution is, after all, less subject to democratic control than the English constitution that the Supreme Court can say to our elected representatives in Congress, "You cannot prohibit child labor in the states that wish to continue the anti-social policy of allowing young children to work by day and by night in the cotton mills."

That redoubtable social critic, Mr. H. G. Wells, during his visit to this country some ten years ago, blundered, he said, "upon the weakest spot in America's fine front of national well-being" when he began to ask questions about our child-labor laws. "My eyes were opened," he said, "to the childish newsboys who sold me papers, and the little boot-blacks at the street corners. . . . . I began to realize another aspect of that great theory of the liberty of property and the subordination of the state to business, upon which American institutions are based. That theory has no regard for children." Mr. Wells pursued the subject with interest:

> Before I had done with the question I had come upon amazing things. Just think of it! The richest, greatest country the world has ever seen, has over 1,700,000 children under fifteen years of age toiling in fields, factories, mines, and workshops. . . . . In the worst days of cotton-milling in England the conditions were hardly worse than those now existing in the South. Children, the tiniest and frailest, ... rise in the morning and, like old men and women, go to the mills to do their day's labor; and when they return home "wearily fling themselves on their beds, too tired to take off their clothes." Many children work all night . . . . "in the maddening racket of the machinery, in an atmosphere insanitary and clouded with humidity and dirt."

. . . . One million seven hundred thousand children, practically uneducated, are toiling over here, and growing up darkened, marred, and dangerous, into the American future I am seeking to forecast.

Thus wrote one of the prophets of English social democracy in his interesting book *The Future in America*, and after ten years America must still plead guilty to this indictment.

THE PROTECTION OF THE WAGE-EARNING WOMAN

Great Britain also took the lead in the policy of extending democratic control over industry to prevent the exploitation of the wage-earning woman as well as of the wage-earning child. In a brief presented to the New York Court of Appeals in 1914, Justice Brandeis, before he became a member of the Supreme Court of the United States, made the following statement, showing that Great Britain furnished a precedent for all the nations of the world in establishing proper safeguards for women's labor. "The British law of 1844 was," he said, "the first statute in any country limiting the hours of labor for adult women. It provided for all women employed in textile mills a period of rest at night between 8:30 P.M. and 5:30 A.M., and it restricted work to twelve hours in one day. By successive enactments between 1847 and 1907 further restrictions were introduced." In our country the Massachusetts Ten-Hour Law of 1874, the first act that "effectively" restricted the hours of labor for women in the United States, was enacted thirty years after the English regulations had gone on the statute book and the Massachusetts act was grudgingly passed only after a decade of vigorous protest and agitation.

Other European countries followed English example—France in 1848, one of the Swiss cantons in 1848, and the Swiss republic in 1877, Austria in 1885, Holland in 1887, Germany in 1891, and Italy in 1902. But these other European countries, although they restricted the hours of labor, did not provide so short a working-day or working-week as the earlier English statutes required. The German law of 1891, for example, provided for an eleven-hour workday with a ten-hour Saturday, or a sixty-five-hour week. Such legislation as this, we may well remind ourselves, was "of the stuff on which England grew great in the eyes of the strong and noble in the eyes of the weak."

England also led the way in abolishing night work for women in 1844; and her example was tardily followed in the other countries of Western Europe, and, to our shame, more tardily in our own country. Thus night work for women was not abolished in Germany until nearly fifty years after the English prohibition had become effective, and our

first American statute against night work for women, a law protecting the women workers in the great textile state of Massachusetts, was not passed until 1890.

HOW AMERICA HAS LAGGED BEHIND

A little stock-taking in the matter of our industrial legislation may be a useful war-time lesson for us in America. Although England prohibited night work for women seventy-four years ago, in only ten of our states has this standard been accepted even in the twentieth century. Important industrial states, like Illinois, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and of course all the southern states, allow women to work by night in their great mills and factories. In Illinois one legislature after another has refused to pass a law prohibiting night work for women even in times of peace. In contrast with this attitude of neglect in our supposedly more democratic state it is significant that England has thought it important even in war time to investigate carefully the effects of the employment of women at night in the war industries and to adopt protecting safeguards. Thus the Health of Munition Workers Committee, with Sir George Newman as chairman, reported last year on the subject of night work as follows:

> The imperative necessity of war has renewed, after almost a century of disuse, the night employment of women in factories. . . . . It was banished by the international agreement for twelve European countries which signed the Convention drawn up at the International Conference held at Berne in 1906. . . . . The agreement was based upon the results of inquiries into the effects, economical, physical, and moral, of night work for women. The reports showed deterioration in health caused by the difficulty of securing sufficient rest by day; disturbance of home life, with its injurious effects upon the children; and diminished value of the work done . . . . the common experience being that night work was inferior to day work. Now once more all these half-forgotten facts are in evidence in the Munition Factories. . . . . The employment of women at night is, without question, undesirable, yet now it is for a time inevitable; and the Committee have therefore directed their efforts to the consideration of those safeguards which would reduce its risks to a minimum.

Not only is night work still legal in Illinois in time of peace as well as in war, but it is legal here for women to work seventy hours a week, a longer working-week than England allowed in 1844. The British Committee on the Health of Munition Workers condemned, even under the stress of war conditions, long hours, Sunday work, and night work for women, all legal in Illinois today. It will be interesting, indeed, if it

is left to the greatest war in history to bring home to the legislature of Illinois its reactionary policy in the face of England's more democratic legislation on behalf of wage-earning women.

THE MINIMUM WAGE A LAST STEP IN THE STATE REGULATION OF INDUSTRY

Britain, with her Australian colonies, also led the world in extending democratic control over industry to the regulation of wages. The Trade Boards Act of 1909, in which Parliament provided machinery for the fixing of a minimum wage for both men and women in low-paid industries, was followed by the Coal Mines (Minimum-Wage) Act of 1911, and by the Corn Production Act of last year in which the minimum-wage principle was extended to agricultural labor. Minimum-wage legislation in England is looked upon merely as a further step in the extension of state control over industry, which has been the national policy for a hundred years. The important Parliamentary Committee that recommended the Minimum-Wage (Trade Boards) Act of 1909 made the following important declaration of principle as a basis for this legislation:

> Upon the question of the general policy of Parliament fixing or providing for the fixing of a minimum rate of payment for work, below which it should be illegal to employ people, your Committee are of the opinion that it is quite as legitimate to establish by legislation a minimum standard of remuneration as it is to establish such a standard of sanitation, cleanliness, ventilation, airspace, and hours of work. If it be said that there may be Industries which cannot be carried on if such a standard of payment be enforced, it may be replied that this was said when the enactment of many of the provisions of the Factory and similar Acts were proposed, and public opinion supported Parliament in deciding that, if the prognostication were an accurate one, it would be better that any trade which could not exist if such a minimum of decent and humane conditions were insisted upon should cease. Parliament, with the full approval of the nation, has practically so decided again and again, when enactments have been passed forbidding the carrying on of specified industries, unless certain minimum conditions as to health, safety, and comfort are complied with. It is doubtful whether there is any more important condition of individual and general well-being than the possibility of obtaining an income sufficient to enable those who earn it to secure, at any rate, the necessaries of life. If a trade will not yield such an income to average industrious workers engaged in it, it is a parasitic industry, and it is contrary to the general well-being that it should continue.

This generous acceptance of minimum-wage legislation as a part of the policy of the democratic regulation of industry is especially important

because up to the period of the outbreak of the European war England was the only European nation that had adopted the principle of state control over wages; and in the United States all efforts to secure legislation were interrupted for five years (1913–18) by the attempt, happily unsuccessful, to have the Oregon Minimum-Wage Law declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court.

SOCIAL INSURANCE NOT MADE IN GERMANY

England led the civilized nations of the world and is still in advance of most of them, including our own, in the establishment of social control over industry through the establishment of a minimum wage, the prohibition of long hours and night work for working-women, and the prohibition of child labor. In the field of social insurance Germany took the lead, and unfortunately social insurance is still supposed to carry the trade-mark "Made in Germany."

Bismarck introduced social insurance into Germany in the early eighties in the hope of stifling German social democracy. The repressive statute against Social Democratic propaganda was to be sugar-coated by a rather imposing scheme of social welfare as a generous gift from the autocratic state. In the words of Bismarck, the purpose of the social insurance legislation was "to bribe the working classes or, if you like, to win them over to regard the state as a social institution existing for their sake and interested in their welfare." The same motive is frankly stated in the familiar sentence of the Imperial Message of November 17, 1881: "The cure of social ills must be sought not exclusively in the repression of Social Democratic excesses, but simultaneously in the positive advancement of the welfare of the working classes." Such was the undemocratic background of the German social legislation of the eighties.

A DEMOCRATIC OLD-AGE PENSION SYSTEM

Social insurance came more slowly in England and not after the high-handed Prussian manner, but along more generous and more democratic lines. The difference is most clearly seen in a comparison between the old-age pension systems of England and Germany.

In England every man and every woman who reaches the age of seventy years and who has an income of less than £31 10*s*. ($153.29) a year can present to his local Pensions Committee his claim, as a right, to an old-age pension; and the entire cost of these pensions is borne by the state. "The most genuinely universal of all our forms of Social Insurance," says the *English Labour Yearbook* in referring

to the Old-Age Pensions Act of 1908. In Germany, on the other hand, the cost of old-age pensions is largely paid by the workingmen themselves by compulsory deductions from their wages. No one can claim an old-age pension (even the smallest pension, which is valued at $26.18 a year) who has not been able to pay his contributions regularly—forty weeks in the year for thirty years. He must have paid in a total of 1,200 contributions. The result is that relatively few people are eligible to old-age pensions in Germany. The men in the vast undertow of labor, the mass of men who are not in regular work and who frequently have no wages from which compulsory contributions can be made, have no claim on the old-age pension fund when they grow old. Even less frequently is the aged woman entitled to an old-age pension under a system which provides that the cost of the pension must be saved largely out of the wages of the poor.

In 1908, when the British Old-Age Pension Law was introduced into Parliament, Mr. Asquith, who was then home secretary, explained the German pension system with all its limitations. But England found more instructive for her purposes, he said, the pension schemes introduced into Denmark in 1891 and into the British Australian Colonies of New Zealand, New South Wales, and Victoria in 1898 and the years following. In these more liberal schemes no contribution was required from the pensioner; the state bore the whole burden. The English pension law was, therefore, modeled along more comprehensive lines in order that the casual and low-paid workers and, in particular, the aged women should not be largely excluded from its benefits. The result is that in the United Kingdom in 1914, 990,000 aged men and women were receiving old-age pensions weekly at the post-offices all over the country, while in Germany in the same year there were only 87,261 old-age pensions being paid. If allowance be made for the number of persons over seventy who are drawing invalidity pensions in Germany, the number of pensioners there might reach a total of 290,000. And it must be remembered that the population of Germany is greater by twenty million than that of the United Kingdom.

A further point of difference is the greater liberality of the English pensions. Old-age pensions in Germany range from $26.18 to $54.64. In England the pension before the war was a five-shilling-a-week allowance, $63.40 a year; pension increases since the war make possible now a pension of seven shillings and sixpence a week, or $94.60 a year. The inevitable result of the inadequacy of the German pensions is that the aged pensioners are only too frequently obliged to ask assistance as paupers from the poor-relief authorities.

LLOYD GEORGE'S SCHEME FOR INSURING A NATION

England has not only improved upon the German system of old-age pensions, but in the field of sickness insurance Parliament also proceeded along simpler, more generous, and more democratic lines. When Lloyd George introduced the English National Insurance Bill he called attention to some important respects in which it would differ from the German system. In Germany there is a complicated division of the wage-earners into five classes, each class paying a different rate of contribution and receiving a different benefit. Under the English scheme there are no class divisions; contributions and benefits are the same for all. Lloyd George explained in Parliament his reason for not adopting the German system. The difficulty was, he said, that in Germany the man with very low wages, the man most in need of assistance, received only the lowest class of benefits, "and when you come down to these lower classes the benefits are so small that the workmen in Germany say that they prefer to resort to parish relief as the benefits are much too inadequate." The German system, said Lloyd George, would not be acceptable in England since it did not "give to the poorer workers a minimum allowance to keep their families from want." The proposed English plan offered benefits for all classes greater than the benefits provided in Germany only for the highest class of contributors. Moreover, in England the state was to be a substantial contributor to the fund, whereas in Germany the state contributed nothing to the sickness insurance funds and paid only a meager contribution to the invalidity and old-age insurance. That is, when Lloyd George introduced his bill, the contribution of the German state to the whole social insurance scheme was only about £2,500,000 and that included old-age pensions. In Great Britain at that time the state was paying the entire cost of old-age pensions, £13,000,000 a year, and it was proposed to add to this large sum another £5,500,000 for the state's contribution to national insurance, making a total for England of £18,500,000 for social insurance for a population of 45,000,000, while Germany was paying only £2,500,000 toward the social insurance provided for 65,000,000 people.

German discussion of the English Health Insurance Bill in 1911 acknowledged the superiority of the English scheme. Opinion in Germany was that "owing to its directness, its simplicity, and its comprehensiveness, it was definitely superior to what one German newspaper, the *Tageblatt*, called the 'bureaucratic hotchpotch of the German Insurance system'" (see speech of Sir Rufus Isaacs in the House of Commons, May 24, 1911).

THE INADEQUACY OF GERMANY'S SOCIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM

That pauperism was on the increase in Germany before the war, in spite of the social insurance legislation, was acknowledged by Ministerialrat Dr. Friedrich Zahn in a paper on "Workingmen's Insurance and Poor Relief," read at the International Congress on Hygiene and Demography at Washington in 1912. With true German thoroughness Dr. Zahn labored to explain that, although the number of paupers and the expenditure on poor relief had been increasing disproportionately to the population increase, nevertheless German social insurance had reduced pauperism, because had there been no insurance the number of destitute would have increased more rapidly!

Dr. Zahn's paper showed clearly that working people were obliged to ask assistance from the poor law because their insurance benefits were so inadequate. Statistics from the city of Berlin were quoted to show the number of cases "in which insurance benefits have not prevented the recipients from becoming a charge upon the poor law, and," he adds, "some indication is given of the extent to which this may be attributed to insufficiency of the amount of the individual's benefits." Among the old-age pensioners in Berlin 8 per cent of the men and 19 per cent of the women were receiving poor-law grants at the time the pension was granted. "Abandonment of the poor grants upon the receipt of the [old-age] pensions occurred only in isolated cases."

The fact that relief under the poor laws is needed, not only by those described by Dr. Zahn as "the uninsured lower classes," but also by those who actually are receiving insurance benefits, cannot be attributed to the fact that poor relief carries with it less disgrace in Germany than elsewhere. Dr. Zahn explained in his Washington paper that the German poor laws provided that relief should be "granted only in case of extreme want and only bare necessities shall be granted." The destitute person is

> merely a recipient of charity with no legal right nor any means of compelling the authorities to grant relief. . . . . The eleemosynary character of poor relief imposes certain civil disabilities upon the recipient. Poverty is a disgrace. The disabilities concern chiefly electoral rights in the Empire, in the State, in the commune, and in the Church. Other curtailments of civil rights affect the service as a juror, membership in the industrial and commercial courts, and, finally, the acquisition of settlement. . . . . The basis for a grant of poor relief is proof of individual need and of the incapacity of the applicant to supply his essential wants. The destitute person must therefore submit to a searching inquiry into all his personal relations both economic and legal, however distasteful this inquiry may be.

How frequently the poorest workers find themselves outside the provisions of the social insurance laws and how important the problem of "the uninsured lower classes" is to the German poor-relief authorities is indicated by Dr. Zahn's picture of the exasperated officials in what he calls "the small poverty-stricken communes in rural districts" because of the persistence of poor-relief charges in spite of the social insurance schemes.

NATIONAL LABOR EXCHANGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

Within the limits of this paper it is not possible to review the whole of England's social reform legislation nor to point out any but the most obvious differences between English and German policies. A word should be said, however, as to England's pioneer experiment in the social insurance field—her bold venture in establishing a system of unemployment insurance as part of the National Insurance Act of 1911. In the German Empire there has been no statutory provision for insurance of this kind. The unemployed workman was left to the municipalities, and in general the small local experiments which attempted to provide what was called unemployment insurance in the German cities were more properly described by English observers as the provision of special relief or distress funds. The imperial government had accepted the theory that insurance against unemployment was desirable but impracticable. The report on this subject issued by the German Imperial Statistical Office in 1906 set out the difficulties involved in defining and limiting the unemployment which should entitle one to insurance and the difficulties in the way of "regulating the obligation to accept the work offered." England took a great step forward in this field when the national system of labor exchanges was established in 1909. The labor exchanges of Germany were chiefly municipal although encouraged to some extent by the imperial government. Very efficient exchanges were to be found in some cities and less efficient ones in others. The English system was enormously superior from the start because it provided for a national system of co-ordinated offices controlled by a central authority.

The successful establishment of a national system of labor exchanges in England made possible the establishment of a national system of unemployment insurance. Where Germany had hesitated, England was prepared to go boldly forward. And it should not be overlooked in discussing the English labor exchanges that on the eve of the Great War England had already organized the machinery necessary for that vast

industrial mobilization which was needed to munition her own new armies and the armies of her Allies. Since our own entrance into the war we have been laboriously trying in America to build up a system of federal employment offices to meet the industrial needs of war time. England was prepared at the outbreak of the war to mobilize her industrial army through her well-organized national labor exchanges as she is prepared safely to demobilize all her armies through her system of unemployment insurance. Social legislation written on the statute books for humanitarian purposes in time of peace proved a most valuable kind of preparedness for the urgent demands of war.

The illustrations which have been given of the growth of England's social policy are necessarily limited. They have only served to indicate the main lines of development and to take some note of their significance. In our relations toward England, we have been too long blinded by our old prejudices, "too long harnessed to old thoughts and old words." We have not learned to know the new England of the new century. "Early Victorian England," wrote Mr. Sidney Webb in 1901, "now lies in effect centuries behind us." "During the last twenty or thirty years we have become a new people. . . . . The England of this generation is changing because Englishmen have had revealed to them another new world of relationships, of which they were before unconscious. We have become aware, almost in a flash, that we are not merely individuals, but members of a community." And Mr. Webb believes that in this community there is a new ideal of national efficiency—the ideal of a national minimum of wages, of leisure, and of conditions of health and safety, democratically prescribed.

THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF ENGLISH WOMEN

Further evidence of England's rapid progress toward social democracy may be found in the extension of political rights to women. The contrast between England and Germany in this respect is so well known that we need not discuss it here. What we often overlook, however, is the fact that England has responded more generously to the demands of her women citizens than have most of our American states. Women all over Great Britain will be voting for members of Parliament before the end of this calendar year, while in our own country, women will not vote for members of Congress, except in a few progressive states. Not only in the matter of the parliamentary vote, but in the field of local politics as well English women have advantages superior to our own. Women have been a part of the county council electorate in England since 1889,

and since 1907 women have been sitting as members of county councils. At the present time there are five women sitting as members of the London County Council; while, in contrast, although Chicago women have had the right to vote in municipal elections for the past five years, we have not been able to elect a woman to any office. In England women have been sitting as poor-law guardians since the year 1875, and ten years ago two-thirds of the boards of guardians had women members elected by the votes of both men and women.

Americans have watched with interest the growth since 1906 of the powerful labor *bloc* in the House of Commons; and that vigorous manifesto, "Labor and the New Social Order," is being weighed and considered by all the diverse groups in this country that are concerned with questions of social policy. Very important for us are the sections of that manifesto dealing with the universal enforcement of the national minimum and the democratic control of industry, for this English program of the future rests upon a present national minimum and a present measure of state control considerably in advance of generally accepted American standards. It may well be that England and America are destined to travel together toward that Street of Tomorrow which is so boldly sketched in the *Labor Memorandum:* "We are members one of another. No man liveth to himself alone. If any, even the humblest, is made to suffer, the whole community and every one of us, whether or not we recognize that fact, is thereby injured. Generation after generation this has been the cornerstone of the faith of British Labor." Surely the voice of British labor will hear an answering echo from the West!

THE WAR AND THE NEW SOCIAL ORDER

It is not enough to discuss social progress in England on the basis of pre-war legislation alone. The historian of the future will recount that from the very earliest days of the great struggle against autocracy plans for a new, a better, and a more democratic England were going steadily forward. Mr. Herbert Fisher, speaking in the House of Commons on the government's new Education Bill, noted this national hunger and thirst for a new social righteousness. "One might have imagined," he said, "that the war would have so occupied and exhausted the mind of the country as to leave room for no other thought. But this has not been the case. The war has had the very opposite effect. Quite naturally, and it seems to me quite rightly, this great calamity has directed attention to every circumstance which may bear upon national strength or national welfare. It has exhibited the full range of our deficiencies, and

it has prompted us to take stock of all the available agencies for their improvement." This is as it should be, and the progress of social legislation has been almost spectacular during these four years of war.

The Education Bill of 1918 is perhaps the best illustration of the new legislation that is designed to make England worthy of her dead sons. This bill, which became a law in August, 1918, requires compulsory school attendance for all children between the ages of five and fourteen without any exemptions whatsoever. Children who go to work at the age of fourteen are to remain under the control of the education authorities by the requirement of two hundred and eighty hours of attendance at continuation schools each year for boys and girls between the ages of fourteen and sixteen; and, after 1925, the requirement is to be three hundred and twenty hours of school attendance each year for young persons between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. The bill is also liberal in its social aspects. Local authorities may provide and maintain holiday or school camps, centers for physical training, and other facilities for social and physical training. Two other important points should be noted. The first is that the requirements of the Education Act are mandatory all over England. In America we have high standards in a few states, for example in Ohio or Massachusetts, while we tolerate the standards of Georgian England in the cotton states of the South. Parliament has required all local authorities to give certain minimum educational opportunities to all the children of England. The second point is that the Education Bill was prepared in spite of the fact that England's effort was consecrated to the great task of winning the greatest war of history. There were those in England who opposed the bill on the ground that it was not a war measure; but the conservative *London Times* said recently in commenting on this opposition:

> Today such views are seen to be both superficial and shortsighted. If education is allowed to wait, children do not wait for it: they grow up uneducated; and if we have learnt one thing from the war, it is that the uneducated are a danger to the State. Again, the Education Act is essentially a war-measure; for without it, in our judgment, we could neither reap the fruits of victory nor re-establish the new England on the solid foundations which alone remain to us from the old.

The *Times*, however, does not minimize the fact that the new bill is little short of revolutionary for some of the great industrial districts of England, and its editorial verdict follows:

> No one who has read the story of the Factory Acts, or understands how English industry has been built up on child labour can fail to realize the extent

of the revolution made by these enactments in the lives of our people. English industrial prosperity owes vast and unpaid debts to the children who slaved for it in the past; but we have learnt by now that immature and cheap labour is not profitable in the long run even to its employer. And there is no one now to argue that such labour is profitable either to the nation that allows its existence or to the children whose wings are singed before ever they have learnt to expand.

Let us hope that the *Times* is right in forecasting that the Education Bill of 1918 is destined "to influence for good the lives of countless men and women in the unknown future, and to play no inconsiderable part in the rebuilding of all that has been shattered in English life during the last four years of violence and upheaval."

The Education Bill does not stand alone as evidence of England's social progress under the stress of war sacrifices. There is also the increase in old-age pensions, the extension of unemployment insurance, the Corn Production (Minimum-Wage) Act of 1917, and the new Trade Boards Act of 1918 by which the protection of the minimum wage is extended to an additional two million workers. In the midst of the tremendous burdens of war, England has found time for an official Committee and Ministry of Reconstruction, who have been busy opening new windows toward that better England which is to come with the peace. It is, indeed, as if we saw the slow coming into life and tangible reality of the old dream of the poet:

> I shall not cease from mental strife
> Nor shall the sword sleep in my hand
> Till I have built Jerusalem
> In England's green and pleasant land.

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